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This	 toolkit	 is	 a	 compilation	 of	 information	 about	 INA	 §	240A(a),	 or	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal	 for	 lawful	 permanent	 residents	 (LPR).	 The	 toolkit	 is	 intended	 to	 serve	 as	 a	
resource	 for	 immigration	 attorneys	 representing	 LPR	 clients	 facing	 removal	 from	 the	
United	 States.	 In	 addition	 to	 describing	 the	 LPR	 Cancellation	 statute,	 the	 toolkit	 also	
provides	 information	 about	 aggravated	 felonies,	 the	 discretionary	 component	 of	
Cancellation,	 individuals	 who	 are	 ineligible	 for	 LPR	 Cancellation,	 options	 available	 to	
those	 who	 are	 ineligible	 for	 LPR	 Cancellation,	 applicable	 regulations,	 the	 Florence	




updated	 case	 law	 and	 government	 forms,	 alternative	 remedies,	 information	 on	
obtaining	 client	 records,	 new	 evidence	 section,	 and	 additional	 suggested	 litigation	






























Penn	 State	 Law’s	 Center	 for	 Immigrants’	 Rights	 Clinic	 is	 directed	 by	 Professor	 Shoba	
Sivaprasad	Wadhia.	At	the	Center,	students	produce	white	papers,	practitioner	toolkits,	
and	 primers	 of	 national	 impact	 for	 institutional	 clients.	 Students	 at	 the	 Center	 also	
engage	 in	 community	 outreach	 and	 education	 on	 immigration	 topics	 such	 as	
immigration	enforcement	and	prosecutorial	discretion.	Finally,	the	Center	provides	legal	




The	Pennsylvania	 Immigration	Resource	Center	 (PIRC)	 is	 located	 less	 than	a	mile	 from	
York	County	Prison	and	has	become	the	 leading	source	of	 legal	services	to	 immigrants	
detained	by	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	in	Pennsylvania.	PIRC	offers	pro	bono	







available	 only	 upon	 request	 from	 the	 Center	 for	 Immigrants’	 Rights	 at	
centerforimmigrantsr@pennstatelaw.psu.edu.	 Part	 2	 contains	 suggested	 litigation	




























Removal	 is	 a	 subheading	 and	 contains	 a	 brief	 description	 of	 critical	 case	 law	











addresses	 the	most	 critical	 components	of	 the	 statutory	elements.	All	 case	 law	 in	 the	
2016	edition	was	Shepardized	and	screened	for	additional	developments.	
	
Additionally,	 the	 case	 law	 section	 is	 arranged	 in	 two	 fashions:	 (1)	 arranged	 by	 court	
authority	 and	 (2)	 arranged	by	 statutory	 element.	 In	 the	 case	 law	 section	 arranged	by	
statutory	 element,	 we	 have	 further	 split	 each	 statutory	 element	 into	 sub-topics.	 For	
example,	 in	 the	case	 law	section	which	addresses	 the	statutory	element	“has	been	an	
alien	 lawfully	 admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence	 for	 not	 less	 than	 5	 years”	 the	 sub-
topics	 include:	 (A)	 Conditional	 Lawful	 Permanent	 Residents,	 (B)	 Burden	 of	 Proof	 for	
Abandonment	of	Lawful	Permanent	Resident	Status,	and	(C)	Ability	to	Impute	a	Parent’s	





The	Practice	Advisory	section	of	 the	 toolkit,	Part	1,	Roman	Numeral	VI,	 includes	“how	
to”	instructions	and	additional	helpful	information	on	how	to	help	get	your	client	out	of	
detention.	 This	 section	 has	 three	 subheadings.	 Section	 (a)	 includes	 information	 about	
how	 to	 prepare	 an	 LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 application,	 supporting	 documents,	
required	 biometric	 and	 biographical	 information,	 fees,	 and	 serving	 and	 filing	 the	






The	 Advice	 of	 Practitioners	 section,	 Part	 2,	 Roman	 Numeral	 II,	 Section	 (a),	 includes	
suggested	 litigation	 strategies,	 best	 practices,	 and	 helpful	 tips	 in	 preparing	 the	
application	 and	 for	 court	 hearings.	 This	 section	 has	 been	 split	 up	 into	 subtopics	 that	
address	 different	 issues	 ranging	 from	 alternative	 remedies	 to	 the	 use	 of	 affidavits.	







evidence	 that	was	 suggested	by	 different	 attorneys.	 Attorneys	who	participated	were	





other	documents	submitted	 to	 the	 Immigration	Court.	At	 the	beginning	of	 the	sample	
legal	documents	section	is	a	brief	description	of	each	legal	document	contained.	Briefs	




This	Toolkit	 is	 limited	 in	 its	scope	as	 it	 is	primarily	focused	on	Cancellation	of	Removal	
for	Lawful	Permanent	Residents.	Moreover,	it	is	not	a	substitute	for	reading	the	primary	











In	 1996,	 Congress	 enacted	 two	 major	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 that	 modified	 the	
statutory	 requirements	 of	 relief	 from	 removal.	 The	 1996	 enactment	 of	 the	 Illegal	
Immigration	 Reform	 and	 Immigrant	 Responsibility	 Act	 (IIRIRA)	 merged	 the	 former	
§	212(c)	 waiver-of-deportation	 and	 suspension-of-deportation	 methods	 of	 relief,	 and	
consolidated	 them	 into	 a	 statutory	 scheme	 called	 “Cancellation	 of	 Removal.”1	 One	
form	 of	 relief	 is	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 for	 Lawful	 Permanent	 Residents	 (LPR)	 and	
another	 form	 of	 relief	 is	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 for	 Non-LPRs.	 The	 other	 major	
piece	 of	 legislation	was	the	Anti-Terrorism	and	Effective	Death	Penalty	Act	(AEDPA).2	
	
Both	 IIRIRA	 and	 AEDPA	 greatly	 expanded	 the	 enumerated	 crimes	 falling	 under	
“aggravated	 felony,”	 thereby	 limiting	 relief	 for 	 many	 noncitizens	 who	 would	
otherwise	 be	 eligible.	 IIRIRA	 applied	 special	 provisions	 and	 restrictions	 on	
noncitizens	 charged	 with	 aggravated	 felonies.	 For	 instance,	 an	 LPR	 charged	 with	 an	
“aggravated	 felony”	 after	 April	 1,	 1997	 is	 ineligible	 for	 §	240A(a)	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal. 3 	Though	 Congress	 repealed	 §	212(c)	 relief,	 §	212(c)	 relief	 still	 can	 be	
invoked	 in	 some	 instances	 by	 noncitizens	 whose	 convictions	 were	 obtained	 through	




240A(b).	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 for	 non-LPRs	 is	 available	 to	 “an	 alien	 who	 is	
inadmissible	 or	 deportable.”5	Unlike	 §	240A(a),	 which	 applies	 only	 to	 LPRs,	 §	240A(b)	






104-828,	 104th	 Cong.	 2d	 See.	 (1996);	 S.	 Rep.	 104-249,	 104th	 Cong.	 2d	 Sess.	 (1996);	 142	 Cong.	 Rec.	
S4730-01,	§	150	(1996);	142	Cong.	Rec.	H2378-05,	§	309	(1996);	8	U.S.C.	§§	1229b(a),	1229b(b)	(2016);	
INA	§§	240A(a)	and	240A(b).	

















The	 relief	 of	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 under	 INA	 §	240A(a)	 applies	 to	 eligible	
noncitizens	 placed	 in	 removal	 proceedings	 on	 or	 after	 April	 1,	 1997.8	As	 with	 most	
































evidence, 9 	the	 applicant	 has	 the	 burden	 of	 proving	 that	 s/he	 qualifies	 for	 LPR	
Cancellation	of	Removal.10	For	example,	if	charging	that	the	noncitizen	is	removable	for	
conviction	of	an	aggravated	felony,	during	the	removal	proceeding	the	government	has	




For	 a	 practice	 advisory	 about	 burden	 of	 proof	 for	 aggravated	 felonies,	 please	 see:	
National	 Immigration	Project,	Practice	Advisory:	The	Burden	of	Proof	to	Overcome	the	














"Lawfully	 admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence"	 means	 having	 been	 lawfully	 accorded	
the	 entry	 into	 the	 “United	 States	 after	 inspection	 and	 authorized	by	 an	 immigration	
officer.”11	A	 person	 who	 obtains	 lawful	 permanent	 residence	 by	 fraud	 or	mistake	 is	
deemed	 to	 have	 not	 been	 "lawfully	 admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence"	 and	 thus	 is	







23	 I.	&	N.	 Dec.	 548	(BIA	2003));	See	also,	 Ijomah-Nwosa	v.	Holder,	Civ.	No.	14–2527	 (WJM),	2015	WL	
5097925	at	*2	(D.N.J.	2015)	(“Even	though	the	Government	mistakenly	admitted	and	granted	Petitioner	
lawful	permanent	resident	status	as	the	unmarried	child	of	a	U.S.	citizen,	such	status	is	deemed	void	ab	























lawful	 immigration	 status;	 rather	 it	 requires	 an	admission	 in	 "any	 status.”18	Also,	 the	
continuous	residence	 requirement	does	not	apply	 to	a	noncitizen	who	has	 served	24	




Additionally,	 §	240(A)(d)(1),	 also	 known	 as	 the	 Stop	 Time	 Rule,	 sets	 forth	 that	




accrual	 of	 more	 time	 of	 continuous	 residence	 with	 concern	 to	 “an	 application	 for	
Cancellation	of	Removal	filed	in	the	current	proceeding.”21	Further,	an	attorney	should	
be	aware	that	children	applying	for	LPR	Cancellation	of	Removal	must	also	meet	the	7	





























Assessment		 For	 purposes	 of	 LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal,	 this	 noncitizen’s	
continued	residence	clock	stopped	on	January	30,	2006,	when	the	
crime	was	 committed.23	The	 stop-time	 rule	was	 triggered	 7	 years	
and	15	days	after	the	noncitizen	was	admitted	as	a	tourist	into	the	
U.S..	 Thus,	 this	 noncitizen	 has	 accrued	 the	 required	 7	 years	 of	





(3)	Has	Not	 Been	 Convicted	 of	 Any	 Aggravated	Felony	
	
A	lawful	permanent	resident	is	deportable	if	convicted	of	an	aggravated	felony	at	any	
time	 after	 admission.24	Furthermore,	 under	 INA	 §	240A(a)(3),	 an	 LPR	 convicted	 of	 an	
aggravated	felony	is	ineligible	for	Cancellation	of	Removal	relief.	The	list	of	aggravated	
felonies	under	 INA	§	101(a)(43)	expanded	as	a	 result	of	 two	pieces	of	 legislation:	 the	











conviction	may	 be	 classified	 as	 such	 at	 the	 time	 of	 application	 for	 LPR	 Cancellation.	
When	 this	 retroactivity	 occurs,	 the	 previous	 crime	will	 be	 considered	 an	 aggravated	
felony	 and	will	 prevent	 the	 LPR	 from	 successfully	 obtaining	Cancellation	of	Removal.	
Further,	 the	 attorney	 should	 be	 aware	 that	 some	 sections	 contain	 a	 term	 of	




The	 attorney	 should	 be	 cognizant	 that	 not	 all	 state	 convictions	 will	 fall	 within	 the	
meaning	 of	 the	 comparable	 federal	 definition	 of	 aggravated	 felony	 under	 INA	
§	101(a)(43).	 That	 is,	 some	 state	 criminal	 statutes	 will	 not	 be	 a	 close	 enough	
comparison	 to	 the	 INA	 definition	 of	 aggravated	 felony	 for	 the	 applicant	 to	 be	
considered	an	aggravated	felon	for	immigration	purposes.27	To	determine	whether	the	















the	 state	 statute’s	 elements	 fit	 within	 the	 “generic”	 federal	 definition	 of	 the	
corresponding	 aggravated	 felony.29	A	 state	 offense	 is	 a	 categorical	match	 to	 a	 federal	
offense	 only	 if	 the	 state	 offense	 conviction	 “necessarily	 involved…	 facts”	 that	 would	
equate	 to	 the	 generic	 federal	 offense.30	Notably,	 the	adjudicator	will	not	consider	 the	
factual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 respondent’s	 case,	 and	 will	 only	 look	 to	 whether	 the	
statute’s	elements	are	comparable.31	Additionally,	the	respondent	must	show	that	there	
was	 a	 realistic	 probability,	 not	 a	 theoretical	 possibility,	 that	 the	 state	would	 apply	 its	
statute	 to	conduct	 that	 falls	outside	of	 the	generic	definition	of	 the	applicable	 federal	
statute.32	In	 order	 to	 show	 a	 realistic	 probability,	 the	 attorney	 should	 provide	 the	
adjudicator	with	 case	 law	 showing	 that	 circumstances	exist	 in	which	 the	 state	 statute	
would	not	be	applied	in	the	same	manner	in	which	the	federal	statute	was	applied.		
	
An	 example	 of	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Categorical	 Approach	 appears	 in	Moncreiffe	 v.	
























applied	 if	 the	state	 statute	 is	divisible	 into	subsections,	at	 least	one	of	which	contains	
elements	that	trigger	a	match	with	the	generic	definition.36	A	state	statute	is	divisible	if	




Descamps	v.	U.S..	38	There,	 the	Supreme	Court	 found	 that	a	California	burglary	 statute	
was	 indivisible.39	The	 California	 statute	 would	 have	 allowed	 for	 lawful	 and	 unlawful	
entries	to	be	considered	burglary,	unlike	the	federal	statute	that	was	only	applicable	to	
unlawful	 entries.40	Because	 the	 statute	 did	 not	 require	 that	 the	 jury	 decide	 which	
alternative,	 lawful	 or	 unlawful	 entry,	 satisfied	 a	 conviction,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 found	
that	 the	 statute	was	 indivisible.41	If	 the	 statute	 is	determined	 to	be	divisible,	 then	 the	
















































INA	 §	 101(a)(43)(A);	Matter	 of	 Small,	 23	 I.	 &	 N.	 Dec.	 448,	 450	 (BIA	 2002)	 (finding	 that	 sexual	
abuse	 of	 a	minor	 includes	 people	 charged	 with	 misdemeanor	sexual	abuse).	
45	Matter	 of	 Rodriguez-Rodriguez,	 22	 I.	 &	 N.	 	 Dec.	 991,	 995	 (1999);	 see	 also	 Stubbs	 v.	 Attorney	




618	Fed.	Appx.	126,	130	 (3d	Cir.	2015)	 (holding	 that	N.J.	 Stat.	Ann.	§	2C:	35-10(a)(1)	 is	an	aggravated	
felony	under	 INA	§	101(a)(43)(B));	 	Mattie	v.	Attorney	General,	585	Fed.	Appx.	821,	822	(3d	Cir.	2014)	
(holding	 that	 the	noncitizen	 failed	 to	show	that	N.J.	Stat.	Ann	§	2C:35-5(b)(11)	was	not	an	aggravated	
felony);	 	 Lepianka	 v.	Attorney	General,	 586	 Fed.	Appx.	 869,	 871	 (3d	Cir.	 2014)	 (holding	 that	N.J.	 Stat.	
Ann.	§	2C:35-5(a)(1),	and	(b)(2)	are	aggravated	felonies	under	the	INA);	Kporlor	v.	Attorney	General,	529	
Fed.	 Appx.	 173,	 176	 (3d	 Cir.	 2013)	 (holding	 that	 N.J.	 Stat.	 Ann.	 §	 2C:35-5(a)(1)	 and	 (b)(2)	 was	 an	
aggravated	 felony	under	 INA	§	101(a)(43)(B));	Cadet	v.	Attorney	General,	339	Fed.	Appx.	273,	275	 (3d	
Cir.	2009)	(holding	that	N.J.	Stat.	Ann.	§	2C:35-5(b)(3)	is	an	aggravated	felony	within	the	INA);	Marte	v.	










relating	 to	 engaging	 in	monetary	 transactions	 in	 property	 derived	 from	 specific	





• It	 shall	 be	 unlawful	 for	 any	 person	 to	 receive,	 possess,	 transport,	 ship,	
conceal,	 store,	 barter,	 sell,	 dispose	 of,	 pledge	 or	 accept	 as	 security	 for	 a	
loan,	any	stolen	explosive	materials	which	are	moving	as,	which	are	part	of,	
which	constitute,	or	which	have	been	shipped	or	transported	in,	interstate	or	
foreign	 commerce,	 either	 before	 or	 after	 such	 materials	 were	 stolen,	
knowing	or	having	reasonable	cause	to	believe	that	the	explosive	materials	
were	stolen.	(see	18	U.S.C.	842(h));		
unlawful	 for	 a	 person	 who:	 is	 convicted	 of	 a	 crime	 punishable	 by	
imprisonment	for	a	term	exceeding	one	year;	who	is	a	fugitive	from	justice;	
who	is	an	unlawful	user	of	or	addicted	to	any	controlled	substance;	who	has	
been	 adjudicated	 as	 a	 mental	 defective	 or	 who	 has	 been	 committed	 to	 a	
mental	 institution;	an	alien	 (unless	admitted	as	an	LPR	 (INA	§	101(a)(20),	 a	
refugee	 (INA	 §	207),	 in	 asylum	 status	 (INA	 §	208));	 and	 -	 is	 a	 foreign	 law	
enforcement	officer	of	a	friendly	foreign	government;	or	
is	 a	 person	 having	 the	 power	 to	 direct	 or	 cause	 the	 direction	 of	 the	
management	 and	 policies	 of	 a	 corporation,	 partnership,	 or	 association	
licensed,	and	 the	shipping,	 transporting,	possession,	or	 receipt	of	explosive	
materials	is	in	furtherance	of	such	power.	(see	18	U.S.C.	842(i));		




will	 be	 imprisoned	 or	 fined,	 or	 both;	 and	 if	 personal	 injury	 results	 to	 any	




47	Bautista	 v.	 Attorney	 General,	 744	 F.3d	 54,	 74	 (3d	 2015)	 (finding	 that	 New	 York	 Penal	 Law	 §§	 110	








attempt	 being	 made,	 or	 to	 be	 made,	 to	 kill,	 injure,	 or	 intimidate	 any	
individual	or	unlawfully	to	damage	or	destroy	any	building,	vehicle,	or	other	
real	 or	 personal	 property	 by	 means	 of	 fire	 or	 an	 explosive	 shall	 be	
imprisoned	or	fined,	or	both.	(see	18	U.S.C.	844(e));		
• Whoever	 maliciously	 damages	 or	 destroys,	 or	 attempts	 to	 damage	 or	
destroy,	by	means	 of	 fire	 or	 an	 explosive,	any	 building,	 vehicle,	 or	 other	











prosecuted	 in	 a	 court	 of	 the	 U.S.,	 or	 (2)	 carries	 an	 explosive	 during	 the	
commission	of	 any	 felony	which	may	be	prosecuted	 in	a	court	of	 the	U.S..	
(see	18	U.S.C.	844(h));		
• Whoever	 maliciously	 damages	 or	 destroys,	 or	 attempts	 to	 damage	 or	
destroy,	 by	means	 of	 fire	 or	 an	 explosive,	 any	 building,	 vehicle,	 or	 other	
real	or	personal	property	used	in	interstate	or	foreign	commerce	or	in	any	









• who	 is	 an	 unlawful	 user	 of	 or	 addicted	 to	 any	 controlled	 substance	 (as	
defined	in	(21	U.S.C.	802	§	102))	(see	18	U.S.C.	922(g)(3));		




• who,	 being	 an	 alien-	 is	 illegally	 or	 unlawfully	 in	 the	 U.S.;	 or	 except	 as	
provided	 in	 subsection	 (y)(2),	 has	 been	 admitted	 to	 the	 U.S.	 under	 a	
nonimmigrant	visa.	(see	18	U.S.C.	922(g)(5));	
• It	shall	be	unlawful	for	any	person	to	receive,	possess,	conceal,	store,	barter,	
sell,	 or	 dispose	of	 any	 stolen	 firearm	or	 stolen	 ammunition,	 or	 pledge	or	





• It	 shall	 be	 unlawful	 for	 any	 person	who	 is	 under	 indictment	 for	 a	 crime	
punishable	 by	 imprisonment	 for	 a	 term	 exceeding	 one	 year	 to	 ship	 or	
transport	 in	 interstate	or	 foreign	 commerce	 any	 firearm	or	 ammunition	or	
receive	any	firearm	or	ammunition	which	has	been	shipped	or	transported	in	
interstate	or	foreign	commerce	(see	18	U.S.C.	922(n));		
• This	 subsection	 does	 not	 apply	 with	 respect	 to-	 a	 transfer	 to	 or	 by,	 or	
possession	 by	 or	 under	 the	 authority	 of,	 the	 U.S.	 or	 any	 department	 or	
agency	 thereof	or	a	State,	or	a	department,	agency,	or	political	 subdivision	
thereof;	 or	any	 lawful	 transfer	or	 lawful	 possession	of	 a	machinegun	 that	
was	lawfully	possessed	before	the	date	this	subsection	takes	effect.	(see	18	
U.S.C.	922(o))	
• It	 shall	 be	 unlawful	 for	 any	 person	 to	 manufacture,	 import,	 sell,	 ship,	
deliver,	 possess,	 transfer,	 or	 receive	 any	 firearm-		
(1)(A)	 that,	 after	 removal	 of	 grips,	 stocks,	 and	 magazines,	 is	 not	 as	
detectable	 as	 the	 Security	 Exemplar,	 by	 walk-through	 metal	 detectors	
calibrated	 and	operated	 to	detect	 the	 Security	 Exemplar;	or	 (B)	any	major	
component	 of	 which,	 when	 subjected	 to	 inspection	 by	 the	 types	 of	 x-ray	
machines	 commonly	 used	 at	 airports,	 does	 not	 generate	 an	 image	 that	
accurately	depicts	the	shape	of	the	component;	(2)	See	for	term	definitions	
and	exception.	(see	18	U.S.C.	922(p));	
• It	 shall	 be	 unlawful	 for	 any	 person	 to	 assemble	 from	 imported	 parts	 any	
semiautomatic	rifle	or	any	shotgun	which	is	identical	to	any	rifle	or	shotgun	
prohibited	from	importation	under	18	U.S.C.	925(d)(3)	(see	18	U.S.C.	922(r));	
• Whoever,	 with	 intent	 to	 commit	 therewith	 an	 offense	 punishable	 by	


















has	 as	 an	 element	 the	 use,	 attempted	 use,	 or	 threatened	 use	 of	 physical	
force	against	the	person	or	property	of	another.”48	





rea	 that	 “suggests	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	 intent	 than	 negligent	 or	 merely	
accidental	conduct.”50	In	this	regard,	a	crime	of	violence	necessarily	involves	
“violent	 force	 -	 that	 is,	 force	 capable	 of	 causing	 physical	 pain	 or	 injury	 to	
another	person.”51		
















US	 to	hold	that	a	statute	which	states	that	 infliction	of	bodily	 injury	by	“any	means	or	form”	does	not	




that	 the	 physical	 force	 might	 be	 used	 against	 another	 in	 committing	 an	
offense.”52		
• However,	a	recent	development	concerning	the	constitutionality	of	18	U.S.C.	









(H) an	 offense	 relating	 to	 the	 demand	 for	 or	 receipt	 of	 ransom	 as	 described	 in	 the	
following	 sections:	 Interstate	 Communications	 (see	 18	 U.S.C.	 875);	 Mailing	




(I) an	offense	 relating	 to	 child	 pornography:	Sexual	 exploitation	 of	 children	 (see	 18	
U.S.C.	 2251),	 Selling	 or	 buying	 of	 children	 (see	 18	 U.S.C.	 2251A),	 or	 Certain	
activities	 relating	 to	material	 involving	 the	sexual	exploitation	of	minors	 (see	18	
U.S.C.	2252).	
(J) an	 offense	 relating	 to	 racketeer	 influenced	 corrupt	 organizations	 (see	 18	 U.S.C.	
1962),	or	 if	 it	 is	a	second	or	 subsequent	 offense	 (see	18	U.S.C.	1084);	 relating	 to	









§	 16(b)	 is	 unconstitutionally	 vague,	 therefore	 INA	 §	 101(a)(43)(F),	 which	 cites	 to	 18	 U.S.C.	 §	 16	 is	
unconstitutionally	 vague).	 For	 the	 standard	 for	 determining	 whether	 a	 residual	 clause	 is	
unconstitutionally	vague,	see	Johnson	v.	U.S.,	135	S.Ct.	2251	(2015).	
54	See,	 e.g.,	 Brooks	 v.	 Attorney	 General,	 297	 Fed.	 Appx.	 205,	 216	 (3rd	 Cir.	 2006)	 (holding	 that	 the	






(i) relates	 to	 the	 owning,	 controlling,	 managing,	 or	 supervising	 of	 a	
prostitution	business;		
(ii) is	relating	to	transportation	for	the	purpose	of	prostitution	if	committed	for	
commercial	 advantage:	 Transportation	 generally	 (see	 18	 U.S.C.	 2421);	
Coercion	and	enticement	(see	18	U.S.C.	2422),	or	Transportation	of	minors	
(see	18	U.S.C.	2423);	or	
(iii) relating	 to	 peonage,	 slavery,	 involuntary	 servitude,	 and	 trafficking	 in	
persons:	Peonage;	 obstructing	 enforcement	 (see	 18	 U.S.C.	 1581),	Vessels	
for	slave	trade	(see	18	U.S.C.	1582),	Enticement	 into	slavery	(see	18	U.S.C.	
1583),	 Sale	 into	 involuntary	 servitude	 (see	 18	 U.S.C.	 1584),	 Seizure,	
detention,	 transportation	 or	 sale	 of	 slaves	 (see	 18	 U.S.C.	 1585),	
Transportation	of	 slaves	 from	U.S.	 (see	18	U.S.C.	1588),	Forced	 labor	 (see	


























(N) an	 offense	 relating	 to	 bringing	 in	 and	 harboring	 certain	 aliens	 [see	 paragraph	
(1)(A)	 or	 (2)	 of	 section	 8	U.S.C.	 1324(a)],	 except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 first	 offense	 for	
which	 the	alien	has	 affirmatively	 shown	 that	 the	alien	 committed	 the	offense	 for	
the	purpose	of	assisting,	abetting,	or	aiding	only	the	alien's	spouse,	child,	or	parent	
(and	no	other	individual)	to	violate	a	provision	of	this	chapter;	
(O) an	 offense	 of	 Improper	 Entry	 by	 Alien:	 Improper	 time	 or	 place;	 avoidance	 of	
examination	 or	 inspection,	 misrepresentation	 and	 concealment	 of	 acts	 (INA	
§	275(a);	 8	U.S.C.	 1325(a))	 or	 of	Reentry	 of	 Removed	 Aliens	 (INA	 §	276;	 8	U.S.C.	
1326)	 committed	 by	 an	 alien	 who	 was	 previously	 deported	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	
conviction	for	an	offense	described	in	another	subparagraph	of	this	paragraph;	
(P) an	offense	(i)	which	either	is	falsely	making,	forging,	counterfeiting,	mutilating,	or	
altering	 a	 passport	 or	 instrument	 in	 violation	of	 Forgery	of	 false	use	of	passport	
(see	18	U.S.C.	1543),	or	Fraud	and	misuse	of	visas,	permits,	and	other	documents	
(see	18	U.S.C.	 1546(a))	 and	 (ii)	 for	which	 the	 term	of	 imprisonment	 is	 at	 least	12	
months,	except	 in	 the	case	of	a	 first	offense	 for	which	the	alien	has	affirmatively	
shown	that	the	alien	committed	the	offense	for	the	purpose	of	assisting,	abetting,	

















The	 term	 applies	 to	 an	 offense	 described	 in	 this	 paragraph	 whether	 in	 violation	 of	
Federal	or	State	law	and	applies	to	such	an	offense	in	violation	of	the	law	of	a	foreign	
country	 for	 which	 the	 term	 of	 imprisonment	 was	 completed	 within	 the	 previous	 15	


















not	 less	 than	5	years,	 (2)	has	 resided	 in	 the	U.S.	 continuously	 for	7	years	after	having	
been	admitted	in	any	status,	and	(3)	has	not	been	convicted	of	any	aggravated	felony),	
an	applicant	for	LPR	Cancellation	of	Removal	must	establish	that	s/he	warrants	relief	
as	 a	 matter	 of	 discretion.	 An	 Immigration	 Judge	 (IJ)	 has	 discretion	 to	 determine	
whether	a	particular	applicant	 should	be	granted	Cancellation	of	Removal	 relief.	An	 IJ	










































If	 an	 attorney	 has	 prepared	 documents	 in	 support	 of	 the	 positive	 factors	 relating	 to	
discretion,	 s/he	 may	 be	 able	 to	 refute	 any	 negative	 factors	 that	 an	 IJ	 considers.	 In	
addition	 to	 submitting	 supporting	 documents,	 an	 attorney	 should	 prepare	 his	 or	 her	




It is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 an	 IJ	 may	 consider	 all	 crimes	 that	 an	 applicant	 has	
committed,	 including	 crimes	 that	 are	 not	 aggravated	 felonies,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
determining	whether	a	favorable	exercise	of	discretion	is	warranted.	While	considering	
such	 crimes,	 an	 IJ	may	 inquire	 into	 circumstances	 surrounding	 the	 commission	of	 the	
crimes.	 However,	 an	 IJ	 may	 not	 look	 to	 an	 applicant's	 criminal	 record	 in	 order	 to	
reassess	his	or	her	ultimate	guilt	or	innocence.63	
	







62 	The	 Florence	 Immigrant	 and	 Refugee	 Rights	 Project,	 available	 at	 http://www.firrp.org	 (choose	
"Resources"	 and	 follow	 "How	 to	 Defend	 Your	 Case”	 hyperlink,	 scroll	 to	 “Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 for	





















defined	 in	 section	 101(a)(15)(J)	 [8	 U.S.C.	 §	1101(a)(15)(J)],	 or	 has	
acquired	 the	 status	 of	 such	 a	 nonimmigrant	 exchange	 alien	 after	
admission	other	than	to	receive	graduate	medical	education	or	training,	
(B) is	 subject	 to	 the	 two-year	 foreign	 residence	 requirement	 of	 section	
212(e)	[8	U.S.C.	§	1182(e)],	and	
(C) has	not	fulfilled	that	requirement	or	received	a	waiver	thereof.	
(4) An	alien	who	 is	 inadmissible	under	section	212(a)(3)	 [I	U.S.C.	§	1182(a)(3)],	or	
deportable	under	section	237(a)(4)	[8	U.S.C.	§	1227(a)(4)].	
(5) An	 alien	 who	 is	 described	 in	 section	 241(b)(3)(B)(i)	 [8	 U.S.C.	 A.	
§	1231(b)(3)(B)(i)].	
(6) An	 alien	 whose	 removal	 has	 previously	 been	 canceled	 under	 this	 section	 or	
whose	deportation	was	suspended	under	section	244(a)	[8	U.S.C.	§	1254(a)]	or	
who	has	been	granted	relief	under	section	212(c)	[8	U.S.C.	§	1182(c)],	as	such	













2. Persons	 admitted	on	 J	 visas	 to	 receive	 graduate	medical	 training	 regardless	of	
whether	 they	 are	 subject	 to	 or	 have	 fulfilled	 the	 2-year	 home	 residency	
requirement;	
3. Persons	admitted	on	a	J	visa	or	who	acquired	such	status	after	admission	with	2-



























	(1)	In	 a	 removal	 proceeding,	 an	 alien	 may	 apply	 to	 the	 immigration	 judge	 for	
cancellation	 of	 removal	 under	 section	 240A	 of	 the	 Act,	 adjustment	 of	 status	 under	





application	made	 to	 the	 immigration	 judge	 under	 section	 245	 of	 the	 Act	 by	 an	 alien	
spouse	 (as	 defined	 in	 section	 216(g)(1)	 of	 the	 Act)	 or	 by	 entrepreneur	 (as	 defined	 in	
section	 216A(f)(1)	 of	 the	 Act)	 shall	 result	 in	 the	 alien's	 obtaining	 the	 status	 of	 lawful	
permanent	resident	on	a	conditional	basis	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	section	
216	or	216A	of	 the	Act,	whichever	 is	applicable.	However,	 the	Petition	to	Remove	the	
Conditions	 on	 Residence	 required	 by	 section	 216(c)	 of	 the	 Act,	 or	 the	 Petition	 by	
Entrepreneur	 to	 Remove	 Conditions	 required	 by	 section	 216A(c)	 of	 the	 Act	 shall	 be	
made	to	the	director	in	accordance	with	8	C.F.R.	part	1216.	
	
(2)	In	 conjunction	 with	 any	 application	 for	 creation	 of	 status	 of	 an	 alien	 lawfully	
admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence	 made	 to	 an	 immigration	 judge,	 if	 the	 alien	 is	






chapter	 and	 shall	 afford	 the	 alien	 an	 opportunity	 to	 make	 application	 during	 the	
hearing,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 provisions	 of	§	 1240.8(d).	 In	 a	 relevant	 case,	 the	
immigration	 judge	 may	 adjudicate	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 an	 Affidavit	 of	 Support	 Under	




(3)	In	 exercising	 discretionary	 power	 when	 considering	 an	 application	 for	 status	 as	 a	
permanent	 resident	under	 this	chapter,	 the	 immigration	 judge	may	consider	and	base	
the	 decision	 on	 information	 not	 contained	 in	 the	 record	 and	 not	 made	 available	 for	
inspection	 by	 the	 alien,	 provided	 the	 Commissioner	 has	 determined	 that	 such	
information	 is	 relevant	 and	 is	 classified	 under	 the	 applicable	 Executive	 Order	 as	
requiring	 protection	 from	unauthorized	 disclosure	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 national	 security.	
Whenever	the	immigration	judge	believes	that	s/he	can	do	so	while	safeguarding	both	
the	 information	 and	 its	 source,	 the	 immigration	 judge	 should	 inform	 the	 alien	 of	 the	
general	nature	of	 the	 information	 in	order	 that	 the	alien	may	have	an	opportunity	 to	




























definition	 of	 controlled	 substance	 under	 the	 Controlled	 Substance	 Act	
when	the	state	misdemeanor	is	silent	as	to	the	controlled	substance?	
HOLDING	 To	 be	 a	 categorical	 federal	 drug	 offense	 for	 immigration	 purposes,	 a	
state	 law	 violation	 for	 controlled	 substances	must	 be	 an	 offense	 for	 a	
controlled	substance	as	defined	in	the	Controlled	Substance	Act.	
• 	 Respondent	Moones	Mellouli,	a	citizen	of	Tunisia,	entered	the	U.S.	on	a	
student	 visa	 in	 2004.	 In	 2009,	 he	 became	 a	 conditional	 permanent	
resident	 and,	 in	 2011,	 an	 LPR.	 In	 2010,	 he	 pleaded	 guilty	 to	 a	
misdemeanor	 offense	 under	 Kansas	 law,	 the	 possession	 of	 drug	
paraphernalia	 to	 “store,	 contain,	 conceal,	 inject,	 ingest,	 inhale	 or	
otherwise	introduce	a	controlled	substance	into	the	human	body.”	Kan.	





four	 orange	 tablets.	 The	 criminal	 charge	 and	 plea	 agreement	 did	 not	
identify	 the	 controlled	 substance	 involved,	 although	 Mellouli	 had	
acknowledged	 the	 tablets	were	 Adderall.	Mellouli	 was	 sentenced	 to	 a	
suspended	term	of	359	days	and	12	months’	probation,	after	which	DHS	
placed	him	in	removal	proceedings.	The	Board	affirmed	the	immigration	
judge's	 decision	 and	 he	 was	 removed.	 The	 Eighth	 Circuit	 denied	
Mellouli’s	 petition	 for	 review.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 then	 granted	




• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 an	 offense	 for	 drug-paraphernalia	
possession	must	specify	whether	the	controlled	substance	is	scheduled	
in	 the	 Controlled	 Substance	 Act	 to	 meet	 the	 criteria	 for	 a	 controlled	
substance	offense.	Please	note	Mellouli	was	not	found	deportable	of	an	









ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 conviction	 under	 a	 statute	 that	 criminalizes	 conduct	
described	 by	 the	 Controlled	 Substance	 Act’s	 (CSA)	 21	 U.S.C.	 §841’s	
felony	provision	 and	 its	misdemeanor	provision,	 such	 as	 a	 statute	 that	
punishes	 all	 marijuana	 distribution	 without	 regard	 to	 the	 amount	 or	
remuneration,	is	a	conviction	for	an	offense	punishable	as	a	felony	under	
the	CSA?	










imprisonment,	§841(b)(1)(D).	An	 IJ	ordered	his	 removal,	and	 the	Board	
affirmed.	 The	 Fifth	 Circuit	 denied	 Moncrieffe’s	 petition	 to	 review	 his	
argument	 that	 his	 conviction	 met	 CSA’s	 §841(b)(4),	 which	 makes	
marijuana	 distribution	 punishable	 as	 a	 misdemeanor	 if	 the	 offense	
involves	 a	 small	 amount	 for	no	 remuneration.	 The	U.S.	 Supreme	Court	
granted	certiorari	to	resolve	whether	the	state	conviction	qualified	as	an	
aggravated	felony	when	applying	the	categorical	approach.	A	state	drug	
offense	 must	 meet	 two	 conditions:	 1)	 the	 offense	 must	 “necessarily”	
proscribe	conduct	that	is	an	offense	under	the	CSA,	and	2)	the	CSA	must	
“necessarily”	 prescribe	 felony	 punishment	 for	 that	 conduct.	Unlike	 the	
federal	 statute,	 the	 Georgia	 statute	 is	 ambiguous	 as	 to	 whether	 the	
conduct	proscribed	 involved	remuneration	or	 the	amount	of	controlled	
substances	 needed	 to	 be	 a	 violation.	 Thus,	 because	 the	 conviction	 did	
not	“necessarily”	involve	facts	that	correspond	to	an	offense	punishable	
as	 a	 felony	 under	 the	 CSA,	 the	 Court	 held	 the	 offense	 was	 not	 a	
categorical	 aggravated	 felony.	 The	 Court	 reversed	 and	 remanded	 the	
case.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 when	 there	 is	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 state	
conviction	 the	 facts	 may	 not	 “necessarily”	 correspond	 to	 an	 offense	













• 	 Respondent	 Michael	 Descamps	 was	 convicted	 of	 being	 “a	 felon	 in	
possession	of	a	firearm”	and	the	government	sought	an	enhanced	sentence	
“based	 on	 Descamps’	 prior	 state	 convictions	 for	 burglary,	 robbery,	 and	
felony	harassment.”	To	be	subject	to	the	enhanced	sentencing,	the	statute	
requires	 that	 the	 person	 had	 been	 previously	 convicted	 of	 a	 3	 violent	
felonies	or	a	serious	drug	offense.	A	“violent	felony”	is	one	which	“has	as	an	
element	the	use,	attempted	use,	or	threatened	use	of	physical	force	against	
the	person	of	another,”	or	 that	 is	a	 “burglary,	arson	or	extortion,	 involves	
use	 of	 explosives	 or	 otherwise	 involves	 conduct	 that	 presents	 a	 serious	
potential	risk	of	physical	injury	to	another.”	Descamps	argued	that	his	past	
conviction	was	not	within	the	meaning	of	the	“violent	felony”	and	therefore	
he	 could	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 enhanced	 sentencing.	 The	 prior	 California	
felony	 that	 Descamps	 had	 been	 convicted	 found	 guilty	 a	 “person	 who	
enters”	 certain	 locations	 “with	 intent	 to	 commit	 grand	or	 petit	 larceny	 or	
any	 felony.”	 Unlike	 the	 federal	 statute,	 Descamps	 argues,	 the	 California	
statute	 did	 not	 require	 that	 a	 person	 enter	 into	 the	 location	 unlawfully;	
therefore,	 the	 California	 statute	 was	 not	 a	 categorical	 match.	 Both	 the	
District	Court	 and	 the	Ninth	Circuit	disagreed	with	Descamps,	 and	applied	
the	modified	categorical	approach	to	look	to	“certain	documents,	including	
the	 record	 of	 the	 plea	 colloquy,	 to	 discover	 whether	 Descamps	 had	
“admitted	the	elements	of	a	generic	burglary”	when	entering	his	plea.”	The	
District	 Court	 and	 the	 Ninth	 Circuit	 concluded	 that	 Descamps’	 crime	 was	
within	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 federal	 statute	 of	 burglary	 but	 Descamps	
appealed.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 concluded	 that	 the	 California	 statute	 was	
indivisible,	 and	 therefore,	 the	 lower	 courts	 erred	 in	 applying	 the	modified	
categorical	 approach.	 The	 Court	 found	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 modified	
categorical	approach	was	to	help	“effectuate	the	categorical	analysis	when	
a	 divisible	 statute,	 listing	 potential	 offense	 elements	 in	 the	 alternative,	
renders	opaque	which	element	played	a	part	in	the	defendant’s	conviction.”	
The	Court	illustrated	that	a	statute	may	be	indivisible,	for	example,	when	a	




the	 generic	 federal	 definition;	 however,	 the	 alternative,	 “entry	 into…	 a	
building”	 would	 be	 within	 the	 generic	 federal	 definition.	 Because,	 in	 this	
hypothetical	 situation,	 the	 statute	would	 not	 reveal	which	 alternative	 the	
defendant	 was	 convicted,	 courts	 could	 look	 to	 the	 plea	 agreement,	 the	
colloquy	 between	 the	 judge	 and	 the	 defendant,	 or	 indictment	 so	 as	 to	
determine	which	alternative	was	used.	On	the	other	hand,	where	a	statute	
is	 indivisible,	 courts	 should	 apply	 the	 categorical	 approach	 and	may	 “only	
look	to	the	statutory	definitions,”	of	the	defendant’s	prior	offenses,	and	not	




modified	 categorical	 approach	 and	 sets	 forth	 that	 the	 “sentencing	 courts	




ISSUE	 Whether	a	parent’s	 lawful	permanent	 resident	 status	 can	be	 imputed	 to	a	
child	for	purposes	of	calculating	the	5	years	of	 lawful	permanent	residence	





to	 the	 5-year	 LPR	 requirement	 and	 the	 other	 with	 regard	 to	 7-year	
continuous	 residence	 requirement.	 Only	 Respondent	 Martinez	 Gutierrez	
involved	 imputation	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 five	 years	 of	 LPR	 requirement.	
Martinez	Gutierrez	illegally	entered	the	U.S.	with	his	family	in	1989,	when	he	
was	 five	 years	 old.	 Respondent’s	 father	 obtained	 a	 LPR	 status	 two	 years	
later;	however,	respondent	never	adjusted	his	status	until	2003.	Two	years	
later	 respondent	 was	 apprehended	 and	 admitted	 to	 smuggling	
undocumented	people	across	 the	border.	He	 then	applied	 for	Cancellation	
of	 Removal.	 The	 IJ	 determined	 he	 could	 qualify	 for	 LPR	 §	 240A(a)(1)	 and	
(a)(2)	 on	 his	 own	 because	 of	 his	 father’s	 status,	 but	 the	 Board	 reversed.	
Respondent	appealed	to	the	Court	of	Appeals,	which	reversed	and	remanded	
the	 decision	 to	 the	 Board.	 On	 appeal	 from	 the	Ninth	 Circuit,	 the	 Supreme	
Court	concluded	that	the	Board’s	interpretation	of	§240A(a)(1)	is	“based	on	a	
permissible	 construction	 of	 the	 statute,”	 and	 reversed	 the	 Ninth	 Circuit’s	
decision.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 reaffirmed	 the	 Board’s	
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holding	that	a	parent’s	LPR	status	may	not	 be	 imputed	 to	their	children	 to	







HOLDING	 Post-IIRAIRA	 statutory	 restrictions	 on	 discretionary	 relief	 do	 not	 apply	 to	
noncitizens	who	pled	guilty	to	a	deportable	crime	prior	to	the	enactment	of	
IIRAIRA.		
• 	 Respondent	Enrico	St.	Cyr	was	admitted	as	an	LPR	in	1986.	 A	decade	later	in	
Connecticut,	 he	 pled	 guilty	 in	 a	 Connecticut	 state	 court	 to	 selling	 a	
controlled	 substance,	 $100	 worth	 of	 cocaine,	 and	 thus	 became	
deportable.	 If	 the	 INS	 had	 taken	 custody	of	 St.	 Cyr	 at	 the	completion	 of	
his	 sentence,	 he	 would	 have	 been	 eligible	 for	 a	 waiver	 of	 deportation	
under	 INA	 §	212(c).	Because	 the	 INS	 did	not	 begin	 proceedings	against	 St.	
Cyr	 until	 1997,	 St.	Cyr	would	be	 subject	 to	 the	 new	 laws	 passed	 in	 1996,	
the	 Antiterrorism	 and	Effective	 Death	 Penalty	 Act	 (AEDPA)	 and	 the	 Illegal	
Immigration	 Reform	 and	 Immigrant	Responsibility	Act	 (IIRIRA),	 if	 the	 court	
found	that	the	statutes	were	retroactive.	Therefore,	St.	Cyr	could	no	 longer	
file	 a	 motion	 for	 §	 212(c),	 even	 though	 he	 pled	 to	 the	 crime	 when	 the	
waiver	was	 still	being	 granted.	 Represented	 by	 the	ACLU,	 St.	Cyr	 sued	 the	
federal	 government	on	 the	 grounds	 that	 he	 was	 lawfully	 eligible	 for	 the	
waiver.	 The	case	reached	 the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	 in	2001.	The	Court	ruled	
that	Congress	never	 intended	 for	 INS	to	apply	 its	new	 rule	 retroactively	 in	
cases	 involving	 plea	bargains	made	prior	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 IIRIRA.	 That	
meant	that	St.	Cyr,	and	other	immigrants	whose	convictions	were	obtained	
through	plea	agreements,	 remain	eligible	 for	§	212(c)	waiver	 if	they	would	
have	been	eligible	for	§	212(c)	relief	at	the	time	of	their	plea.	
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	it	held	that	the	effective	date	of	the	changes	
from	INA	 §	212(c)	 to	Cancellation	of	Removal	 for	 LPRs,	April	 1,	1997,	does	












• 	 Respondent,	 Narinder	 Singh,	 was	 a	 native	 and	 citizen	 of	 India.	 He	 was	
granted	asylum	on	July	1,	1993,	and	adjusted	to	LPR	status	on	June	1,	1994.	
On	September	14,	2000,	he	was	convicted	 in	the	U.S.	District	Court	for	the	
Northern	 District	 of	 Florida	 of	 conspiracy	 to	 counterfeit	 passports,	
counterfeiting	and	using	visas,	and	mail	fraud	in	violation	of	18	U.S.C.	§	371.	
He	 was	 also	 convicted	 of	 unlawful	 possession	 of	 forged,	 counterfeited,	
altered,	and	falsely	made	nonimmigrant	U.S.	visas	in	violation	of	18	U.S.C.	§	




because	 he	 had	 a	 counterfeiting	 conviction,	 a	 crime	 involving	 moral	
turpitude.	 Singh	 applied	 for	 Cancellation	of	 Removal	 but	 the	 IJ	 denied	 the	
petition	and	the	Board	dismissed	his	appeal	based	on	a	finding	that	he	had	
not	accrued	seven	years	of	continuous	residence	in	the	U.S.	to	be	eligible	for	
Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 pursuant	 to	 8	 U.S.C.	 §	 1229b(a)	 [240A(a)].	 Singh	
then	filed	a	petition	for	review	arguing	that	his	2003	re-entry	restarted	the	
clock	 for	purposes	of	 the	 seven-year	 residence	 requirement.	However,	 the	








a	 CIMT,	 the	 CIMT	 terminated	 his	 continuous	 residence	 and	 continuous	
presence	so	his	re-entry	could	not	restart	the	clock.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 it	 reaffirms	 that	 re-entry	 can	 re-start	 the	
clock	after	a	“clock	stopping	event”	(i.e.,	receipt	of	a	NTA),	except	when	the	
NTA	 states	 the	 “clock	 stopping	event”	as	 the	 cause	 for	 removal.	Here,	 the	
Third	Circuit	distinguished	 in	part	and	applied	 in	part	 the	holding	 in	Okeke	
and	 thereby	 Cisneros-Gonzalez,	 to	 the	 context	 of	 LPR	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal.		
	
MATTER	 OF	 PAEK,	 26	 I.	 &	 N.	 403	 (BIA	 2014),	 aff’d,	 793	 F.3d	 330	 (3d	 Cir.	 2015)	
[Precedent]:	




HOLDING	 A	 noncitizen	 spouse	 lawfully	 admitted	 as	 a	 permanent	 resident	 on	 a	
conditional	basis,	is	considered	an	LPR.	
• 	 Respondent	 Ka	A.	 Paek	was	 admitted	 into	 the	U.S.	 in	 1991.	 Respondent	
was	 convicted	 of	 theft	 in	 2005	 and	 robbery	 in	 2006,	 and	 removal	
proceedings	 were	 initiated	 in	 July	 2013.	 Respondent	 then	 applied	 for	
adjustment	of	status	pursuant	to	his	marriage	to	a	U.S.	citizen	and	applied	
for	 Section	 212(h)	 waiver.	 However,	 the	 waiver	 states	 that	 “No	 waiver	
shall	 be	 granted	 under	 this	 subsection	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 alien	 who	 has	
previously	 been	 admitted	 to	 the	 United	 States	 as	 an	 alien	 lawfully	
admitted	for	permanent	residence	if…	since	the	date	of	his	admission	the	
alien	 has	 been	 convicted	 of	 an	 aggravated	 felony.”	 Therefore,	 if	 the	
Respondent	was	considered	a	“lawful”	permanent	resident	at	the	time	of	
his	convictions,	he	would	not	be	eligible	for	the	waiver.	The	Board	found	
that	 “notwithstanding	 any	other	 provision	of	 this	Act,	 an	 alien	 spouse….	
shall	be	considered,	at	the	time	of	obtaining	the	status	of	an	alien	lawfully	
admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence	 to	 have	 obtained	 such	 status	 on	 a	
conditional	basis	to	the	provisions	of	this	section.”		
• 	 While	this	case	deals	with	§	212(h)	waivers,	this	case	further	indicates	that	






HOLDING	 The	 stop-time	 rule	 can	 be	 applied	 retroactively	 to	 terminate	 accrual	 of	
time	required	to	satisfy	the	requisite	7-year	continuous	physical	presence.	
• 	 Respondent,	 Cristian	 Guzman	 is	 a	 38-year-old	 citizen	 of	 the	 Dominican	
Republic.	He	was	admitted	to	the	U.S.	as	an	LPR	on	October	8,	1994	and	
had	continually	resided	 in	the	U.S.	since	that	time.	 In	1995,	Guzman	was	
arrested	 in	 NY	 and	 charged	 with	 Criminal	 Possession	 of	 a	 Controlled	
Substance.	 On	 December	 19,	 1995,	 Guzman	 pled	 guilty	 to	 a	 lesser	




into	 custody	 based	 on	 the	 2005	 conviction	 pursuant	 to	 a	 controlled	
substance	 abuse	 (INA	 §237(a)(2)(B)(i)).	 He	 conceded	 removability,	 but	




his	 continuous	 residence	 when	 he	 committed	 the	 1995	 drug	 offense.	




(2)	 he	 should	 be	 able	 to	 apply	 for	 the	 212(c)	 deportation	waiver,	which	
was	 available	 prior	 to	 IIRIRA,	 and	 he	 should	 be	 able	 to	 delay	 his	
deportation,	which	was	a	strategy	available	prior	to	IIRIRA	to	allow	him	to	
accrue	the	7	years	of	continuous	presence	for	the	212(c)	waiver;	and,	(3)	
the	 retroactive	 application	 of	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 was	 arbitrary	 and	




Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 and	 for	 212(c)	 because	 he	 had	 only	 accrued	 1	
year	of	 continuous	 residence	by	 the	 time	he	committed	 the	1995	crime.	
Further,	 Guzman	 had	 not	 made	 affirmative	 communication	 with	 DHS	
regarding	his	prima	facie	eligibility	for	naturalization,	which	is	required	to	
terminate	 the	 deportation	 so	 that	 the	 Petitioner	 can	 seek	 naturalization	
(In	re	Acosta	Hidalgo).	The	Board	affirmed	the	IJ’s	holding	and	found	that	
Guzman	 could	 not	 apply	 simultaneously	 for	 212(c)	 relief	 and	 LPR	
Cancellation	of	Removal	because	8	U.S.C.	§	1229b(c)(6)	explicitly	precludes	
applying	 for	 both.	 Additionally,	 even	 if	 he	 could	 obtain	 a	 212(c)	 waiver	
notwithstanding	his	1995	conviction,	the	conviction	would	still	have	ended	
his	continuous	residence	for	purposes	of	Cancellation	of	Removal	because	
the	 212(c)	 waiver	 does	 not	 serve	 to	 pardon,	 expunge,	 or	 eliminate	 all	
negative	immigration	consequences	stemming	from	a	noncitizen’s	criminal	
conviction.	 The	 3rd	 Circuit	 Court	 affirmed	 the	 Board’s	 decision	 that	
Guzman	 was	 ineligible	 to	 apply	 for	 the	 212(c).	 The	 Court	 cited	 St.	 Cyr,	
wherein	 the	 noncitizen	 has	 accrued	 the	 required	 7	 years	 of	 continuous	






was	 impermissible	 in	 that	 case	 because	 the	 LPR	 relied	on	 the	pre-IIRIRA	
law	 when	 he	 pled	 guilty.	 In	 the	 present	 case,	 the	 3rd	 Circuit	 held	 that	
Guzman	 has	 no	 vested	 right	 in	 212(c)	 because	 he	 did	 not	 have	 the	




rule	 was	 triggered	 and	 made	 him	 ineligible	 for	 LPR	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal.		
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	the	3rd	Circuit	reinforced	that	an	LPR	may	




3rd	 Circuit	 did	 not	 rule	 on	whether	 the	 Board’s	 interpretation	 is	 correct	









• 	 Respondent	 Emmanuel	 De	 La	 Cruz	 Vargas	 was	 found	 to	 be	 statutorily	
eligible	for	Cancellation	of	Removal;	however,	he	was	denied	application	on	
account	 of	 discretionary	 factors.	 Respondent	 argued	 that	 the	 IJ	 erred	
because	 the	 Judge	 did	 not	meaningfully	 consider	 all	 discretionary	 factors.	
The	government	argues	that	the	Courts	of	Appeal	generally	lack	jurisdiction	
to	 review	 discretionary	 matters.	 The	 Third	 Circuit	 agreed	 with	 the	
government	 finding	 that	 the	court	 lacked	authority	 to	 review	claims	based	
on	 the	 IJ’s	 discretion;	 however,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 found	 that	 the	 court	 can	
review	for	“impermissible	fact	finding.”	
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	it	holds	that	the	Third	Circuit	will	not	look	to	
whether	the	Board	or	 IJ	 insufficiently	weighed	the	equities,	but	will	 look	at	






be	 applied	 retroactively	 to	 prevent	 noncitizens	 from	 fulfilling	 the	 seven-year	 continuous	 residence	
requirement	when	 the	 noncitizen	 pleads	 guilty	 under	 the	 expectation	 that	 his	 plea	will	 not	 affect	 his	
immigration	status	based	on	the	law	in	effect	at	the	time	the	noncitizen	pleads	guilty).	








• 	 Respondent	 Mun	 Seok	 Lee	 conceded	 removability	 on	 account	 of	 his	
conviction	 of	 possession	 of	 a	 handgun	 without	 a	 permit	 and	 applied	 for	
Cancellation	of	Removal.	Although	Respondent	was	statutorily	eligible,	the	IJ	
denied	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 on	 a	 discretionary	 basis.	 The	 IJ	 stated:	
“[Respondent]	 has	 not	 demonstrated	 that	 he	 is	 worthy	 of	 the	 Court’s	
favorable	 exercise	 of	 discretion	 based	 on	 [his]	 pattern	 of	 engaging	 in	
unlawful	 conduct	 relating	 to	 his	 alcohol	 intoxication	 as	 reported	 in	
conviction	and/or	 arrest	 records	occurring	 from	1993	 to	2008.”	 The	Board	
affirmed,	 finding	 that	 Respondent	 had	 not	 displayed	 that	 his	 “positive	
equities	do	not	outweigh	the	adverse	factors	in	this	case.”	The	Board	stated	
that	Respondent’s	positive	equities	included	his	lengthy	stay	in	the	U.S.,	the	
fact	 that	 he	 owns	 “several	 successful	 businesses	 that	 employ	 about	 40	
people,	his	history	of	paying	taxes,	and	his	active	participation	in	his	church	
and	 community.”	 The	 adverse	 factors	 included	 his	 criminal	 history,	 the	
“recency,	the	quantity	of	the	[]	alcohol-related	arrests	and	convictions[,]	and	
the	 serious	 nature	 of	 them	 poses	 a	 public	 risk,”	 the	 fact	 that	 his	
rehabilitation	is	not	supported	by	the	record,	the	fact	that	he	only	attended	
Alcoholics	 Anonymous	 that	 were	 mandated	 because	 of	 his	 criminal	








ISSUE	1	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 had	 mistakenly	 responded	 falsely	 on	 an	
application	 for	 adjustment	 of	 status	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 been	 “lawfully	
admitted	for	permanent	residence?”	
ISSUE	2	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 been	 “lawfully”	 admitted	 for	




A	 noncitizen	 who	 had	 mistakenly	 responded	 falsely	 on	 an	 application	 for	
adjustment	 of	 status	 is	 not	 considered	 to	 have	been	 lawfully	 admitted	 for	
permanent	residence.		




• 	 The	 Respondent,	 Earl	 Gallimore,	 entered	 the	 U.S.	 on	 August	 7,	 1993	
pursuant	to	a	nonimmigrant	visa.	On	September	25,	1993,	police	found	five	
pounds	of	marijuana	in	Respondent’s	car	on	a	car	stop.	On	January	12,	1994,	
Respondent	married	a	US	 citizen	and	applied	 for	 adjustment	of	 status.	On	
the	 application	 for	 adjustment	 of	 status,	 Respondent	 answered	 no	 to	 the	
following	 question:	 “Have	 you	 ever,	 in	 or	 outside	 the	 U.S.	 been	 arrested,	
cited,	 charged,	 indicted,	 fined,	 or	 imprisoned	 for	 breaking	 or	 violating	 any	
law	or	ordinance…?”	On	September	13,	1994,	Respondent	was	arrested	for	
the	 pending	 indictment	 for	 possession	 of	 marijuana	 and	 eventually	 pled	
guilty	 to	 the	 charge.	 On	 April	 1,	 1996,	 Respondent	 applied	 to	 have	 the	
conditions	 on	 his	 status	 removed.	 When	 Respondent	 applied	 for	 the	
removal	of	the	conditions,	his	wife	answered	on	a	supporting	document	that	
Respondent	 had	 never	 been	 convicted	 of	 violating	 any	 law.	On	December	
17,	 2001,	 Gallimore	 applied	 for	 naturalization	 and	 was	 denied.	 Due	 to	
Respondent’s	 previous	 failure	 to	 disclose	 the	 indictment,	 he	was	 found	 to	
have	 poor	 moral	 character.	 On	 April	 3,	 2006	 he	 was	 served	 a	 Notice	 to	
Appear.	Respondent	explained	to	the	IJ	that	he	had	not	understood	that	he	
had	 been	 arrested	 during	 the	 car	 stop.	 The	 IJ	 found	 that	 Respondent	 had	
“willfully	failed	to	disclose”	his	arrest	on	his	application	for	adjustment,	and	
that	 he	had	not	 been	eligible	 for	 Cancellation	of	 Removal	 because	he	had	
never	been	“lawfully	admitted	for	permanent	residence.”	The	Board	agreed	
with	 the	 IJ’s	 conclusion,	 and	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 affirmed.	 The	 Third	 Circuit	
concluded	 that	his	1995	conviction	 rendered	 the	Respondent	 inadmissible.	
As	 such,	 the	Respondent	was	 inadmissible	at	 the	 time	adjustment,	 and	he	
had	 not	 been	 “lawfully”	 admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence.	 However,	 the	
Third	Circuit	found	that	this	was	not	the	end	of	the	inquiry	as	the	date	that	
Respondent	 could	 be	 considered	 to	 have	 obtained	 “lawful”	 permanent	
residence	is	January	12,	1994,	the	date	in	which	Respondent	had	applied	for	
conditional	permanent	residence.	The	Third	Circuit	found	that	the	Board	did	
not	 speak	 to	 this	 issue.	 While	 finding	 that	 the	 word	 “permanent”	 may	
connote	a	meaning	that	did	not	encompass	noncitizens	given	a	conditional	





alien	 lawfully	 admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence	 and	 to	 be	 in	 the	 United	
States	 as	 an	 alien	 lawfully	 admitted	 to	 the	 United	 States	 for	 permanent	






permanent	 resident.	However,	 the	 Third	Circuit	 leaves	 this	 decision	 to	 the	
Board	to	make	an	affirmative	holding	that	a	conditional	permanent	resident	
is	considered	a	“lawful”	permanent	resident.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 for	 three	 reasons.	 The	 case	 affirms	 the	 Board’s	
holding	 that	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 fraudulently	 or	 mistakenly	 completed	 an	
application	 for	 lawful	 permanent	 residence	will	 not	be	 considered	 to	have	
“lawfully”	entered.	The	noncitizen	will	not	be	considered	to	have	“lawfully”	




JURADO-DELGADO	 v.	 ATTORNEY	 GENERAL,	 498	 Fed.	 App.	 101	 (3d	 Cir.	 2009)	
[Precedent]:	
ISSUE	 Whether	 INA	 §	 240A(a)	can	 be	 applied	 retroactively	 to	 crimes	committed	
by	an	LPR	in	1991,	before	INA	§240	was	enacted?	
HOLDING	 A	noncitizen	who	 committed	 crimes	 for	which	 s/he	was	 deportable	 under	
pre-Illegal	 Immigration	 Reform	 and	 Immigrant	 Responsibility	 Act	may	 be	
deportable	under	post-IIRIRA	proceedings;	the	court	left	open	the	question	
as	 to	whether	 Lawful	 Permanent	Resident	Cancellation	of	Removal	 can	be	
applied	retroactively	to	crimes	committed	before	IIRIRA	was	enacted.	
• 	 Respondent,	 Jimmy	 Jurado-Delgado,	 a	 native	 and	 citizen	 of	 Ecuador,	 was	
admitted	to	the	U.S.	as	an	LPR	in	1985.	Jurado-Delgado	conceded	before	an	
IJ	that	he	was	removable	either	under	INA	§237(a)(2)(A)(ii)	for	 having	 been	
convicted	 of	 two	 crimes	 involving	 moral	 turpitude	 in	 1997,	 or	 under	 INA	
§	 237(a)(3)(D),	 for	 having	 falsely	 represented	himself	 to	 be	 a	 U.S.	 citizen,	
but	 he	 requested	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	under	 INA	 §240A(a).	 The	court	
held	that	Jurado-Delgado's	 1991	crimes	stopped	his	 accrual	of	 time	 toward	
a	 period	of	 seven	 years	of	 continuous	residence	because	they	were	crimes	
involving	 moral	 turpitude,	 which	 rendered	 him	 inadmissible	 under	 §	
212(a)(2)(A)(i).	 Jurado-Delgado	petitioned	for	review	of	a	final	 order	 of	 the	
Board.	 He	 argued,	 among	other	things,	that	the	Board's	determination	that	
he	 was	 ineligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 is	 the	 result	 of	 an	
impermissible,	retroactive	application	of	that	statute.	In	his	view,	the	Board,	
when	 determining	 whether	 he	 was	 statutorily	 eligible	 for	 Cancellation	 Of	





no	 question	 of	 retroactivity	 was	 implicated.	 Here,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 Court	
denied	Jurado-Delgado's	petition	for	review.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 it	 suggests	 that	 INA	 §	 240A(a)	 can	 be	
applied	retroactively	to	crimes	committed	by	an	LPR	before	INA	§	240A	was	




ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 entered	 the	 U.S.	 as	 a	 minor	 can	 impute	 his	





of	 13	 to	 join	 his	 parents	 who	 had	 previously	 come	 to	 the	 U.S..	
Approximately	 five	 years	 after	 coming	 to	 the	 U.S.,	 the	 noncitizen	
committed	 a	 crime	 involving	 moral	 turpitude.	 He	 was	 later	 charged	 with	
being	removable	 based	 in	part	on	that	crime.	 The	noncitizen	 admitted	 the	
allegations	 but	 argued	 that	 he	 was	 eligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	
based	on	his	father's	seven	years	of	continuous	residence	in	the	U.S.	prior	to	
any	 of	 the	 crimes	 being	 committed.	 The	 Board	 rejected	 that	 argument,	
interpreting	 the	 statute	 as	 requiring	 that	 the	 noncitizen	 himself	 actually	
dwell	 in	the	U.S.	for	seven	years	 before	 committing	 the	 crime.	On	 review,	
the	 court	 held	 that	 the	 Board's	denial	 of	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 and	 its	
refusal	 to	 impute	 the	 father's	 years	 of	residence	 was	 permissible	 because	
it	was	 a	 straightforward	 application	 of	 the	statute's	 requirements.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 it	 affirms,	 under	 Chevron	 deference,	 the	
view	 that	 a	 parent's	 residence	 may	 not	 be	 imputed	 to	 his	 or	 her	 minor	
child	 for	purposes	 of	 the	 seven-year	 residence	provision	 of	Cancellation	of	





to	 noncitizens	 who	 were	 convicted	 of	 a	 deportable	 crime	 prior	 to	 the	
enactment	of	IIRAIRA?	
HOLDING	 Post-IIRAIRA	 statutory	 restrictions	 on	 discretionary	 relief	 do	 not	 apply	 to	
noncitizens	 who	 were	 convicted	 of	 a	 deportable	 crime	 prior	 to	 the	
enactment	of	IIRAIRA.	
• 	 Respondent	 Claudius	 Atkinson	 was	 convicted	 of	 state	 criminal	 offenses	 in	
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1991.	 He	 received	 a	 notice	 to	 appear	 in	 1997,	 notifying	 him	 that	 he	was	




The	 noncitizen	 filed	 his	 habeas	 petition	 after	 his	 reconsideration	 motion,	
based	on	St.	Cyr,	was	 denied.	 The	District	 Court	 held	 that	 the	 he	was	 not	
entitled	 to	 relief	because	he	 failed	to	 show	that	he	had	 relied	on	§	212(c)	
when	 he	was	 convicted	 in	 1991.	 In	 conformity	 with	 the	 REAL	 ID	 Act,	 the	
court	treated	the	habeas	petition	as	a	petition	for	review.	The	court	held	that	
the	noncitizen	was	not	precluded	 from	applying	 for	 §	 212(c)	 relief.	 IIRIRA	
did	 not	 apply	 retroactively	 to	 noncitizens	 who	 were	 convicted	 of	
aggravated	 felonies	 prior	 to	 IIRIRA's	 effective	 date,	 regardless	 of	whether	
they	pleaded	guilty	or	were	convicted	by	a 	 jury.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 held	 that	 §	 212(c)	 is	




ISSUE	 Whether	 an	 LPR	 is	 eligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 when	 he	
commits	 a	 controlled	substance	 violation,	 triggering	 the	statute's	"stop-
time"	provision	under	§	240A(d)(1)?	
HOLDING	 The	 stop-time	 rule	 only	 terminates	 the	 accrual	 of	 time	 for	 purposes	 of	
satisfying	 the	 requisite	 7-year	 continuous	 residence;	 the	 stop-time	 rule	
does	not	apply	to	the	5-years	of	permanent	residency	requirement.	
• 	 Respondent	 George	 Russel	 Joseph	 entered	 the	 U.S.	 in	 1992	 as	 a	
conditional	 resident	 and	became	 an	 LPR	 in	 1994.	 A	NTA	 that	was	 dated	
June	 15,	 2005	 placed	 him	 in	 removal	 proceedings.	He	was	 charged	with	
being	 removable	 because	 in	 August	 of	 1997	 he	 committed	 a	 controlled	
substance	violation	and	an	aggravated	felony.	He	was	convicted	in	January	
of	 1998.	 The	 IJ	 found	 him	 removable	 for	 committing	 the	 controlled	
substance	 violation,	 but	 found	 that	 the	 Government	 had	 not	 met	 its	
burden	 of	 showing	 that	 any	 of	 his	 convictions	 were	 also	 aggravated	
felonies.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 IJ	 found	 Joseph	 ineligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	








Court	 of	 Appeals	 for	 the	 Third	 Circuit,	 which	 held	 that	 the	 Board	
impermissibly	applied	the	stop-time	rule	to	the	requirement	of	5	years	of	
permanent	residence,	and	the	stop-time	rule	only	applies	to	the	7	years	of	
continuous	 residence.	 Joseph	 had	 met	 the	 permanent	 residency	
requirement.	 However,	 the	 Board	 still	 found	 him	 ineligible	 for	 LPR	











ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 is	 entitled	 to	 a	 new	 period	 of	 continuous	 physical	
presence,	commencing	upon	his	 lawful	reentry	into	the	U.S.,	so	as	to	allow	
him	 to	 accrue	 the	 time	 required	 to	 establish	 eligibility	 for	 Non-LPR	
Cancellation	of	Removal?	
HOLDING	 A	noncitizen	who	lawfully	reenters	the	U.S.	after	overstaying	a	visa	may	start	
a	 new	 accrual	 of	 time	 for	 purposes	 of	 satisfying	 the	 requisite	 10-year	
continuous	 physical	 presence	 when	 the	 noncitizen’s	 Notice	 to	 Appear	
exclusively	charges	the	noncitizen	with	being	a	visa	overstay.	
• 	 Respondent,	 Anderson	 Jude	 Okeke,	 a	 native	 and	 citizen	 of	 Nigeria,	
petitioned	for	review	of	two	orders	from	the	Board.	Those	orders	affirmed	
the	 Immigration	 Judge's	 decision	 that	 Okeke	 could	 not	 demonstrate	 the	
requisite	 continuous	 physical	 presence	 in	 the	 U.S.	 in	 order	 to	 qualify	 for	
Non-LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal.	 Essentially,	 the	 Board	 found	 that	 the	
'stop-time'	 provision	 (INA	 §	 240A(d)(l)),	 once	 triggered,	 precluded	 the	
accrual	 of	 a	 new	 period	 of	 continuous	 presence,	 which	 in	 this	 case	
commenced	 with	 Okeke's	 lawful	 reentry	 into	 the	 U.S.	 The	 lawful	 reentry,	
which	 was	 the	 critical	 fact	 on	 appeal,	 occurred	 after	 Okeke	 committed	 a	
controlled	 substance	 offense,	 which,	 pursuant	 to	 INA	 §	 240A(d)(l),	 clearly	
ended	 any	 prior	 period	 of	 continuous	 physical	 residence.	 This	 court	
concluded	 that	 the	 clock	 restarted	 upon	Okeke's	 reentry.	 Pursuant	 to	 the	
express	 terms	of	 the	NTA,	 it	was	 the	 last	 reentry	 into	 the	U.S.	 that	 should	
have	been	considered	in	calculating	continuous	physical	presence.	





establish	 eligibility	 for	 Non-LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal.	 Here,	 the	 Third	
Circuit	 is	 applying	 the	 holding	 in	 Cisneros.	 Though	 this	 holding	 applies	 to	
Non-LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal,	 the	 holding	 could	 also	 apply	 to	 LPR	
Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 as	 INA	 §	 240A(d)(l)	 refers	 to	 both	 continuous	









August	 1992.	 In	 October	 1998,	 he	 was	 convicted	 of	 possession	 and	
possession	with	the	 intent	to	deliver	a	controlled	 substance	 (92	packets	 of	
marijuana).	 On	 August	 3,	 1999,	 he	 was	 convicted	 of	 possession	 of	 a	
controlled	substance,	simple	assault	and	for	resisting	arrest	during	an	August	
20,	 1998	 incident.	 Dudney	 also	 was	 convicted	 on	 August	 31,	 1999	 of	
charges	 of	 simple	 assault,	 possession	 of	 an	 instrument	 of	 crime	 and	
recklessly	endangering	another	person	in	an	incident	on	February	 19,	1999.	
In	 June	 1999,	 the	 INS	 issued	 a	 NTA	 charging	 Dudney	 with	 removability	
based	 upon	 his	 October	 1998	 conviction.	 A	 removal	 order	 was	 entered	
after	Dudney	failed	to	appear	for	his	hearing,	but	the	IJ	later	terminated	the	
proceedings	 due	 to	 insufficient	 evidence.	 In	 October	 2001,	 the	 INS	 issued	
another	 NTA	 charging	 Dudney	 with	 removability	 for	 having	 committed	 an	
aggravated	 felony	 (drug	 trafficking),	 two	 crimes	 involving	moral	 turpitude	
not	arising	out	of	a	single	scheme	of	criminal	misconduct,	and	a	violation	 of	
law	 relating	 to	 a	 controlled	 substance,	 other	 than	 a	 single	 offense	
involving	 possession	 for	 one's	 own	 use	 of	 30	 grams	 or	 less	 of	marijuana.	
These	 charges	 were	 based	 on	 the	 October	 1998	 and	 August	 31,	 1999	
convictions.	The	NTA	was	then	amended,	and	the	August	3,	1999	convictions	
for	 drug	 possession	 and	 simple	 assault,	 and	 another	 aggravated	 felony	
charge	 were	 added.	 Through	 counsel,	 Dudney	 sought	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal	 as	a	permanent	 resident	pursuant	 to	 INA	§	240A(a).	 The	 IJ	 found	
Dudney	removable	for	a	violation	of	 law	relating	to	a	controlled	 substance,	
other	 than	 a	 single	 offense	 involving	 possession	 for	 one's	 own	 use	 of	 30	
grams	 or	 less	 of	marijuana,	 based	 on	 his	 August	 3,	 1999	 drug	 conviction.	
The	 Board	 also	 agreed	 with	 the	 IJ	 that	 Dudney	 was	 not	 eligible	 for	
Cancellation	of	Removal	because	he	did	not	meet	the	requirement	 that	he	
have	continuous	 residence	here	 for	 seven	years.	 The	Board	explained	 that	
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even	 if	 Dudney	 could	 not	 be	 removed	 based	 upon	 his	 October	 1998	
conviction	 because	 the	 proceedings	 related	 to	 this	 conviction	 were	
terminated,	 the	October	 1998	conviction	stopped	the	clock	for	purposes	of	
the	 seven-year	 residence	 requirement.	 Alternatively,	 Dudney’s	 continuous	
residence	 stopped	 as	 early	 as	 August	 20,	 1998	 when	 the	 crime	 was	
committed.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 it	 affirms	 that	 an	 LPR	 must	 satisfy	 INA	 §	
240A(a)(2),	the	seven-year	continuous	residence	requirement,	in	order	to	be	










• 	 Respondent	Richard	Jose	 Rodriguez-Munoz	was	 admitted	 to	 the	U.S.	 as	an	
LPR	 in	 1976.	 In	 1992,	 he	 pled	 guilty	 to	 four	 drug	 offenses	 in	 New	 York	
state	 court,	 including	 third	 degree	 criminal	 sale	of	 a	 controlled	 substance	
(crack	 cocaine).	 In	 1994,	 the	 INS	 charged	 Rodriguez-Munoz	 with	
deportability	 as	 a	 noncitizen	 convicted	 of	 an	 aggravated	 felony	 and	 as	
being	 convicted	of	a	violation	 relating	 to	a	controlled	 substance.	While	the	
immigration	 proceedings	 were	 pending,	 Rodriguez-Munoz	 pled	 guilty	 in	
New	 York	 to	 two	 additional	 offenses:	 fifth	 degree	 criminal	 possession	 of	
marijuana	and	seventh	degree	criminal	possession	of	a	controlled	substance.	
The	government	acknowledged	that	there	was	no	question	that	Rodriguez-
Munoz	 was	 eligible	 to	 apply	 for	 an	 INA	 §	 212(c),	 waiver	 of	 deportation	
concerning	 his	 1992	conviction.	 Indeed,	 §	 212(c)	 relief	 remained	 available	
for	 noncitizens	 whose	 convictions	 were	 obtained	 through	 plea	
agreements	 and	who,	 notwithstanding	those	convictions,	would	have	been	
eligible	 for	 §	212(c)	 relief	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	 plea	 under	 the	 law	 then	 in	
effect.	 Rodriguez-Munoz	apparently	 did	not	argue	before	the	Board	that	his	
1992	 conviction	 was	 not	 an	 aggravated	 felony,	 nor	 did	 he	 raise	 such	 an	
argument	 on	appeal.	Although	 a	waiver	 of	deportation	 gave	him	a	chance	
to	 stay	 in	 the	U.S.	 despite	 his	misdeed,	 it	 did	 not	 expunge	 his	 conviction.	
Thus,	even	 if	Rodriguez-Munoz's	 deportation	based	on	his	 1992	conviction	
were	waived	under	 §	212(c),	 that	 conviction	would	nonetheless	 remain	an	




• 	 This	case	 is	 important	because	a	 noncitizen	who	has	an	 aggravated	 felony	
conviction	 along	 with	 other	 crimes	 of	 moral	 turpitude	 cannot	 seek	
simultaneous	INA	§	212(c)	 and	Cancellation	 of	Removal	 relief,	because	 the	
aggravated	 felony	makes	him	or	her	ineligible	for	Cancellation	of	Removal.	
	
MURALI	KRISHNA	PONNAPULA	v.	ASHCROFT,	373	 F.3d	 480	 (3d	Cir.	2004)	[Precedent]:	
ISSUE	 Whether	the	post-IIRAIRA	statutory	restrictions	on	discretionary	relief	apply	
to	 noncitizens	 who	 were	 convicted	 of	 a	 deportable	 crime	 prior	 to	 the	
enactment	of	IIRAIRA,	but	who	turned	down	a	misdemeanor	plea	deal?	
HOLDING	 A	 noncitizen	 who	 turned	 down	 a	 misdemeanor	 plea	 deal,	 and	 was	 later	
convicted	of	an	aggravated	felony	is	not	subject	to	the	statutory	restrictions	
of	IIRAIRA.	
• 	 Respondent	Murali	 Krishna	 Ponnapula	 was	 indicted	 for	 grand	 larceny	 and	
falsifying	 business	 records	 in	 violation	 of	 New	 York	 law	 after	 his	 brother	
submitted	 a	 loan	 application	 with	 the	 noncitizen's	 forged	 signature	 and	
without	 the	 noncitizen's	 knowledge.	 In	 reliance	 on	 counsel's	 advice,	 the	
noncitizen	 turned	 down	 a	 misdemeanor	 plea	 agreement,	 went	 to	 trial	
when	 former	 INA	§	212(c)	was	 still	 in	effect,	and	was	convicted.	The	 court	
rejected	 the	 Government's	 contention	 that	 St.	 Cyr	 precluded	 the	
noncitizen	 from	 claiming	 an	 impermissible	 retroactive	 effect	 of	 the	
repeal	 of	 §	 212(c).	 With	 respect	 to	 the	 noncitizen,	 who	 reasonably	 could	
have	 relied	 on	 the	potential	 availability	 of	 §	212(c)	 relief,	 the	 court	 found	
the	 repeal	 of	 §	 212(c)	 had	 an	 impermissible	 retroactive	 effect.	 Although	
the	court	 concluded	 that	actual	reliance	was	not	necessary,	the	court	found	
that	 the	noncitizen	demonstrated	 clear	 and	 reasonable	 actual	 reliance	 on	
the	 former	 statutory	 scheme	 in	making	 the	decision	to	go	to	trial.	
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	the	noncitizen	reasonably	believed	that	even	
if	he	was	convicted	of	a	felony	after	trial	he	would	still	 likely	be	eligible	for	
hardship	 relief	 from	 deportation	 pursuant	 to	 former	 §	 212(c).	 In	 reliance	
of	 this,	 the	 noncitizen	 decided	 to	 turn	 down	 the	misdemeanor	 offer	 and	




ISSUE	 Whether	 an	 LPR	who	 has	 served	 at	 least	 five	years	 of	 imprisonment	 for	a	






• 	 Respondent	 James	 Scheidemann	 was	 an	 LPR	 since	 1959.	 Scheidemann	
sought	 review	 of	 an	 order	 of	 the	 Board,	 which	 dismissed	 his	 appeal	 to	
overturn	a	deportation	order.	 Scheidemann	 faced	 deportation	 on	 account	
of	 a	 1987	 drug	 trafficking	 conviction	 for	 which	 he	 had	 served	 over	 five	
years	 in	 prison.	 Scheidemann	 did	not	 contest	 his	 deportability.	 Rather,	 he	
argued	 that	 he	 was	 eligible	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 discretionary	 waiver	 of	
deportation	 under	 I N A 	 §	 212(c).	 The	 court	 held	 that	 Congress	 intended	
§	212(c)	 to	 restrict	 the	Attorney	 General's	 power	 to	 exercise	 discretionary	
relief,	 immediately	 after	 the	 amendment	 to	 the	 aggravated	 felony	 statute,	
with	respect	to	noncitizens	who	had	served	at	least	five	years	imprisonment	
for	crimes	defined	as	aggravated	felonies	under	the	 original	1988	definition,	
regardless	 of	 the	 conviction	 date.	 Accordingly,	 Scheidemann's	petition	 for	
review	was	denied.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 an	 LPR	who	 has	 served	 at	 least	 five	 years	
of	 imprisonment	 for	 a	 crime	 defined	 as	 an	 aggravated	 felony	 (under	 the	








• 	 The	 noncitizen	 family	 members	 were	 natives	 and	 citizens	 of	 Taiwan	 and	
included	 an	 adult	 female	 and	 her	 two	 minor	 children.	 They	 were	 initially	
admitted	to	the	US	as	LPRs	on	June	5,	1982.	The	noncitizen's	 husband	was	
admitted	 as	 an	 LPR	 one	 week	 earlier.	 The	 noncitizen's	 husband,	 after	
receiving	his	Alien	Registration	Receipt	Card,	returned	to	Japan	to	continue	
studying	and	working	 at	a	 university's	medical	 school	as	a	 medical	doctor.	
Soon	 after,	 the	 noncitizen	 wife	 and	 the	 children	 returned	 to	 Japan.	 The	
noncitizen	 and	 her	 two	 children	 last	 sought	 to	 reenter	 the	 U.S.	 on	 May	
10,	 1986,	 at	 which	 time	 they	 were	 placed	 in	 exclusion	 proceedings	 and	
ordered	 removed.	 She	 appealed.	 The	 INS	 contended	 on	 appeal	 that	 the	
noncitizens	 had	 abandoned	 their	 LPR	 statuses.	 The	 Board	 noted	 that	 the	
INS	has	 the	burden	 of	proving	 that	 a	 noncitizen	 is	 ineligible	 for	 admission	
as	 a	 returning	 permanent	 resident.	 In	 determining	 whether	 the	 DHS	 has	
met	 its	 burden	 of	 proof,	 the	 IJ	 should	 look	 to	 whether	 the	 LPR	 has	 an	
unrelinquished	 residence	 after	 a	 temporary	 visit	 abroad.	A	 temporary	 visit	
abroad	may	be	an	extended	period	of	absence,	“if	the	end	of	the	period	of	
absence	 can	 be	 fixed	 by	 some	 early	 event.”	 The	 noncitizen’s	 professed	
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intent	 to	 return	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 support	 a	 finding	 that	 the	 visit	 was	
“temporary.”	 The	 Board	 found	 that	 the	 INS	 had	 met	 the	 burden	and	 the	
Board	ordered	the	noncitizen	and	her	children	removed	 from	the	U.S.	










7-year	 period	 of	 continuous	 residence	 required	 for	 cancellation	 of	
removal…section	 240A(d)(1)	 of	 the	 Act	 does	 not	 permit	 such	 residence	 to	











when	he	 re-entered	after	his	 trip	 to	Canada.	Thus,	according	 to	 the	 IJ,	 the	
clock	 stopped	 for	 purposes	 of	 accruing	 continuous	 residence	 time	 on	
February	20,	1999,	at	which	point	Nelson	had	not	resided	in	the	U.S.	for	7-







The	 respondent	 in	 Okeke,	 was	 then	 placed	 into	 removal	 proceedings	 for	
failing	to	maintain	a	student	status.	Here,	the	Board	found	that	the	fact	that	










of	 7-years	 continuous	 residence	 when	 the	 clock-stopping	 event	 was	 the	
basis	 for	 removal.	 Further,	 this	 distinguishes	 the	 holding	 in	 Okeke	 v.	
Attorney	General,	providing	a	further	wrinkle	in	that	the	clock	cannot	restart	




ISSUE	 Whether	 an	 NTA	 that	 does	 not	 include	 the	 date	 and	 time	 of	 the	 initial	
hearing	can	stop	the	clock	for	purposes	of	Cancellation	of	Removal?		





a	Notice	 to	Appear,	which	 included	 the	 phrase	 “To	 be	 set”	 in	 the	 space	
provided	for	the	date	and	time	of	the	hearing.	The	NTA	was	later	filed	with	
the	 Harlingen	 Immigration	 Court,	 which	 issued	 a	 notice	 of	 hearing	 on	
November	9,	2007.	She	was	charged	with	alien	smuggling	and	the	IJ	found	
her	removable.	But	the	IJ	granted	her	petition	for	Cancellation	of	Removal	
on	 the	 grounds	 that	 Camarillo	 had	 accrued	 the	 required	 seven-years	 of	
continuous	 residence	 by	 the	 time	 the	 Court	 issued	 the	 notice	 that	
contained	the	hearing	date.	The	IJ	interpreted	the	terms	in	239(a)(1)	of	8	
U.S.C.	§1229(a)(1)(G),	“[t]he	time	and	place	at	which	the	proceedings	will	
be	 held,”	 as	 requirements	 for	 an	 NTA	 so	 that	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 takes	
effect.	DHS	 appealed,	 arguing	 that	 section	 §	 1229(a)(1)	 specifies	 that	 an	
NTA	must	be	served,	and	the	terms	in	§1229(a)(1)(G)	help	identify	what	an	
NTA	is.	The	Board	agreed	with	the	DHS	that	the	key	phrase	was	“served	a	
notice	 to	 appear”	 and	 the	 Congress	 intended	 the	 phrase	 “under	 section	
239(a)”	 after	 “notice	 to	 appear”	 to	 specify	 the	 document	 the	DHS	must	
serve	 to	 trigger	 the	 “stop-time”	 rule.	 Additionally,	 the	 court	 highlighted	
that	 removal	 proceedings	 commence	 when	 the	 NTA	 is	 filed	 with	 the	
Immigration	Court.	8	C.F.R.	§	1239.1(a)	(2011).	Since	the	commencement	
of	 proceedings	 is	 a	 separate	 issue	 from	 the	 service	 of	 the	 NTA,	 what	
mattered	 was	 the	 NTA	 that	 Camarillo	 was	 served	 in	 person.	 Thus,	
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Camarillo	 was	 not	 eligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 because	 she	 had	
not	 accrued	 seven-years	 at	 the	 time	 she	was	 served	 in	 2005.	 The	 court	
sustained	the	appeal	by	DHS.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	the	holding	found	that	the	NTA	will	suffice	
to	end	continuous	residence,	regardless	 if	 there	 is	a	date	or	time	for	the	
hearing	 on	 the	NTA	 at	 the	 time	 the	 noncitizen	 is	 served.	 The	 court	 also	
distinguished	 that	 the	 date	 that	 mattered	 for	 purposes	 of	 terminating	
continuous	residence	is	the	date	that	the	NTA	was	served	and	not	the	date	
on	which	 removal	 proceedings	 commence	 nor	 the	 date	 that	 the	 NTA	 is	
filed.	 Peculiarly,	 the	 Board	 never	 makes	 any	 conclusions	 regarding	
Camarillo’s	 criminal	 conviction	 for	 smuggling	 aliens	 into	 the	 U.S.,	 which	




ISSUE	 Whether	 a	parent's	 lawful	permanent	 resident	 status	can	be	 imputed	 to	a	
child	 for	 purposes	 of	 calculating	 the	 5	 years	 of	 lawful	 permanent	




• 	 Respondent,	Ramirez-Vargas,	 a	native	 and	citizen	of	Mexico	 and	an	LPR	of	
the	 U.S.,	 was	 found	 removable	 as	 a	 noncitizen	 convicted	 of	 a	 controlled	
substance	 violation	 but	 granted	 his	 application	 for	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal.	 The	 DHS	 appealed,	 arguing	 that	 the	 IJ	 erred	 in	 finding	 the	
respondent	 statutorily	eligible	 for	that	relief	because	the	lawful	permanent	
residence	of	the	noncitizen's	father	could	not	be	imputed	to	the	noncitizen.	
The	 Board	 sustained	 the	 appeal	 by	 DHS.	 The	 Board	 held	 that	 a	 parent's	
period	of	residence	in	the	U.S.	cannot	be	imputed	to	a	child	for	purposes	of	
calculating	 the	 7	 years	 of	 continuous	 residence	 required	 to	 establish	
eligibility	for	Cancellation	of	Removal	under	INA	§	240A(a)(2).	
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	it	rejected	the	9th	Circuit	Court’s	holding	that	
imputation	 of	 a	 parent’s	 LPR	 status	 to	 a	 child	was	 permissible.	Matter	 Of	
Escobar,	24	 I.	&	N.	Dec.	231	 (BIA	2007).	Matter	of	Escobar	was	vacated	 in	














September	15,	1985.	He	was	convicted	 in	1991	of	retail	 theft	 in	violation	
of	 Pennsylvania	 law.	 In	 1992	 he	 was	 also	 convicted	 of	 unsworn	
falsification	 to	 authorities.	 In	 addition,	 the	 noncitizen	 was	 convicted	 in	
1997	of	 two	 crimes	 involving	moral	 turpitude	 that	were	 the	basis	 of	 the	
charge	 of	 removability	 in	 his	 NTA.	 In	 proceedings	 before	 the	 IJ,	 the	
noncitizen	 conceded	 that	 he	 was	 removable,	 both	 on	 the	 initial	 charge	
and	 on	 a	 lodged	 charge	 that	 he	 falsely	 represented	 himself	 to	 be	 a	U.S.	
citizen.	He	applied	 for	Cancellation	 of	Removal	 under	 section	240A(a)	of	
the	 Act,	which	 the	 IJ	 granted.	 On	 appeal,	 the	 DHS	 contended	 that	 the	
noncitizen	 failed	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 requisite	 period	 of	 continuous	
residence	 to	 establish	 his	 eligibility	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal.	 The	
Board	agreed	and	found	that	the	IJ	erred	in	concluding	that	the	noncitizen	
was	eligible	for	Cancellation	of	Removal.	
• 	 This	case	is	 important	because	the	Board	concluded	that	the	time	period	










document	 on	 which	 the	 current	 removal	 proceeding	 is	 based	 (8	 U.S.C.	 §	
1229b(d)(1));	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 charging	 documents	
served	in	prior	proceedings.		
• 	 Respondent	 Ignacio	 Cisneros-Gonzalez’s	 first	 removal	 proceeding	 was	 in	
December	28,	1990.	He	was	served	with	an	Order	to	Show	Cause,	Notice	of	
Hearing,	 and	Warrant	 for	 Arrest	 of	 Alien	 (Form	 I-221S),	 charging	 him	with	









However,	 the	Board’s	 legislative	history	analysis	determined	 that	Congress	
did	 not	 intend	 for	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 under	 INA	 §240A(d)(1)	 to	 ban	
noncitizens	 from	 seeking	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 relief.	 The	 “stop-time”	
rule	 was	 not	 intended	 to	 extend	 to	 charging	 documents	 issued	 in	 earlier	




applied	 for	 suspension	 of	 deportation	 based	 on	 a	 single	 order	 to	 show	
cause.	Here,	however,	multiple	charging	documents	existed.	When	the	DHS	
does	not	or	 cannot	 reinstate	a	prior	order	of	 removal	 against	 a	previously	
deported	 noncitizen	 and	 instead	 issues	 a	 new	 order	 of	 removal,	 the	
noncitizen	may	be	eligible	to	apply	for	Cancellation	of	Removal	based	on	the	
accrual	 of	 the	 new	 continuous	 presence	 (§	 240A(b))	 or	 new	 continuous	
residence	(§	240A(a)).	Importantly,	note	that	Cisneros-Gonzalez	was	applied	
to	§	240A(b)	[Non-LPR	Cancellation	of	Removal],	rather	than	§	240A(a)	[LPR	
Cancellation	 of	 Removal].	 Under	 240A(d)(1),	 however,	 the	 stop-time	 rule	
applies	 to	 both	 LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal’s	 continuous	 residence	




ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 has	 committed	 two	 crimes	 involving	 moral	
turpitude	 is	 precluded	 from	 establishing	 the	 requisite	 7	 years	 of	
continuous	 residence	 for	 cancellation	 of	 removal	 under	 INA	 §240A(a)(2),	
where	 his	 first	 crime	 was	 a	 petty	 offense	 that	 was	 committed	 within	 the	
7-year	period	and	the	second	crime	was	committed	more	than	7	years	after	
his	admission	to	the	U.S.?	
HOLDING	 The	 stop-time	 rule	 is	 triggered	 by	 crimes	 for	 which	 a	 noncitizen	 is	
inadmissible;	however,	the	stop-time	rule	is	not	triggered	by	petty	offenses.	
• 	 Respondent	 Jose	 Abraham	Deanda-Romo,	was	 admitted	 to	 the	 U.S.	 as	 an	
LPR	on	January	8,	1992.	On	September	21,	1999,	he	was	convicted	in	Texas	
of	 two	misdemeanor	 offenses	 of	 assault	 with	 bodily	 injury	 to	 his	 spouse,	
one	occurring	on	 October	 30,	 1998,	 and	 the	 other	 on	 June	 20,	 1999.	 He	
was	 sentenced	 to	 imprisonment	 for	 both	 offenses.	 He	 conceded	
removability	and	applied	for	LPR	Cancellation	of	Removal.	The	IJ	terminated	
the	 application	 after	 finding	 that	 the	 noncitizen	 was	 ineligible	 for	 relief	
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under	 the	 "stop-time"	 rule.	 The	 Board	 held	 that	 the	 noncitizen	 was	 not	
precluded	 by	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 from	 establishing	 the	 requisite	 seven	
years	 of	 continuous	 residence	 because	 his	 first	 crime	 qualified	 as	 a	 petty	
offense,	 under	 INA	 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II),	 and	 therefore	 did	 not	 render	 him	
inadmissible.	 Thus,	 according	 to	the	Board,	the	noncitizen	had	accrued	the	
requisite	seven	years	of	continuous	residence	before	the	second	offense	was	
committed.	






a	 nonimmigrant	 may	 be	 considered	 in	 calculating	 the	 7	 years	 of	
continuous	 residence	 required	 to	 establish	 eligibility	 for	 cancellation	 of	
removal.	
HOLDING	 A	 noncitizen’s	 admission	 as	 a	 nonimmigrant	may	 be	 used	 to	 calculate	 the	
start	of	7-year	continuous	residence	requirement.	
• 	 Respondent	Eduardo	Blancas-Lara	was	 first	 admitted	 to	 the	U.S.	 in	August	
1986	with	 a	border-crossing	card.	He	adjusted	his	status	to	that	of	an	LPR	on	
August	 5,	 1991.	 The	 noncitizen's	 period	 of	 continuous	 residence	 under	
section	240A(a)(2)	 of	the	Act	ended	on	April	 1,	1998,	when	he	was	 served	
with	a	Notice	 to	 Appear.	 At	 that	 point,	 the	 noncitizen	 had	 resided	 in	 the	
U.S.	 as	 an	 LPR	 for	about	 6	years	and	8	months.	 The	 IJ	 concluded	 that	 the	
noncitizen	 could	 count	 time	 he	 spent	 in	 the	 U.S.	 as	 a	 child	 before	 his	
admission	as	an	LPR	toward	the	accrual	of	7	years	of	 continuous	 residence	
under	 section	 240A(a)(2),	 because	 the	 lawful	 residence	 of	 his	 father,	 a	
citizen	 and	 resident	 of	 the	U.S.,	 could	 be	 imputed	 to	 him.	 On	 appeal	 the	
Board	 found	 that	 the	 noncitizen	 established	 that,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 his	
application	 for	 relief,	 he	 had	 resided	 in	 the	 U.S.	 continuously	 for	 7	 years	
after	 having	 been	 admitted	 as	 a	nonimmigrant.	 Thus,	 an	applicant	 who	 is	
admitted	 with	 a	 nonimmigrant	 visa,	 and	 accrues	 the	 7	 years	 of	
continuous	 residence	 to	 meet	 the	 second	 element	 of	 the	 statute,	 does	
not	 need	 an	 imputation	 argument.	 Accordingly,	 the	 Board	 concurred	 with	
the	 IJ's	decision	and	dismissed	the	appeal.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Board	 stated	 that	 the	 period	 of	 a	
noncitizen's	residence	in	the	U.S.	after	admission	as	a	nonimmigrant	may	be	






ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 is	 required	 to	 satisfy	 a	 threshold	 test	 of	 showing	
"unusual	 or	 outstanding	 equities"	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 whether	 a	
favorable	exercise	of	discretion	is	warranted?	
HOLDING	 The	noncitizen	 does	 not	 have	 to	 show	 “unusual	 or	 outstanding	 equities.”	
Rather,	 favorable	 and	 adverse	 factors	 should	 be	 weighed	 to	 determine	
whether	the	person	warrants	discretionary	relief.	
• 	 Respondent	 Javier	Sotelo-Sotelo	 adjusted	 his	 status	 to	 that	 of	 an	LPR	 on	
December	 1,	 1990.	 On	 July	 24,	 2000,	 he	 was	 convicted	 of	 the	 following	
offenses:	 possession	 and	 passing	 fraudulent	 resident	 alien	 cards,	 failure	
to	 provide	 migrant	 workers	 with	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 employment,	
and	 illegal	 entry	 or	 aiding	 and	 abetting	 illegal	 entry.	 The	 noncitizen	 was	
sentenced	to	8	months	of	imprisonment	for	each	of	the	first	two	offenses,	
and	 to	 6	 months	 of	 imprisonment	 for	 the	 third	 offense.	 In	 proceedings	
before	 the	IJ,	the	noncitizen	conceded	removability	as	charged	and	applied	
for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 under	 INA	 §240A(a).	 The	 IJ	 denied	 the	
noncitizen's	 application	 for	 relief,	 and	 the	 noncitizen	 appealed.	 The	
Board	 found	 that	 the	 favorable	 factors	 presented	 in	 support	 of	 the	
noncitizen's	 application	 for	 cancellation	 of	 removal	 did	 not	 outweigh	 the	





• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Board	 rejected	 the	 use	 of	 an	
'outstanding	 and	 unusual	 equities'	 requirement	 as	 a	 threshold	 for	 relief	
and	 instead	 found	 that	 the	 IJ	 should	 weigh	 the	 favorable	 and	 adverse	




ISSUE	 Whether	 the	 noncitizen's	 commission	 of	 a	 firearms	 offense,	 which	 is	 not	
referred	 to	 in	 INA	 §	 212(a)(2),	 precluded	 him	 from	 satisfying	 the	




• 	 Respondent	 Ignacio	 Campos-Torres,	 was	 admitted	 to	 the	 U.S.	 as	 a	
temporary	 resident	 on	May	 4,	 1988,	 and	 adjusted	 his	 status	 to	 that	 of	 a	
LPR	 on	 December	 13,	 1990.	 On	 September	 23,	 1993	 the	 noncitizen	 was	
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convicted	 of	 a	 single	offense	 of	 unlawful	 use	 of	 a	weapon.	The	noncitizen	
was	 sentenced	 to	 18	 months	 of	 probation.	 On	 June	 25,	 1997,	 the	 INS	
issued	 and	 served	 a	NTA,	 commencing	 removal	 proceedings	and	 charging	
the	 noncitizen	 with	 removability.	 The	 issue	 that	 was	 raised	 before	 the	 IJ	
and	 argued	 in	 the	 initial	 briefs	 submitted	 on	 appeal	 concerned	 the	
appropriate	 date	 to	 apply	 in	 determining	 when	 accrual	 of	 continuous	
residence	 ends.	The	noncitizen	argued	that	under	the	plain	 language	of	the	
statute,	 firearms	 offenses	 do	 not	 cut	 off	 continuous	 residence	 because	
they	 are	 not	 "referred	 to"	 in	 §	 212(a)(2)	 of	 the	 Act.	 The	 government	
argued	 that	 the	 plain	 language	 of	 INA	 §	 240A(d)(l)	 does	 not	 clearly	
support	 either	 its	position	 or	 that	of	 the	noncitizen	 because	 the	 statute	 is	
ambiguous.	 The	 Board	 found	 that	 because	 the	 noncitizen's	 firearms	
offense,	 which	 rendered	 him	 deportable	 under	 INA	 §	 237(a)(2)(C),	 is	 not	
referred	to	in	INA	§	212(a)(2),	 it	did	not	stop	time	under	 INA	§	240A(d)(l).	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Board	 held	 that	 “an	 offense	must	 be	
one	‘referred	to	in	section	212(a)(2)”	of	the	Act,	8	U.S.C.	§	1182(a)(2)	(1994	




ISSUE	 Whether	 the	 "stop-time"	 rule	 operates	 to	 terminate	 the	 period	 of	
continuous	 residence	 required	 for	 Cancellation	of	 Removal	as	 of	 the	 date	
the	noncitizen	commits	the	offense	that	renders	him/her	deportable?	
HOLDING	 The	 stop-time	 rule	 is	 triggered	by	 a	 noncitizen	who	 violates	 a	 provision	 in	
INA	§	212(a)(2),	§	237(a)(2)	or	237(a)(4).	
• 	 Respondent	Cristobal	Perez,	admitted	each	of	the	 factual	 allegations	 in	the	
Notice	 to	Appear.	 Specifically,	 he	 admitted 	 that 	was	 first	 admitted	 as	 a	
temporary	 resident	 on	 September	 21,	 1989,	 and	 that	 his	 status	 was	
subsequently	 adjusted	 to	 that	 of	 an	 LPR	 on	 December	 7,	 1990.	 The	
noncitizen	 further	 admitted	 that	 he	 was	 convicted	 on	 July	 11,	 1997,	 in	
Texas,	 of	possession	of	 cocaine,	 and	 that	 this	offense	was	committed	on	or	
about	August	 4,	 1992.	The	noncitizen	 conceded	 that	he	was	 removable	 as	
charged	 under	 section	 237(a)(2)(B)(i)	 of	 the	 Act	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	





continuous	 residence	 is	deemed	 to	have	ended	on	the	date	he	 committed	
his	 controlled	 substance	 violation.	 The	 commission	 of	 that	 offense	 was	
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prior	 to	 his	 attainment	 of	 the	 required	 7	 years	 of	 continuous	 residence.	
Therefore,	 he	 was	statutorily	 ineligible	 for	 section	240A(a)	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal.	 Accordingly,	 the	 Board	 found	 that	 the	 IJ's	 pretermission	 of	 his	
application	 for	Cancellation	of	Removal	was	proper.		
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	the	Board	concluded	that	"admission	in	any	
status"	 includes	 admission	 as	 a	 temporary	 resident.	 Also,	 "Under	 INA	
240A(d)(l)(B),	 continuous	 residence	 is	 deemed	 to	 end	 upon	 the	





ISSUE	 Whether	 S e c t i o n 	 2 1 2 ( c ) 	 provides	 an	 indiscriminate	 waiver	 for	
individuals	who	demonstrate	 statutory	eligibility?	
HOLDING	 Section	 212(c)	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 indiscriminate	 waiver	 for	 individuals	
who	demonstrate	statutory	eligibility.	
• 	 Respondent	Edwards,	who	was	 admitted	 as	an	LPR	in	1968.	He	married	a	
US	 citizen	 with	 whom	 he	 had	 four	 US	 citizen	 children.	 He	 incurred	
criminal	 convictions	while	 in	the	US	that	entailed	him	serving	 some	2	and	
1/2	years	of	imprisonment.	The	noncitizen	 implored	that	he	be	allowed	to	
remain	 in	 the	 US	 because	 of	 his	 family.	 He	 insisted	 that	 he	 would	 work	
hard	to	change	his	ways.	He	stated	that	his	wife	and	children,	as	well	as	his	




favorable	 factors	 presented	 in	 his	 case.	 The	 Board	 balanced	 the	 various	
factors	 in	 the	 noncitizen'	 s	 case	 and	 took	 note	 of	 his	 favorable	 equities,	
which	 the	board	 found	to	be	unusual	or	outstanding.	 However,	when	the	
Board	 weighed	 these	 equities	 against	 the	 adverse	 factors	 of	 the	
noncitizen's	 extensive	 criminal	 record,	 the	 Board	 determined	 that	 a	
favorable	exercise	of	discretion	was	not	warranted.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	Board	 states	 that	under	 f o rme r 	 INA	
§	 212(c),	 courts	 should	 consider	 the	 record	 as	 a	 whole.	 Additionally,	
this	case	clarified	confusion	that	was	found	from	the	rehabilitation	factor	in	
Matter	of	Marin.	Some	courts	found	that	“a	clear	showing	of	reformation	is	
an	 absolute	 prerequisite	 to	 a	 favorable	 exercise	 of	 discretion;”	 however,	










all	 who	 demonstrate	 statutory	 eligibility	 for	 such	 relief.	 Rather,	 the	
adjudicator	will	consider	positive	and	adverse	factors,	as	set	forth	below.	
• 	 Respondent	Marin	was	admitted	as	a	LPR	on	 February	 3,	 1965.	 In	March	
1976,	 he	 pled	 guilty	 to	 the	 felony	 charge	 of	criminal	 sale	 of	 cocaine.	 He	
served	 30	months	 in	 New	 York	 State	 penal	 institutions.	 In	May	 1977	he	
was	 served	 with	 an	 order	 to	 show	 cause	 and	 was	 charged	 with	 being	
deportable.	 The	IJ	 found	him	deportable	and	 he	appealed.	The	noncitizen	
argued	 that	 he	 was	 eligible	 for	 212(c)	 relief.	 The	 Board	 stated	 that	
Section	 212(c)	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 indiscriminate	 waiver	 for	 all	 who	
demonstrate	 statutory	 eligibility	 for	 such	 relief.	 Instead,	 the	 Attorney	
General	 is	 required	 to	 determine	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 discretion	 whether	 an	
applicant	 warrants	 the	 relief	 sought.	 The	 Board	 concluded	 that	 the	
noncitizen	 bears	 the	 burden	 of	demonstrating	 that	 his	 application	merits	
favorable	 consideration.	 The	 noncitizen	 was	 unable	 to	 advance	 any	
substantial	equities	and	the	Board	dismissed	his	appeal.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Board	 courts	 should	 consider	 a	
noncitizen's	record	as	a	 whole.	Courts	should	balance	 the	adverse	 factors	
evidencing	 the	 noncitizen's	 undesirability	 as	 a	 permanent	 resident	 with	
the	 social	 and	 humane	 considerations	 presented	 in	 his	 or	 her	 behalf	 to	
determine	 whether	 relief	 should	 be	 granted.	 Adverse	 factors	 include:	 (1)	
“the	nature	and	underlying	circumstances	of	the	exclusion	ground	at	issue,”	
(2)	 “the	 presence	 of	 additional	 significant	 violations	 of	 this	 country's	




US,	 (2)	 residence	 of	 long	 duration	 in	 this	 country	 (particularly	 when	 the	





exists,	 and	 (9)	 other	 evidence	 attesting	 to	 a	 respondent's	 good	 character	












ISSUE	1	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 had	 mistakenly	 responded	 falsely	 on	 an	
application	 for	 adjustment	 of	 status	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 been	 “lawfully	
admitted	for	permanent	residence?”	
ISSUE	2	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 been	 “lawfully”	 admitted	 for	




A	 noncitizen	 who	 had	 mistakenly	 responded	 falsely	 on	 an	 application	 for	




A	 noncitizen	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 been	 admitted	 as	 a	 lawful	 permanent	
resident	when	s/he	is	admitted	on	a	conditional	basis.		
• 	 The	 Respondent,	 Earl	 Gallimore,	 entered	 the	 U.S.	 on	 August	 7,	 1993	
pursuant	to	a	nonimmigrant	visa.	On	September	25,	1993,	police	found	five	
pounds	of	marijuana	in	Respondent’s	car	on	a	car	stop.	On	January	12,	1994,	
Respondent	married	a	US	 citizen	and	applied	 for	 adjustment	of	 status.	On	
the	 application	 for	 adjustment	 of	 status,	 Respondent	 answered	 no	 to	 the	
following	 question:	 “Have	 you	 ever,	 in	 or	 outside	 the	 U.S.	 been	 arrested,	
cited,	 charged,	 indicted,	 fined,	 or	 imprisoned	 for	 breaking	 or	 violating	 any	
law	or	ordinance…?”	On	September	13,	1994,	Respondent	was	arrested	for	
the	 pending	 indictment	 for	 possession	 of	 marijuana	 and	 eventually	 pled	
guilty	 to	 the	 charge.	 On	 April	 1,	 1996,	 Respondent	 applied	 to	 have	 the	
conditions	 on	 his	 status	 removed.	 When	 Respondent	 applied	 for	 the	
removal	of	the	conditions,	his	wife	answered	on	a	supporting	document	that	
Respondent	 had	 never	 been	 convicted	 of	 violating	 any	 law.	On	December	
17,	 2001,	 Gallimore	 applied	 for	 naturalization	 and	 was	 denied.	 Due	 to	
Respondent’s	 previous	 failure	 to	 disclose	 the	 indictment,	 he	was	 found	 to	
have	 poor	 moral	 character.	 On	 April	 3,	 2006	 he	 was	 served	 a	 Notice	 to	
Appear.	Respondent	explained	to	the	IJ	that	he	had	not	understood	that	he	
had	 been	 arrested	 during	 the	 car	 stop.	 The	 IJ	 found	 that	 Respondent	 had	
“willfully	failed	to	disclose”	his	arrest	on	his	application	for	adjustment,	and	




with	 the	 IJ’s	 conclusion,	 and	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 affirmed.	 The	 Third	 Circuit	
concluded	 that	his	1995	conviction	 rendered	 the	Respondent	 inadmissible.	
As	 such,	 the	Respondent	was	 inadmissible	at	 the	 time	adjustment,	 and	he	
had	 not	 been	 “lawfully”	 admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence.	 However,	 the	
Third	Circuit	found	that	this	was	not	the	end	of	the	inquiry	as	the	date	that	
Respondent	 could	 be	 considered	 to	 have	 obtained	 “lawful”	 permanent	
residence	is	January	12,	1994,	the	date	in	which	Respondent	had	applied	for	
conditional	permanent	residence.	The	Third	Circuit	found	that	the	Board	did	
not	 speak	 to	 this	 issue.	 While	 finding	 that	 the	 word	 “permanent”	 may	
connote	a	meaning	that	did	not	encompass	noncitizens	given	a	conditional	
status,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 found	 this	 interpretation	 to	 be	 inconsistent	 with	
Section	1186(a),	which	concerns	“conditional	permanent	residents’	eligibility	
for	citizenship.”	The	statutes	states:	“For	purposes	of	[naturalization]	in	the	
case	 of	 an	 alien	 who	 is	 in	 the	 United	 States	 as	 an	 LPR	 resident	 on	 a	





LPRs,	 as	 well.	 Therefore,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 indicates	 that	 the	 court	 is	 not	
aware	 of	 any	 reason	 to	 conclude	 that	 a	 conditional	 permanent	 resident	 is	
not	 a	 “lawful”	 permanent	 resident.	 However,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 leaves	 this	
decision	 to	 the	 Board	 to	 make	 an	 affirmative	 holding	 that	 a	 conditional	
permanent	resident	is	considered	a	“lawful”	permanent	resident.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 for	 three	 reasons.	 The	 case	 affirms	 the	 Board’s	
holding	 that	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 fraudulently	 or	 mistakenly	 completed	 an	
application	 for	 lawful	 permanent	 residence	will	 not	be	 considered	 to	have	
“lawfully”	entered.	The	noncitizen	will	not	be	considered	to	have	“lawfully”	




MATTER	 OF	 PAEK,	 26	 I.	 &	 N.	 403	 (BIA	 2014),	 aff’d,	 793	 F.3d	 330	 (3d	 Cir.	 2015)	
[Precedent]:	
ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 was	 admitted	 to	 the	 U.S.	 as	 a	 conditional	
permanent	resident	is	considered	a	lawful	permanent	resident?	
HOLDING	 A	 noncitizen	 spouse	 lawfully	 admitted	 as	 a	 permanent	 resident	 on	 a	
conditional	basis,	is	considered	an	LPR.	
• 	 Respondent	Ka	A.	Paek,	was	admitted	 into	 the	U.S.	 in	1991.	Respondent	
was	 convicted	 of	 theft	 in	 2005	 and	 robbery	 in	 2006,	 and	 removal	
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proceedings	 were	 initiated	 in	 July	 2013.	 Respondent	 then	 applied	 for	
adjustment	of	status	pursuant	to	his	marriage	to	a	U.S.	citizen	and	applied	
for	 Section	 212(h)	 waiver.	 However,	 the	 waiver	 states	 that	 “No	 waiver	
shall	 be	 granted	 under	 this	 subsection	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 alien	 who	 has	
previously	 been	 admitted	 to	 the	 United	 States	 as	 an	 alien	 lawfully	
admitted	for	permanent	residence	if…	since	the	date	of	his	admission	the	
alien	 has	 been	 convicted	 of	 an	 aggravated	 felony.”	 Therefore,	 if	 the	
Respondent	was	considered	a	“lawful”	permanent	resident	at	the	time	of	
his	convictions,	he	would	not	be	eligible	for	the	waiver.	The	Board	found	
that	 “notwithstanding	 any	other	 provision	of	 this	Act,	 an	 alien	 spouse….	
shall	be	considered,	at	the	time	of	obtaining	the	status	of	an	alien	lawfully	
admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence	 to	 have	 obtained	 such	 status	 on	 a	
conditional	basis	to	the	provisions	of	this	section.”		
• 	 While	this	case	deals	with	§	212(h)	waivers,	this	case	further	indicates	that	










• 	 The	 noncitizen	 family	 members	 were	 natives	 and	 citizens	 of	 Taiwan	 and	
included	 an	 adult	 female	 and	 her	 two	 minor	 children.	 They	 were	 initially	
admitted	to	the	US	as	LPRs	on	June	5,	1982.	The	noncitizen's	 husband	was	
admitted	as	a	lawful	permanent	 resident	one	week	earlier.	The	noncitizen's	
husband,	 after	 receiving	 his	 Alien	 Registration	 Receipt	 Card,	 returned	 to	
Japan	 to	continue	 studying	and	working	at	a	 university's	medical	 school	as	
a	 medical	 doctor.	 Soon	 after,	 the	 noncitizen	 wife	 and	 the	 children	
returned	 to	 Japan.	 The	 noncitizen	 and	 her	 two	 children	 last	 sought	 to	
reenter	 the	 U.S.	 on	 May	 10,	 1986,	 at	 which	 time	 they	 were	 placed	 in	
exclusion	 proceedings	 and	 ordered	 removed.	 She	 appealed.	 The	 INS	
contended	 on	 appeal	 that	 the	 noncitizens	 had	 abandoned	 their	 LPR	
statuses.	 The	 Board	 noted	 that	 the	 INS	 has	 the	 burden	 of	 proving	 that	 a	






the	 end	 of	 the	 period	 of	 absence	 can	 be	 fixed	 by	 some	 early	 event.”	 The	
noncitizen’s	professed	intent	to	return	is	not	sufficient	to	support	a	finding	
that	the	visit	was	“temporary.”	The	Board	 found	 that	 the	 INS	 had	met	 the	
burden	 and	 the	 Board	 ordered	 the	 noncitizen	 and	 her	 children	 removed	
from	the	U.S.	






ISSUE	 Whether	a	parent’s	 lawful	permanent	 resident	 status	 can	be	 imputed	 to	a	
child	for	purposes	of	calculating	the	5	years	of	 lawful	permanent	residence	
required	 to	 establish	 eligibility	 for	 cancellation	 of	 removal	 under	 §	
240A(a)(1)?	
HOLDING	 A	child	of	an	LPR	may	not	impute	the	parent’s	 length	of	time	as	an	LPR	for	
purposes	 of	 5	 years	 of	 lawful	 permanent	 residence	 and	 7-year	 continuous	
residence	requirement.		
• 	 This	case	decided	two	consolidated	cases	about	imputation,	one	with	regard	
to	 the	 5-year	 LPR	 requirement	 and	 the	 other	 with	 regard	 to	 7-year	
continuous	 residence	 requirement.	 Only	 Respondent	 Martinez	 Gutierrez	
involved	 imputation	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 five	 years	 of	 lawful	 permanent	
residence	 requirement.	Martinez	 Gutierrez,	 illegally	 entered	 the	 U.S.	 with	
his	family	in	1989,	when	he	was	five	years	old.	Respondent’s	father	obtained	
a	LPR	status	two	years	later;	however,	respondent	never	adjusted	his	status	
until	 2003.	 Two	years	 later	 respondent	was	apprehended	and	admitted	 to	
smuggling	 undocumented	 people	 across	 the	 border.	 He	 then	 applied	 for	
cancellation	 of	 removal.	 The	 IJ	 determined	 he	 could	 qualify	 for	 LPR	 §	
240A(a)(1)	and	(a)(2)	on	his	own	because	of	his	father’s	status,	but	the	Board	
reversed.	Respondent	appealed	to	the	Court	of	Appeals,	which	reversed	and	
remanded	the	decision	to	 the	Board.	On	appeal	 from	the	Ninth	Circuit,	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 concluded	 that	 the	 Board’s	 interpretation	 of	 §240A(a)(1)	 is	
“based	on	a	permissible	construction	of	the	statute,”	and	reversed	the	Ninth	
Circuit’s	decision.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 reaffirmed	 the	 Board’s	
holding	that	a	parent’s	LPR	status	may	not	 be	 imputed	 to	their	children	 to	











JURADO-DELGADO	 v.	 ATTORNEY	 GENERAL,	 498	 Fed.	 App.	 101	 (3d	 Cir.	 2009)	
[Precedent]:	
ISSUE	 Whether	 INA	 §	 240A(a)	 can	 be	 applied	 retroactively	 to	 crimes	
committed	by	an	LPR	in	1991,	before	INA	§240	was	enacted?	
HOLDING	 A	noncitizen	who	committed	crimes	for	which	s/he	was	deportable	under	
pre-Illegal	 Immigration	Reform	and	 Immigrant	 Responsibility	Act	may	be	
deportable	 under	 post-IIRIRA	 proceedings;	 the	 court	 left	 open	 the	
question	 as	 to	 whether	 Lawful	 Permanent	 Resident	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal	 can	be	applied	 retroactively	 to	 crimes	 committed	before	 IIRIRA	
was	enacted.	
• 	 Respondent,	Jimmy	Jurado-Delgado,	 a	native	and	citizen	of	Ecuador,	was	
admitted	to	the	U.S.	as	an	LPR	in	 1985.	Jurado-Delgado	conceded	before	
an	IJ	that	he	was	removable	either	under	 INA	§237(a)(2)(A)(ii)	 for	 having	
been	 convicted	 of	 two	 crimes	 involving	 moral	 turpitude	 in	 1997,	 or	
under	 INA	 §	237(a)(3)(D),	 for	 having	 falsely	 represented	himself	 to	 be	 a	
U.S.	 citizen,	 but	 he	 requested	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 under	 INA	
§240A(a).	 The	court	held	 that	 Jurado-Delgado's	 1991	crimes	 stopped	his	
accrual	of	 time	 toward	a	 period	of	 seven	 years	of	 continuous	residence	
because	 they	 were	 crimes	 involving	 moral	 turpitude,	 which	 rendered	
him	 inadmissible	 under	 §	 212(a)(2)(A)(i).	 Jurado-Delgado	 petitioned	 for	
review	 of	 a	 final	 order	 of	 the	 Board.	 He	 argued,	 among	 other	 things,	
that	 the	Board's	determination	 that	 he	was	 ineligible	 for	Cancellation	of	
Removal	 is	the	result	of	an	 impermissible,	 retroactive	 application	of	that	
statute.	 In	 his	 view,	 the	 Board,	 when	 determining	 whether	 he	 was	
statutorily	 eligible	 for	Cancellation	 Of	 removal,	 was	 not	 entitled	 to	 take	
into	 account	 crimes	 that	 he	 committed	 prior	 to	 Congress's	 creation	 of	
that	 remedy.	 Because	 the	 Board	 applied	 the	 law	 in	 effect	 at	 the	 time	
Jurado-Delgado	 committed	 the	 deportable	 offense,	 no	 question	 of	
retroactivity	 was	 implicated.	 Here,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 Court	 denied	
Jurado-Delgado's	petition	for	review.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 it	 suggests	 that	 INA	 §	 240A(a)	 can	 be	
applied	 retroactively	 to	 crimes	 committed	 by	 an	 LPR	 before	 INA	 §	240A	
was	 enacted,	 such	 that	 the	 crimes	 can	 stop	 accrual	 of	 time	 toward	 a	










• 	 Respondent,	 Cristian	 Guzman	 is	 a	 38-year-old	 citizen	 of	 the	 Dominican	
Republic.	He	was	admitted	to	the	U.S.	as	an	LPR	on	October	8,	1994	and	had	
continually	resided	in	the	U.S.	since	that	time.	In	1995,	Guzman	was	arrested	
in	NY	and	 charged	with	Criminal	 Possession	of	 a	Controlled	 Substance.	On	
December	19,	1995,	Guzman	pled	guilty	 to	a	 lesser	possession	 charge	and	
was	 sentenced	 to	 3	 years’	 probation.	 In	 2005,	 he	was	 again	 arrested	 and	
charged	with	Criminal	Possession	of	a	Controlled	Substance	and	pled	guilty.	
On	December	1,	2005	he	was	sentenced	to	time	served.	On	March	6,	2012,	
DHS	 served	Guzman	with	an	NTA	and	 took	him	 into	custody	based	on	 the	
2005	 conviction	 pursuant	 to	 a	 controlled	 substance	 abuse	 (INA	
§237(a)(2)(B)(i)).	He	conceded	removability,	but	applied	for	LPR	Cancellation	
of	 Removal.	 The	 Government	 argued	 that	 Guzman	 was	 ineligible	 for	 the	
relief	because	the	stop-time	rule	terminated	his	continuous	residence	when	
he	 committed	 the	 1995	 drug	 offense.	 Guzman	 argued	 that	 he	 could	 have	
accrued	7	 years	 of	 continuous	 residence.	 Specifically,	Guzman	argued	 that	
(1)	 the	 application	 of	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 was	 impermissibly	 retroactive	
because	the	rule	became	effective	on	April	1,	1997	through	IIRIRA,	after	he	
committed	 his	 1995	 drug	 offense;	 (2)	 he	 should	 be	 able	 to	 apply	 for	 the	





years	of	 admission	were	punished	by	being	 subject	 to	 the	 rule.	 Therefore,	
Guzman	moved	to	terminate	his	deportation	to	apply	for	naturalization.	The	
IJ	 held	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 was	 not	 arbitrary;	 therefore,	 Guzman	 was	
ineligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 and	 for	 212(c)	 because	 he	 had	 only	
accrued	1	year	of	continuous	residence	by	the	time	he	committed	the	1995	
crime.	Further,	Guzman	had	not	made	affirmative	communication	with	DHS	
regarding	 his	 prima	 facie	 eligibility	 for	 naturalization,	which	 is	 required	 to	
terminate	the	deportation	so	that	the	Petitioner	can	seek	naturalization	(In	
re	 Acosta	 Hidalgo).	 The	 Board	 affirmed	 the	 IJ’s	 holding	 and	 found	 that	
Guzman	 could	 not	 apply	 simultaneously	 for	 212(c)	 relief	 and	 LPR	
Cancellation	of	Removal	because	8	U.S.C.	§	1229b(c)(6)	explicitly	precludes	




his	 continuous	 residence	 for	 purposes	of	 Cancellation	of	Removal	 because	
the	 212(c)	 waiver	 does	 not	 serve	 to	 pardon,	 expunge,	 or	 eliminate	 all	
negative	 immigration	 consequences	 stemming	 from	a	noncitizen’s	 criminal	
conviction.	The	3rd	Circuit	Court	affirmed	the	Board’s	decision	that	Guzman	
was	 ineligible	 to	apply	 for	 the	212(c).	 The	Court	 cited	St.	Cyr,	wherein	 the	
noncitizen	has	accrued	the	required	7	years	of	continuous	residence	before	
IIRIRA	became	effective	 and	 removal	 proceedings	 commenced	 after	 IIRIRA	
became	 effective,	 thus,	 retroactive	 application	 of	 IIRIRA	 was	 held	 a	 “new	
disability”	because	the	LPR	already	had	a	vested	right	to	use	212(c)	when	he	
plead	 guilty.	 The	 3rd	 Circuit	 Court	 also	 cited	 to	 Sinotes-Cruz,	 where	 the	
noncitizen	committed	a	crime	pre-IIRIRA	that	was	later	reclassified	by	IIRIRA	




time	 he	 committed	 the	 1995	 crime,	 and	 the	 1995	 crime	 made	 him	
deportable.	Thus,	the	stop-time	rule	was	triggered	and	made	him	ineligible	
for	LPR	Cancellation	of	Removal.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 3rd	 Circuit	 reinforced	 that	 an	 LPR	may	
use	 212(c)	 as	 relief	 only	 when	 the	 vested	 right	 to	 qualify	 under	 212(c)	
existed	 at	 the	 time	 in	which	 the	 crime	was	 committed	 and	 that	 the	 stop-
time	 rule	 does	 apply	 retroactively	 to	 terminate	 the	 accrual	 of	 continuous	
presence	 for	 purposes	 of	 LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal67.	 Additionally,	 the	












be	 applied	 retroactively	 to	 prevent	 noncitizens	 from	 fulfilling	 the	 seven-year	 continuous	 residence	








document	 on	 which	 the	 current	 removal	 proceeding	 is	 based	 (8	 U.S.C.	 §	
1229b(d)(1));	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 charging	 documents	
served	in	prior	proceedings.		
• 	 Respondent	 Ignacio	 Cisneros-Gonzalez’s	 first	 removal	 proceeding	 was	 in	
December	28,	1990.	He	was	served	with	an	Order	to	Show	Cause,	Notice	of	
Hearing,	 and	Warrant	 for	 Arrest	 of	 Alien	 (Form	 I-221S),	 charging	 him	with	







However,	 the	Board’s	 legislative	history	analysis	determined	 that	Congress	
did	 not	 intend	 for	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 under	 INA	 §240A(d)(1)	 to	 ban	
noncitizens	 from	 seeking	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 relief.	 The	 “stop-time”	
rule	 was	 not	 intended	 to	 extend	 to	 charging	 documents	 issued	 in	 earlier	




applied	 for	 suspension	 of	 deportation	 based	 on	 a	 single	 order	 to	 show	
cause.	Here,	however,	multiple	charging	documents	existed.	When	the	DHS	
does	not	or	 cannot	 reinstate	a	prior	order	of	 removal	 against	 a	previously	
deported	 noncitizen	 and	 instead	 issues	 a	 new	 order	 of	 removal,	 the	
noncitizen	may	be	eligible	to	apply	for	Cancellation	of	Removal	based	on	the	
accrual	 of	 the	 new	 continuous	 presence	 (§	 240A(b))	 or	 new	 continuous	
residence	(§	240A(a)).	Importantly,	note	that	Cisneros-Gonzalez	was	applied	
to	§	240A(b)	[Non-LPR	Cancellation	of	Removal],	rather	than	§	240A(a)	[LPR	
Cancellation	of	Removal].	Under	§	240A(d)(1),	however,	 the	 stop-time	 rule	
applies	 to	 both	 LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal’s	 continuous	 residence	








him	 to	 accrue	 the	 time	 required	 to	 establish	 eligibility	 for	 Non-LPR	
Cancellation	of	Removal?	
HOLDING	 A	noncitizen	who	lawfully	reenters	the	U.S.	after	overstaying	a	visa	may	start	
a	 new	 accrual	 of	 time	 for	 purposes	 of	 satisfying	 the	 requisite	 10-year	
continuous	 physical	 presence	 when	 the	 noncitizen’s	 Notice	 to	 Appear	
exclusively	charges	the	noncitizen	with	being	a	visa	overstay.	
• 	 Respondent,	 Anderson	 Jude	 Okeke,	 a	 native	 and	 citizen	 of	 Nigeria,	
petitioned	for	review	of	two	orders	from	the	Board.	Those	orders	affirmed	
the	 Immigration	 Judge's	 decision	 that	 Okeke	 could	 not	 demonstrate	 the	
requisite	 continuous	 physical	 presence	 in	 the	 U.S.	 in	 order	 to	 qualify	 for	
Non-LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal.	 Essentially,	 the	 Board	 found	 that	 the	
'stop-time'	 provision	 (INA	 §	 240A(d)(l)),	 once	 triggered,	 precluded	 the	
accrual	 of	 a	 new	 period	 of	 continuous	 presence,	 which	 in	 this	 case	
commenced	 with	 Okeke's	 lawful	 reentry	 into	 the	 U.S.	 The	 lawful	 reentry,	
which	 was	 the	 critical	 fact	 on	 appeal,	 occurred	 after	 Okeke	 committed	 a	
controlled	 substance	 offense,	 which,	 pursuant	 to	 INA	 §	 240A(d)(l),	 clearly	
ended	 any	 prior	 period	 of	 continuous	 physical	 residence.	 This	 court	
concluded	 that	 the	 clock	 restarted	 upon	Okeke's	 reentry.	 Pursuant	 to	 the	
express	 terms	of	 the	NTA,	 it	was	 the	 last	 reentry	 into	 the	U.S.	 that	 should	
have	been	considered	in	calculating	continuous	physical	presence.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 a	 noncitizen	 is	 entitled	 to	 a	 new	period	 of	
continuous	physical	presence	under	INA	§	240A(d)(l),	commencing	upon	his	
lawful	reentry	into	the	U.S.,	so	as	to	allow	him	to	accrue	the	time	required	to	
establish	 eligibility	 for	 Non-LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal.	 Here,	 the	 Third	
Circuit	 is	 applying	 the	 holding	 in	 Cisneros.	 Though	 this	 holding	 applies	 to	
Non-LPR	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal,	 the	 holding	 could	 also	 apply	 to	 LPR	
Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 as	 INA	 §	 240A(d)(l)	 refers	 to	 both	 continuous	








7-year	 period	 of	 continuous	 residence	 required	 for	 cancellation	 of	
removal…section	 240A(d)(1)	 of	 the	 Act	 does	 not	 permit	 such	 residence	 to	













when	he	 re-entered	after	his	 trip	 to	Canada.	Thus,	according	 to	 the	 IJ,	 the	
clock	 stopped	 for	 purposes	 of	 accruing	 continuous	 residence	 time	 on	
February	20,	1999,	at	which	point	Nelson	had	not	resided	in	the	U.S.	for	7-







The	 respondent	 in	 Okeke,	 was	 then	 placed	 into	 removal	 proceedings	 for	
failing	to	maintain	a	student	status.	Here,	the	Board	found	that	the	fact	that	








of	 7-years	 continuous	 residence	 when	 the	 clock-stopping	 event	 was	 the	
basis	 for	 removal.	 Further,	 this	 distinguishes	 the	 holding	 in	 Okeke	 v.	
Attorney	General,	providing	a	further	wrinkle	in	that	the	clock	cannot	restart	











• 	 Respondent,	 Narinder	 Singh,	 was	 a	 native	 and	 citizen	 of	 India.	 He	 was	
granted	asylum	on	July	1,	1993,	and	adjusted	to	LPR	status	on	June	1,	1994.	
On	September	14,	2000,	he	was	convicted	 in	the	U.S.	District	Court	for	the	
Northern	 District	 of	 Florida	 of	 conspiracy	 to	 counterfeit	 passports,	
counterfeiting	and	using	visas,	and	mail	fraud	in	violation	of	18	U.S.C.	§	371.	
He	 was	 also	 convicted	 of	 unlawful	 possession	 of	 forged,	 counterfeited,	
altered,	and	falsely	made	nonimmigrant	U.S.	visas	in	violation	of	18	U.S.C.	§	




because	 he	 had	 a	 counterfeiting	 conviction,	 a	 crime	 involving	 moral	
turpitude.	 Singh	 applied	 for	 Cancellation	of	 Removal	 but	 the	 IJ	 denied	 the	
petition	and	the	Board	dismissed	his	appeal	based	on	a	finding	that	he	had	
not	accrued	seven	years	of	continuous	residence	in	the	U.S.	to	be	eligible	for	
Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 pursuant	 to	 8	 U.S.C.	 §	 1229b(a)	 [240A(a)].	 Singh	
then	filed	a	petition	for	review	arguing	that	his	2003	re-entry	restarted	the	
clock	 for	purposes	of	 the	 seven-year	 residence	 requirement.	However,	 the	








a	 CIMT,	 the	 CIMT	 terminated	 his	 continuous	 residence	 and	 continuous	
presence	so	his	re-entry	could	not	restart	the	clock.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 it	 reaffirms	 that	 re-entry	 can	 re-start	 the	
clock	after	a	“clock	stopping	event”	(i.e.,	receipt	of	a	NTA),	except	when	the	
NTA	 states	 the	 “clock	 stopping	event”	as	 the	 cause	 for	 removal.	Here,	 the	
Third	Circuit	distinguished	 in	part	and	applied	 in	part	 the	holding	 in	Okeke	















a	Notice	 to	Appear,	which	 included	 the	 phrase	 “To	 be	 set”	 in	 the	 space	
provided	for	the	date	and	time	of	the	hearing.	The	NTA	was	later	filed	with	
the	 Harlingen	 Immigration	 Court,	 which	 issued	 a	 notice	 of	 hearing	 on	
November	9,	2007.	She	was	charged	with	alien	smuggling	and	the	IJ	found	
her	removable.	But	the	IJ	granted	her	petition	for	Cancellation	of	Removal	
on	 the	 grounds	 that	 Camarillo	 had	 accrued	 the	 required	 seven-years	 of	
continuous	 residence	 by	 the	 time	 the	 Court	 issued	 the	 notice	 that	
contained	the	hearing	date.	The	IJ	interpreted	the	terms	in	239(a)(1)	of	8	
U.S.C.	§1229(a)(1)(G),	“[t]he	time	and	place	at	which	the	proceedings	will	
be	 held,”	 as	 requirements	 for	 an	 NTA	 so	 that	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 takes	
effect.	DHS	 appealed,	 arguing	 that	 section	§	 1229(a)(1)	 specifies	 that	 an	
NTA	must	be	served,	and	the	terms	in	§1229(a)(1)(G)	help	identify	what	an	
NTA	is.	The	Board	agreed	with	the	DHS	that	the	key	phrase	was	“served	a	
notice	 to	 appear”	 and	 the	 Congress	 intended	 the	 phrase	 “under	 section	
239(a)”	 after	 “notice	 to	 appear”	 to	 specify	 the	 document	 the	DHS	must	
serve	 to	 trigger	 the	 “stop-time”	 rule.	 Additionally,	 the	 court	 highlighted	
that	 removal	 proceedings	 commence	 when	 the	 NTA	 is	 filed	 with	 the	
Immigration	Court.	8	C.F.R.	§	1239.1(a)	(2011).	Since	the	commencement	
of	 proceedings	 is	 a	 separate	 issue	 from	 the	 service	 of	 the	 NTA,	 what	
mattered	 was	 the	 NTA	 that	 Camarillo	 was	 served	 in	 person.	 Thus,	
Camarillo	 was	 not	 eligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 because	 she	 had	
not	 accrued	 seven-years	 at	 the	 time	 she	was	 served	 in	 2005.	 The	 court	
sustained	the	appeal	by	DHS.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	the	holding	found	that	the	NTA	will	suffice	
to	end	continuous	residence,	regardless	 if	 there	 is	a	date	or	time	for	the	
hearing	 on	 the	NTA	 at	 the	 time	 the	 noncitizen	 is	 served.	 The	 court	 also	
distinguished	 that	 the	 date	 that	 mattered	 for	 purposes	 of	 terminating	
continuous	residence	is	the	date	that	the	NTA	was	served	and	not	the	date	
on	which	 removal	 proceedings	 commence	 nor	 the	 date	 that	 the	 NTA	 is	
filed.	 Peculiarly,	 the	 Board	 never	 makes	 any	 conclusions	 regarding	
Camarillo’s	 criminal	 conviction	 for	 smuggling	 aliens	 into	 the	 U.S.,	 which	








ISSUE	 Whether	 a	parent's	 lawful	permanent	 resident	 status	can	be	 imputed	 to	a	
child	 for	 purposes	 of	 calculating	 the	 5	 years	 of	 lawful	 permanent	




• 	 Respondent,	Ramirez-Vargas,	 a	native	 and	citizen	of	Mexico	 and	an	LPR	of	
the	 U.S.,	 was	 found	 removable	 as	 a	 noncitizen	 convicted	 of	 a	 controlled	
substance	 violation	 but	 granted	 his	 application	 for	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal.	 The	 DHS	 appealed,	 arguing	 that	 the	 IJ	 erred	 in	 finding	 the	
respondent	 statutorily	eligible	 for	that	relief	because	the	lawful	permanent	
residence	of	the	noncitizen's	father	could	not	be	imputed	to	the	noncitizen.	
The	 Board	 sustained	 the	 appeal	 by	 DHS.	 The	 Board	 held	 that	 a	 parent's	
period	of	residence	in	the	U.S.	cannot	be	imputed	to	a	child	for	purposes	of	
calculating	 the	 7	 years	 of	 continuous	 residence	 required	 to	 establish	
eligibility	for	Cancellation	of	Removal	under	INA	§	240A(a)(2).	
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	it	rejected	the	9th	Circuit	Court’s	holding	that	
imputation	 of	 a	 parent’s	 LPR	 status	 to	 a	 child	was	 permissible.	Matter	 Of	
Escobar,	24	 I.	&	N.	Dec.	231	 (BIA	2007).	Matter	of	Escobar	was	vacated	 in	




ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 entered	 the	 U.S.	 as	 a	 minor	 can	 impute	 his	





of	 13	 to	 join	 his	 parents	 who	 had	 previously	 come	 to	 the	 U.S..	
Approximately	 five	 years	 after	 coming	 to	 the	 U.S.,	 the	 noncitizen	
committed	 a	 crime	 involving	 moral	 turpitude.	 He	 was	 later	 charged	 with	
being	removable	 based	 in	part	on	that	crime.	 The	noncitizen	 admitted	 the	
allegations	 but	 argued	 that	 he	 was	 eligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	
based	on	his	father's	seven	years	of	continuous	residence	in	the	U.S.	prior	to	
any	 of	 the	 crimes	 being	 committed.	 The	 Board	 rejected	 that	 argument,	
interpreting	 the	 statute	 as	 requiring	 that	 the	 noncitizen	 himself	 actually	
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dwell	 in	the	U.S.	for	seven	years	 before	 committing	 the	 crime.	On	 review,	
the	 court	 held	 that	 the	 Board's	denial	 of	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 and	 its	
refusal	 to	 impute	 the	 father's	 years	 of	residence	 was	 permissible	 because	
it	was	 a	 straightforward	 application	 of	 the	statute's	 requirements.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 it	 affirms,	 under	 Chevron	 deference,	 the	
view	 that	 a	 parent's	 residence	 may	 not	 be	 imputed	 to	 his	 or	 her	 minor	







ISSUE	 Whether	 the	 "stop-time"	 rule	 operates	 to	 terminate	 the	 period	 of	




• 	 Respondent	 Cristobal	 Perez,	 admitted	 each	 of	 the	 factual	 allegations	 in	
the	 Notice	 to	 Appear.	 Specifically,	 he	 admitted 	 that 	 was	 first	
admitted	 as	 a	 temporary	 resident	 on	 September	 21,	 1989,	and	 that	 his	
status	was	subsequently	adjusted	to	that	of	an	LPR	on	 December	7,	 1990.	
The	 noncitizen	 further	 admitted	 that	 he	 was	 convicted	 on	 July	 11,	
1997,	 in	 Texas,	 of	 possession	 of	 cocaine,	 and	 that	 this	 offense	 was	
committed	on	or	about	August	4,	1992.	The	noncitizen	conceded	that	he	
was	removable	as	charged	under	section	237(a)(2)(B)(i)	of	the	Act	on	the	
basis	of	 this	 conviction	 and	 the	 IJ	 ordered	 him	 removed.	 The	noncitizen	
appealed	 to	 the	 Board	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 retroactive	 effect	 of	 §	 240A,	
arguing	 that	 the	 section's	 rules	 limiting	 eligibility	 for	 relief	 from	 removal	
should	 not	 apply	 to	 him.	 The	 Board,	 after	 finding	 that	 applying	 Section	
240A	 would	 not	 have	 an	 impermissible	 "retroactive	 effect,"	 concluded	
that	the	respondent's	period	of	 continuous	 residence	 is	deemed	 to	have	
ended	on	the	date	he	 committed	 his	controlled	 substance	violation.	 The	
commission	of	that	offense	was	prior	to	his	attainment	 of	the	 required	 7	
years	 of	 continuous	 residence.	 Therefore,	 he	 was	 statutorily	 ineligible	
for	 section	 240A(a)	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal.	 Accordingly,	 the	 Board	
found	 that	 the	 IJ's	 pretermission	 of	 his	 application	 for	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal	was	proper.		




240A(d)(l)(B),	 continuous	 residence	 is	 deemed	 to	 end	 upon	 the	






ISSUE	 Whether	 the	 noncitizen's	 commission	 of	 a	 firearms	 offense,	 which	 is	 not	
referred	 to	 in	 INA	 §	 212(a)(2),	 precluded	 him	 from	 satisfying	 the	




• 	 Respondent	 Ignacio	 Campos-Torres,	 was	 admitted	 to	 the	 U.S.	 as	 a	
temporary	 resident	 on	May	 4,	 1988,	and	 adjusted	 his	 status	 to	 that	 of	 an	
LPR	 on	 December	 13,	 1990.	 On	 September	 23,	 1993	 the	 noncitizen	 was	
convicted	 of	 a	 single	offense	 of	 unlawful	 use	 of	 a	weapon.	The	noncitizen	
was	 sentenced	 to	 18	 months	 of	 probation.	 On	 June	 25,	 1997,	 the	 INS	
issued	 and	 served	 a	NTA,	 commencing	 removal	 proceedings	and	 charging	
the	 noncitizen	 with	 removability.	 The	 issue	 that	 was	 raised	 before	 the	 IJ	
and	 argued	 in	 the	 initial	 briefs	 submitted	 on	 appeal	 concerned	 the	
appropriate	 date	 to	 apply	 in	 determining	 when	 accrual	 of	 continuous	
residence	 ends.	The	noncitizen	argued	that	under	the	plain	 language	of	the	
statute,	 firearms	 offenses	 do	 not	 cut	 off	 continuous	 residence	 because	
they	 are	 not	 "referred	 to"	 in	 §	 212(a)(2)	 of	 the	 Act.	 The	 government	
argued	 that	 the	 plain	 language	 of	 INA	 §	 240A(d)(l)	 does	 not	 clearly	
support	 either	 its	position	 or	 that	of	 the	noncitizen	 because	 the	 statute	 is	
ambiguous.	 The	 Board	 found	 that	 because	 the	 noncitizen's	 firearms	
offense,	 which	 rendered	 him	 deportable	 under	 INA	 §	 237(a)(2)(C),	 is	 not	
referred	to	in	INA	§	212(a)(2),	 it	did	not	stop	time	under	 INA	§	240A(d)(l).	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Board	 held	 that	 “an	 offense	 must	 be	 one	
‘referred	to	in	section	212(a)(2)”	of	the	Act,	8	U.S.C.	§	1182(a)(2)	(1994	&	Supp.	II	




ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 who	 has	 committed	 two	 crimes	 involving	 moral	
turpitude	 is	 precluded	 from	 establishing	 the	 requisite	 7	 years	 of	
continuous	 residence	 for	 cancellation	 of	 removal	 under	 INA	 §240A(a)(2),	





HOLDING	 The	 stop-time	 rule	 is	 triggered	 by	 crimes	 for	 which	 a	 noncitizen	 is	
inadmissible;	however,	the	stop-time	rule	is	not	triggered	by	petty	offenses.	
• 	 Respondent	 Jose	 Abraham	Deanda-Romo,	was	 admitted	 to	 the	 U.S.	 as	 an	
LPR	on	January	8,	1992.	On	September	21,	1999,	he	was	convicted	in	Texas	
of	 two	misdemeanor	 offenses	 of	 assault	 with	 bodily	 injury	 to	 his	 spouse,	
one	occurring	on	 October	 30,	 1998,	 and	 the	 other	 on	 June	 20,	 1999.	 He	
was	 sentenced	 to	 imprisonment	 for	 both	 offenses.	 He	 conceded	
removability	and	applied	for	LPR	Cancellation	of	Removal.	The	IJ	terminated	
the	 application	 after	 finding	 that	 the	 noncitizen	 was	 ineligible	 for	 relief	
under	 the	 "stop-time"	 rule.	 The	 Board	 held	 that	 the	 noncitizen	 was	 not	
precluded	 by	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 from	 establishing	 the	 requisite	 seven	
years	 of	 continuous	 residence	 because	 his	 first	 crime	 qualified	 as	 a	 petty	
offense,	 under	 INA	 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II),	 and	 therefore	 did	 not	 render	 him	
inadmissible.	 Thus,	 according	 to	the	Board,	the	noncitizen	had	accrued	the	
requisite	seven	years	of	continuous	residence	before	the	second	offense	was	
committed.	









• 	 Respondent	Barrington	Dudney,	was	 admitted	 to	 the	U.S.	 as	an	 immigrant	
in	 August	 1992.	 In	 October	 1998,	 he	 was	 convicted	 of	 possession	 and	
possession	with	the	 intent	to	deliver	a	controlled	 substance	 (92	packets	 of	
marijuana).	 On	 August	 3,	 1999,	 he	 was	 convicted	 of	 possession	 of	 a	
controlled	substance,	simple	assault	and	for	resisting	arrest	during	an	August	
20,	 1998	 incident.	 Dudney	 also	 was	 convicted	 on	 August	 31,	 1999	 of	
charges	 of	 simple	 assault,	 possession	 of	 an	 instrument	 of	 crime	 and	
recklessly	endangering	another	person	in	an	incident	on	February	 19,	1999.	
In	 June	 1999,	 the	 INS	 issued	 a	 NTA	 charging	 Dudney	 with	 removability	
based	 upon	 his	 October	 1998	 conviction.	 A	 removal	 order	 was	 entered	
after	Dudney	failed	to	appear	for	his	hearing,	but	the	IJ	later	terminated	the	
proceedings	 due	 to	 insufficient	 evidence.	 In	 October	 2001,	 the	 INS	 issued	
another	 NTA	 charging	 Dudney	 with	 removability	 for	 having	 committed	 an	




law	 relating	 to	 a	 controlled	 substance,	 other	 than	 a	 single	 offense	
involving	 possession	 for	 one's	 own	 use	 of	 30	 grams	 or	 less	 of	marijuana.	
These	 charges	 were	 based	 on	 the	 October	 1998	 and	 August	 31,	 1999	
convictions.	The	NTA	was	then	amended,	and	the	August	3,	1999	convictions	
for	 drug	 possession	 and	 simple	 assault,	 and	 another	 aggravated	 felony	
charge	 were	 added.	 Through	 counsel,	 Dudney	 sought	 cancellation	 of	
removal	 as	a	permanent	 resident	pursuant	 to	 INA	 §	240A(a).	 The	 IJ	 found	
Dudney	removable	for	a	violation	of	 law	relating	to	a	controlled	 substance,	
other	 than	 a	 single	 offense	 involving	 possession	 for	 one's	 own	 use	 of	 30	
grams	 or	 less	 of	marijuana,	 based	 on	 his	 August	 3,	 1999	 drug	 conviction.	
The	 Board	 also	 agreed	 with	 the	 IJ	 that	 Dudney	 was	 not	 eligible	 for	
cancellation	 of	 removal	 because	 he	did	not	meet	 the	 requirement	 that	he	
have	continuous	 residence	here	 for	 seven	years.	 The	Board	explained	 that	
even	 if	 Dudney	 could	 not	 be	 removed	 based	 upon	 his	 October	 1998	
conviction	 because	 the	 proceedings	 related	 to	 this	 conviction	 were	
terminated,	 the	October	 1998	conviction	stopped	the	clock	for	purposes	of	
the	 seven-year	 residence	 requirement.	 Alternatively,	 Dudney’s	 continuous	
residence	 stopped	 as	 early	 as	 August	 20,	 1998	 when	 the	 crime	 was	
committed.		
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 it	 affirms	 that	 an	 LPR	 must	 satisfy	 INA	 §	
240A(a)(2),	the	seven-year	continuous	residence	requirement,	in	order	to	be	













September	15,	1985.	He	was	convicted	 in	1991	of	retail	 theft	 in	violation	
of	 Pennsylvania	 law.	 In	 1992	 he	 was	 also	 convicted	 of	 unsworn	
falsification	 to	 authorities.	 In	 addition,	 the	 noncitizen	 was	 convicted	 in	
1997	of	 two	 crimes	 involving	moral	 turpitude	 that	were	 the	basis	 of	 the	
charge	 of	 removability	 in	 his	 NTA.	 In	 proceedings	 before	 the	 IJ,	 the	
noncitizen	 conceded	 that	 he	 was	 removable,	 both	 on	 the	 initial	 charge	
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and	 on	 a	 lodged	 charge	 that	 he	 falsely	 represented	 himself	 to	 be	 a	U.S.	
citizen.	He	applied	 for	Cancellation	 of	Removal	 under	 section	240A(a)	of	
the	 Act,	which	 the	 IJ	 granted.	 On	 appeal,	 the	 DHS	 contended	 that	 the	
noncitizen	 failed	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 requisite	 period	 of	 continuous	
residence	 to	 establish	 his	 eligibility	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal.	 The	
Board	agreed	and	found	that	the	IJ	erred	in	concluding	that	the	noncitizen	
was	eligible	for	cancellation	of	removal.	
• 	 This	case	is	 important	because	the	Board	concluded	that	the	time	period	






ISSUE	 Whether	 an	 LPR	 is	 eligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 when	 he	
commits	 a	 controlled	 substance	 violation,	 triggering	 the	 statute's	 "stop-
time"	provision	under	§	240A(d)(1)?	
HOLDING	 The	 stop-time	 rule	 only	 terminates	 the	 accrual	 of	 time	 for	 purposes	 of	
satisfying	the	requisite	7-year	continuous	residence;	the	stop-time	rule	does	
not	apply	to	the	5-years	of	permanent	residency	requirement.	
• 	 Respondent	George	Russel	Joseph	entered	the	U.S.	 in	1992	as	a	conditional	
resident	and	became	 an	LPR	 in	1994.	A	NTA	that	was	dated	June	15,	2005	
placed	him	 in	 removal	proceedings.	He	was	charged	with	being	 removable	
because	 in	 August	 of	 1997	 he	 committed	 a	 controlled	 substance	 violation	
and	an	aggravated	felony.	He	was	convicted	in	January	of	1998.	The	IJ	found	
him	removable	for	committing	the	controlled	substance	violation,	but	found	
that	 the	 Government	 had	 not	 met	 its	 burden	 of	 showing	 that	 any	 of	 his	
convictions	were	also	aggravated	felonies.	 Nevertheless,	the	IJ	found	Joseph	
ineligible	for	Cancellation	of	removal	under	INA	§	240A(a).	Joseph	appealed	
to	 the	 Board,	 but	 the	 Board	 affirmed	 that	 Joseph	 was	 ineligible	 for	 LPR	
Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 because	 he	 did	 not	 have	 the	 required	 5	 years	 of	
permanent	 residence.	 The	 Board	 applied	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 to	 Joseph’s	
permanent	residence	status,	and	calculated	that	his	status	as	a	permanent	
resident	 began	 in	 1994	 and	 terminated	 in	 1998	 when	 he	 was	 convicted.	
Joseph	 then	 appealed	 to	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 for	 the	 Third	 Circuit,	which	
held	 that	 the	 Board	 impermissibly	 applied	 the	 stop-time	 rule	 to	 the	
requirement	of	5	years	of	permanent	residence,	and	the	stop-time	rule	only	
applies	 to	 the	 7	 years	 of	 continuous	 residence.	 Joseph	 had	 met	 the	
















as	 a	 nonimmigrant	 may	 be	 considered	 in	 calculating	 the	 7	 years	 of	








served	 with	 a	 Notice	 to	 Appear.	 At	 that	 point,	 the	 noncitizen	 had	
resided	 in	 the	 U.S.	 as	 an	 LPR	 for	 about	 6	 years	 and	 8	months.	 The	 IJ	
concluded	 that	the	noncitizen	 could	count	time	he	spent	 in	the	U.S.	as	a	
child	 before	 his	 admission	 as	 an	 LPR	 toward	 the	 accrual	 of	 7	 years	 of	
continuous	 residence	 under	 section	 240A(a)(2),	 because	 the	 lawful	
residence	 of	 his	 father,	 a	 citizen	 and	 resident	 of	 the	 U.S.,	 could	 be	
imputed	 to	 him.	 On	 appeal	 the	 Board	 found	 that	 the	 noncitizen	
established	 that,	 at	the	 time	 of	his	 application	 for	 relief,	 he	had	 resided	
in	 the	 U.S.	 continuously	 for	 7	 years	 after	 having	 been	 admitted	 as	 a	
nonimmigrant.	 Thus,	 an	applicant	 who	 is	 admitted	with	 a	nonimmigrant	
visa,	 and	 accrues	 the	 7	 years	 of	 continuous	 residence	 to	 meet	 the	
second	 element	 of	 the	 statute,	 does	not	 need	 an	 imputation	 argument.	
Accordingly,	 the	 Board	 concurred	 with	 the	 IJ's	 decision	 and	 dismissed	
the	appeal.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Board	 stated	 that	 the	 period	 of	 a	
noncitizen's	residence	in	the	U.S.	after	admission	as	a	nonimmigrant	may	











ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 conviction	 for	 trafficking	 in	 counterfeit	 goods	 or	 services	 in	
violation	 of	 the	 Trademark	 Counterfeiting	 Act	 of	 1984,	 18	U.S.C.	 §2320,	 is	
a	 conviction	 for	 "an	offense	 relating	 to	...	 counterfeiting,"	 pursuant	 to	 INA	
§101(a)(43)(R)	(and	an	aggravated	felony)?	
HOLDING	 A	 noncitizen	 who	 commits	 an	 aggravated	 felony	 as	 defined	 in	 INA	
§101(a)(43)	is	ineligible	for	LPR	Cancellation	of	Removal	and	18	U.S.C.	2320	
is	an	aggravated	felony.	
• 	 Respondent	 Yong	 Wong	 Park	 was	 admitted	 to	 the	 U.S.	 as	 an	 immigrant	
on	 or	 around	 February	 12,	 1998.	 On	 February	 18,	 2000,	 Park	 pleaded	
guilty	in	the	U.S.	District	Court	for	the	Southern	District	of	New	York	to	one	
count	of	trafficking	 in	counterfeit	 goods	or	services	from	 at	 least	 February	
1997	 through	 October	 1997,	 in	 violation	 of	 18	 U.S.C.	 §	 2320.	 After	 his	
conviction,	 the	 DHS	 initiated	 removal	 proceedings.	 The	 court	 found	 that	
Park's	 conviction	 under	 18	 U.S.C.	 §2320	 was	 an	 offense	 relating	 to	
counterfeiting	 for	purposes	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 "aggravated	 felony"	 under	
INA	§	101(a)(43)(R).	 Park	 applied	 for	 LPR	Cancellation	 under	 INA	 §240A(a)	
but	 because	 he	 had	 been	 convicted	 of	 an	 aggravated	 felony,	 he	 was	
ineligible	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal.	 Park's	 petition	 for	 review	 was	
dismissed.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 a	 conviction	 for	 trafficking	 in	 counterfeit	
goods	 or	 services	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 Trademark	 Counterfeiting	 Act	 of	
1984,	 18	U.S.C.	§2320,	is	an	aggravated	felony	because	it	is	a	conviction	for	
"an	offense	 relating	 to	...	 counterfeiting,"	 pursuant	 to	 INA	 §	 101(a)(43)(R).	




ISSUE	 Whether	a	 conviction	under	a	 statute	 that	 criminalizes	 conduct	described	
by	 the	 Controlled	 Substance	Act’s	 (CSA)	 21	U.S.C.	 §841’s	 felony	 provision	
and	 its	 misdemeanor	 provision,	 such	 as	 a	 statute	 that	 punishes	 all	
marijuana	distribution	without	regard	to	the	amount	or	remuneration,	is	a	
conviction	for	an	offense	punishable	as	a	felony	under	the	CSA?	
HOLDING	 To	be	a	categorical	 federal	drug	offense	for	 immigration	purposes,	a	state	






of	 marijuana.	 He	 pleaded	 guilty	 under	 Georgia	 law	 to	 possession	 of	
marijuana	with	intent	to	distribute.	He	was	placed	in	removal	proceedings	
on	 the	 grounds	 that	 his	 conviction	 was	 an	 aggravated	 felony	 because	
possession	of	marijuana	with	intent	to	distribute	is	a	Controlled	Substance	
Act	 offense,	 21	 U.S.C.	 §841(a),	 punishable	 by	 up	 to	 five	 years’	
imprisonment,	 §841(b)(1)(D).	 An	 IJ	 ordered	 his	 removal,	 and	 the	 Board	
affirmed.	 The	 Fifth	 Circuit	 denied	 Moncrieffe’s	 petition	 to	 review	 his	
argument	that	his	conviction	met	CSA’s	§841(b)(4),	which	makes	marijuana	
distribution	 punishable	 as	 a	misdemeanor	 if	 the	 offense	 involves	 a	 small	
amount	for	no	remuneration.	The	U.S.	Supreme	Court	granted	certiorari	to	
resolve	 whether	 the	 state	 conviction	 qualified	 as	 an	 aggravated	 felony	
when	 applying	 the	 categorical	 approach.	 A	 state	 drug	 offense	must	meet	
two	conditions:	1)	the	offense	must	“necessarily”	proscribe	conduct	that	is	
an	 offense	 under	 the	 CSA,	 and	 2)	 the	 CSA	 must	 “necessarily”	 prescribe	
felony	punishment	for	that	conduct.	Unlike	the	federal	statute,	the	Georgia	
statute	 is	 ambiguous	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 conduct	 proscribed	 involved	
remuneration	 or	 the	 amount	 of	 controlled	 substances	 needed	 to	 be	 a	
violation.	 Thus,	 because	 the	 conviction	did	 not	 “necessarily”	 involve	 facts	
that	 correspond	 to	 an	 offense	 punishable	 as	 a	 felony	 under	 the	 CSA,	 the	
Court	held	the	offense	was	not	a	categorical	aggravated	felony.	The	Court	
reversed	and	remanded	the	case.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 when	 there	 is	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 state	
conviction,	 then	the	 facts	may	not	“necessarily”	correspond	to	an	offense	





ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 state	 drug-paraphernalia	 misdemeanor	 meets	 the	 categorical	
definition	 of	 controlled	 substance	 under	 the	 Controlled	 Substance	 Act	
when	the	state	misdemeanor	is	silent	as	to	the	controlled	substance?	
HOLDING	 To	be	a	categorical	 federal	drug	offense	for	 immigration	purposes,	a	state	
law	violation	for	controlled	substances	must	be	an	offense	for	a	controlled	
substance	as	defined	in	the	Controlled	Substance	Act.	







into	 the	 human	 body.”	 Kan.	 Stat.	 Ann.	 §21-5709(b)(2).	 Under	 the	 Kansas	
law,	 it	 was	 immaterial	 whether	 the	 substance	 was	 scheduled	 in	 the	
Controlled	Substance	Act,	21	U.	S.	C.	§802.	The	State	did	not	charge,	or	seek	
to	prove,	that	Mellouli	possessed	a	substance	on	the	§802	schedules.	The	
sole	 “paraphernalia”	Mellouli	 was	 charged	with	 possessing	was	 a	 sock	 in	
which	 he	 had	 placed	 four	 orange	 tablets.	 The	 criminal	 charge	 and	 plea	
agreement	 did	 not	 identify	 the	 controlled	 substance	 involved,	 although	
Mellouli	 had	 acknowledged	 the	 tablets	 were	 Adderall.	 Mellouli	 was	
sentenced	 to	 a	 suspended	 term	 of	 359	 days	 and	 12	 months’	 probation,	
after	 which	 DHS	 placed	 him	 in	 removal	 proceedings.	 The	 Board	 affirmed	
the	 immigration	 judge's	 decision	 and	he	was	 removed.	 The	 Eighth	 Circuit	
denied	 Mellouli’s	 petition	 for	 review.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 then	 granted	




• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 an	 offense	 for	 drug-paraphernalia	
possession	must	 specify	whether	 the	controlled	 substance	 is	 scheduled	 in	
the	Controlled	Substance	Act	to	meet	the	criteria	for	a	controlled	substance	
offense.	 Please	note	Mellouli	was	 not	 found	deportable	of	 an	 aggravated	
felony,	but	rather	deportable	because	Mellouli	was	found	guilty	of	a	crime	










• 	 Respondent	 Michael	 Descamps	 was	 convicted	 of	 being	 “a	 felon	 in	
possession	of	a	firearm”	and	the	government	sought	an	enhanced	sentence	
“based	 on	 Descamps’	 prior	 state	 convictions	 for	 burglary,	 robbery,	 and	
felony	harassment.”	To	be	subject	to	the	enhanced	sentencing,	the	statute	
requires	 that	 the	 person	 had	 been	 previously	 convicted	 of	 a	 3	 violent	
felonies	or	a	serious	drug	offense.	A	“violent	felony”	is	one	which	“has	as	an	
element	the	use,	attempted	use,	or	threatened	use	of	physical	force	against	
the	person	of	 another,”	or	 that	 is	 a	 “burglary,	 arson	or	 extortion,	 involves	
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use	 of	 explosives	 or	 otherwise	 involves	 conduct	 that	 presents	 a	 serious	
potential	risk	of	physical	 injury	to	another.”	Descamps	argued	that	his	past	
conviction	was	not	within	the	meaning	of	the	“violent	felony”	and	therefore	
he	 could	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 enhanced	 sentencing.	 The	 prior	 California	
felony	 that	 Descamps	 had	 been	 convicted	 found	 guilty	 a	 “person	 who	
enters”	 certain	 locations	 “with	 intent	 to	 commit	 grand	 or	 petit	 larceny	 or	
any	 felony.”	 Unlike	 the	 federal	 statute,	 Descamps	 argues,	 the	 California	
statute	 did	 not	 require	 that	 a	 person	 enter	 into	 the	 location	 unlawfully;	
therefore,	 the	 California	 statute	 was	 not	 a	 categorical	 match.	 Both	 the	
District	 Court	 and	 the	Ninth	 Circuit	 disagreed	with	Descamps,	 and	 applied	
the	modified	categorical	approach	to	look	to	“certain	documents,	 including	
the	 record	 of	 the	 plea	 colloquy,	 to	 discover	 whether	 Descamps	 had	
“admitted	the	elements	of	a	generic	burglary”	when	entering	his	plea.”	The	
District	 Court	 and	 the	 Ninth	 Circuit	 concluded	 that	 Descamps’	 crime	 was	
within	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 federal	 statute	 of	 burglary	 but	 Descamps	
appealed.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 concluded	 that	 the	 California	 statute	 was	
indivisible,	 and	 therefore,	 the	 lower	 courts	 erred	 in	 applying	 the	modified	
categorical	 approach.	 The	 Court	 found	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 modified	
categorical	approach	was	to	help	“effectuate	the	categorical	analysis	when	a	
divisible	 statute,	 listing	 potential	 offense	 elements	 in	 the	 alternative,	
renders	opaque	which	element	played	a	part	in	the	defendant’s	conviction.”	
The	Court	illustrated	that	a	statute	may	be	indivisible,	for	example,	when	a	
statute	 of	 burglary	 includes	 both	 “entry	 into	 an	 automobile	 as	 well	 as	 a	
building.”	 In	such	a	situation,	entering	an	automobile,	would	not	be	within	
the	 generic	 federal	 definition;	 however,	 the	 alternative,	 “entry	 into…	 a	
building”	 would	 be	 within	 the	 generic	 federal	 definition.	 Because,	 in	 this	
hypothetical	 situations,	 the	 statute	would	not	 reveal	which	alternative	 the	
defendant	 was	 convicted,	 courts	 could	 look	 to	 the	 plea	 agreement,	 the	








modified	 categorical	 approach	 and	 sets	 forth	 that	 the	 “sentencing	 courts	













• 	 Respondent	Richard	Jose	 Rodriguez-Munoz	was	 admitted	 to	 the	U.S.	 as	an	
LPR	 in	 1976.	 In	 1992,	 he	 pled	 guilty	 to	 four	 drug	 offenses	 in	 New	 York	
state	 court,	 including	 third	 degree	 criminal	 sale	of	 a	 controlled	 substance	
(crack	 cocaine).	 In	 1994,	 the	 INS	 charged	 Rodriguez-Munoz	 with	
deportability	 as	 a	 noncitizen	 convicted	 of	 an	 aggravated	 felony	 and	 as	
being	 convicted	of	a	violation	 relating	 to	a	controlled	 substance.	While	the	
immigration	 proceedings	 were	 pending,	 Rodriguez-Munoz	 pled	 guilty	 in	
New	 York	 to	 two	 additional	 offenses:	 fifth	 degree	 criminal	 possession	 of	
marijuana	and	seventh	degree	criminal	possession	of	a	controlled	substance.	
The	government	acknowledged	that	there	was	no	question	that	Rodriguez-
Munoz	 was	 eligible	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 INA	 §	 212(c),	 waiver	 of	 deportation	
concerning	 his	 1992	conviction.	 Indeed,	 §	 212(c)	 relief	 remained	 available	
for	 noncitizens	 whose	 convictions	 were	 obtained	 through	 plea	
agreements	 and	who,	 notwithstanding	those	convictions,	would	have	been	
eligible	 for	 §	212(c)	 relief	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	 plea	 under	 the	 law	 then	 in	
effect.	 Rodriguez-Munoz	apparently	 did	not	argue	before	the	Board	that	his	
1992	 conviction	 was	 not	 an	 aggravated	 felony,	 nor	 did	 he	 raise	 such	 an	
argument	 on	appeal.	Although	 a	waiver	 of	deportation	 gave	him	a	chance	
to	 stay	 in	 the	U.S.	 despite	 his	misdeed,	 it	 did	 not	 expunge	 his	 conviction.	
Thus,	even	 if	Rodriguez-Munoz's	 deportation	based	on	his	 1992	conviction	
were	waived	under	 §	212(c),	 that	 conviction	would	nonetheless	 remain	an	
aggravated	 felony	 for	 purposes	 of	 precluding	 his	 application	 for	
cancellation	 of	 removal	under	INA§	240A.	Thus,	he	was	deportable.	
• 	 This	case	 is	 important	because	a	 noncitizen	who	has	an	 aggravated	 felony	
conviction	 along	 with	 other	 crimes	 of	 moral	 turpitude	 cannot	 seek	











crime	 defined	 as	 an	 aggravated	 felony	 (under	 the	 original	 1988	
definition)	 is	 eligible	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 discretionary	 waiver	 of	 deportation	
under	§	212(c).	
HOLDING	 A	 noncitizen	who	 has	 been	 convicted	 of	 an	 aggravated	 felony	with	 a	 5-
year	sentence	is	ineligible	for	relief	under	INA	212(c).	
• 	 Respondent	 James	 Scheidemann	 was	 an	 LPR	 since	 1959.	 Scheidemann	
sought	 review	 of	 an	 order	 of	 the	 Board,	which	 dismissed	 his	 appeal	 to	
overturn	 a	 deportation	 order.	 Scheidemann	 faced	 deportation	 on	
account	 of	 a	 1987	 drug	 trafficking	 conviction	 for	 which	 he	 had	 served	
over	 five	 years	 in	prison.	 Scheidemann	 did	not	 contest	his	deportability.	
Rather,	he	argued	that	he	was	eligible	to	apply	for	a	discretionary	 waiver	
of	 deportation	 under	 I N A 	 §	 212(c).	 The	 court	 held	 that	 Congress	
intended	 §	 212(c)	 to	 restrict	 the	 Attorney	 General's	 power	 to	 exercise	
discretionary	 relief,	 immediately	 after	 the	 amendment	 to	 the	 aggravated	
felony	 statute,	 with	 respect	 to	 noncitizens	 who	 had	 served	 at	 least	 five	
years	 imprisonment	 for	 crimes	defined	 as	aggravated	 felonies	under	 the	
original	 1988	 definition,	 regardless	 of	 the	 conviction	 date.	 Accordingly,	
Scheidemann's	petition	for	review	was	denied.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 an	 LPR	 who	 has	 served	 at	 least	 five	
years	 of	 imprisonment	 for	 a	 crime	 defined	 as	 an	 aggravated	 felony	













all	 who	 demonstrate	 statutory	 eligibility	 for	 such	 relief.	 Rather,	 the	
adjudicator	will	consider	positive	and	adverse	factors,	as	set	forth	below.	
• 	 Respondent	Marin	was	admitted	as	a	LPR	on	 February	 3,	 1965.	 In	March	
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1976,	 he	 pled	 guilty	 to	 the	 felony	 charge	 of	criminal	 sale	 of	 cocaine.	 He	
served	 30	months	 in	 New	 York	 State	 penal	 institutions.	 In	May	 1977	he	
was	 served	 with	 an	 order	 to	 show	 cause	 and	 was	 charged	 with	 being	
deportable.	 The	IJ	 found	him	deportable	and	 he	appealed.	The	noncitizen	
argued	 that	 he	 was	 eligible	 for	 212(c)	 relief.	 The	 Board	 stated	 that	
Section	 212(c)	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 indiscriminate	 waiver	 for	 all	 who	
demonstrate	 statutory	 eligibility	 for	 such	 relief.	 Instead,	 the	 Attorney	
General	 is	 required	 to	 determine	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 discretion	 whether	 an	
applicant	 warrants	 the	 relief	 sought.	 The	 Board	 concluded	 that	 the	
noncitizen	 bears	 the	 burden	 of	demonstrating	 that	 his	 application	merits	
favorable	 consideration.	 The	 noncitizen	 was	 unable	 to	 advance	 any	
substantial	equities	and	the	Board	dismissed	his	appeal.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Board	 courts	 should	 consider	 a	
noncitizen's	record	as	a	 whole.	Courts	should	balance	 the	adverse	 factors	
evidencing	 the	 noncitizen's	 undesirability	 as	 a	 permanent	 resident	 with	
the	 social	 and	 humane	 considerations	 presented	 in	 his	 or	 her	 behalf	 to	
determine	 whether	 relief	 should	 be	 granted.	 Adverse	 factors	 include:	 (1)	
“the	nature	and	underlying	circumstances	of	the	exclusion	ground	at	issue,”	
(2)	 “the	 presence	 of	 additional	 significant	 violations	 of	 this	 country's	




US,	 (2)	 residence	 of	 long	 duration	 in	 this	 country	 (particularly	 when	 the	





exists,	 and	 (9)	 other	 evidence	 attesting	 to	 a	 respondent's	 good	 character	




ISSUE	 Whether	 S e c t i o n 	 2 1 2 ( c ) 	 provides	 an	 indiscriminate	 waiver	 for	
individuals	who	demonstrate	 statutory	eligibility?	
HOLDING	 Section	 212(c)	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 indiscriminate	 waiver	 for	 individuals	
who	demonstrate	statutory	eligibility.	
• 	 Respondent	Edwards,	who	was	 admitted	 as	an	LPR	in	1968.	He	married	a	
US	 citizen	 with	 whom	 he	 had	 four	 US	 citizen	 children.	 He	 incurred	
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criminal	 convictions	while	 in	the	US	that	entailed	him	serving	 some	2	and	
1/2	years	of	imprisonment.	The	noncitizen	 implored	that	he	be	allowed	to	
remain	 in	 the	 US	 because	 of	 his	 family.	 He	 insisted	 that	 he	 would	 work	
hard	to	change	his	ways.	He	stated	that	his	wife	and	children,	as	well	as	his	




favorable	 factors	 presented	 in	 his	 case.	 The	 Board	 balanced	 the	 various	
factors	 in	 the	 noncitizen'	 s	 case	 and	 took	 note	 of	 his	 favorable	 equities,	
which	 the	board	 found	to	be	unusual	or	outstanding.	 However,	when	the	
Board	 weighed	 these	 equities	 against	 the	 adverse	 factors	 of	 the	
noncitizen's	 extensive	 criminal	 record,	 the	 Board	 determined	 that	 a	
favorable	exercise	of	discretion	was	not	warranted.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	Board	 states	 that	under	 f o rme r 	 INA	
§	 212(c),	 courts	 should	 consider	 the	 record	 as	 a	 whole.	 Additionally,	
this	case	clarified	confusion	that	was	found	from	the	rehabilitation	factor	in	
Matter	of	Marin.	Some	courts	found	that	“a	clear	showing	of	reformation	is	
an	 absolute	 prerequisite	 to	 a	 favorable	 exercise	 of	 discretion;”	 however,	




ISSUE	 Whether	 a	 noncitizen	 is	 required	 to	 satisfy	 a	 threshold	 test	 of	 showing	
"unusual	 or	 outstanding	 equities"	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 whether	 a	
favorable	exercise	of	discretion	is	warranted?	
HOLDING	 The	noncitizen	 does	 not	 have	 to	 show	 “unusual	 or	 outstanding	 equities.”	
Rather,	 favorable	 and	 adverse	 factors	 should	 be	 weighed	 to	 determine	
whether	the	person	warrants	discretionary	relief.	
• 	 Respondent	 Javier	Sotelo-Sotelo	 adjusted	 his	 status	 to	 that	 of	 an	LPR	 on	
December	 1,	 1990.	 On	 July	 24,	 2000,	 he	 was	 convicted	 of	 the	 following	
offenses:	 possession	 and	 passing	 fraudulent	 resident	 alien	 cards,	 failure	
to	 provide	 migrant	 workers	 with	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 employment,	
and	 illegal	 entry	 or	 aiding	 and	 abetting	 illegal	 entry.	 The	 noncitizen	 was	
sentenced	to	8	months	of	imprisonment	for	each	of	the	first	two	offenses,	
and	 to	 6	 months	 of	 imprisonment	 for	 the	 third	 offense.	 In	 proceedings	
before	 the	IJ,	the	noncitizen	conceded	removability	as	charged	and	applied	
for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 under	 INA	 §240A(a).	 The	 IJ	 denied	 the	
noncitizen's	 application	 for	 relief,	 and	 the	 noncitizen	 appealed.	 The	
Board	 found	 that	 the	 favorable	 factors	 presented	 in	 support	 of	 the	
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noncitizen's	 application	 for	 cancellation	 of	 removal	 did	 not	 outweigh	 the	





• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Board	 rejected	 the	 use	 of	 an	
'outstanding	 and	 unusual	 equities'	 requirement	 as	 a	 threshold	 for	 relief	
and	 instead	 found	 that	 the	 IJ	 should	 weigh	 the	 favorable	 and	 adverse	







• 	 Respondent	 Mun	 Seok	 Lee	 conceded	 removability	 on	 account	 of	 his	
conviction	 of	 possession	 of	 a	 handgun	 without	 a	 permit	 and	 applied	 for	
Cancellation	of	Removal.	Although	Respondent	was	statutorily	eligible,	the	IJ	
denied	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 on	 a	 discretionary	 basis.	 The	 IJ	 stated:	
“[Respondent]	 has	 not	 demonstrated	 that	 he	 is	 worthy	 of	 the	 Court’s	
favorable	 exercise	 of	 discretion	 based	 on	 [his]	 pattern	 of	 engaging	 in	
unlawful	 conduct	 relating	 to	 his	 alcohol	 intoxication	 as	 reported	 in	
conviction	and/or	 arrest	 records	occurring	 from	1993	 to	2008.”	 The	Board	
affirmed,	 finding	 that	 Respondent	 had	 not	 displayed	 that	 his	 “positive	
equities	do	not	outweigh	the	adverse	factors	in	this	case.”	The	Board	stated	
that	Respondent’s	positive	equities	included	his	lengthy	stay	in	the	U.S.,	the	
fact	 that	 he	 owns	 “several	 successful	 businesses	 that	 employ	 about	 40	
people,	his	history	of	paying	taxes,	and	his	active	participation	in	his	church	
and	 community.”	 The	 adverse	 factors	 included	 his	 criminal	 history,	 the	
“recency,	the	quantity	of	the[]	alcohol-related	arrests	and	convictions[,]	and	
the	 serious	 nature	 of	 them	 poses	 a	 public	 risk…,”	 the	 fact	 that	 his	
rehabilitation	is	not	supported	by	the	record,	the	fact	that	he	only	attended	
Alcoholics	 Anonymous	 that	 were	 mandated	 because	 of	 his	 criminal	

















• 	 Respondent	 Emmanuel	 De	 La	 Cruz	 Vargas	 was	 found	 to	 be	 statutorily	
eligible	for	Cancellation	of	Removal;	however,	he	was	denied	application	on	
account	 of	 discretionary	 factors.	 Respondent	 argued	 that	 the	 IJ	 erred	
because	 the	 Judge	 did	 not	meaningfully	 consider	 all	 discretionary	 factors.	
The	government	argues	that	the	Courts	of	Appeal	generally	lack	jurisdiction	
to	 review	 discretionary	 matters.	 The	 Third	 Circuit	 agreed	 with	 the	




whether	the	Board	or	 IJ	 insufficiently	weighed	the	equities,	but	will	 look	at	









HOLDING	 Post-IIRAIRA	 statutory	 restrictions	 on	 discretionary	 relief	 do	 not	 apply	 to	
noncitizens	who	pled	guilty	to	a	deportable	crime	prior	to	the	enactment	of	
IIRAIRA.		
• 	 Respondent	Enrico	St.	Cyr	was	admitted	as	an	LPR	in	1986.	 A	decade	later	in	
Connecticut,	 he	 pled	 guilty	 in	 a	 Connecticut	 state	 court	 to	 selling	 a	
																																								 										
	




controlled	 substance,	 $100	 worth	 of	 cocaine,	 and	 thus	 became	
deportable.	 If	 the	 INS	 had	 taken	 custody	of	 St.	 Cyr	 at	 the	completion	 of	
his	 sentence,	 he	 would	 have	 been	 eligible	 for	 a	 waiver	 of	 deportation	
under	 INA	 §	212(c).	Because	 the	 INS	 did	not	 begin	 proceedings	against	 St.	
Cyr	 until	 1997,	 St.	Cyr	would	be	 subject	 to	 the	 new	 laws	 passed	 in	 1996,	
the	 Antiterrorism	 and	Effective	 Death	 Penalty	 Act	 (AEDPA)	 and	 the	 Illegal	
Immigration	 Reform	 and	 Immigrant	Responsibility	Act	 (IIRIRA),	 if	 the	 court	
found	that	the	statutes	were	retroactive.	Therefore,	St.	Cyr	could	no	 longer	
file	 a	 motion	 for	 §	 212(c),	 even	 though	 he	 pled	 to	 the	 crime	 when	 the	
waiver	was	 still	being	 granted.	 Represented	 by	 the	ACLU,	 St.	Cyr	 sued	 the	
federal	 government	on	 the	 grounds	 that	 he	 was	 lawfully	 eligible	 for	 the	
waiver.	 The	case	reached	 the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	 in	2001.	The	Court	ruled	
that	Congress	never	 intended	 for	 INS	to	apply	 its	new	 rule	 retroactively	 in	
cases	 involving	 plea	bargains	made	prior	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 IIRIRA.	 That	
meant	that	St.	Cyr,	and	other	immigrants	whose	convictions	were	obtained	
through	plea	agreements,	 remain	eligible	 for	§	212(c)	waiver	 if	they	would	
have	been	eligible	for	§	212(c)	relief	at	the	time	of	their	plea.	
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	it	held	that	the	effective	date	of	the	changes	
from	INA	 §	212(c)	 to	Cancellation	of	Removal	 for	 LPRs,	April	 1,	1997,	does	




to	 noncitizens	 who	 were	 convicted	 of	 a	 deportable	 crime	 prior	 to	 the	
enactment	of	IIRAIRA?	
HOLDING	 Post-IIRAIRA	 statutory	 restrictions	 on	 discretionary	 relief	 do	 not	 apply	 to	
noncitizens	 who	 were	 convicted	 of	 a	 deportable	 crime	 prior	 to	 the	
enactment	of	IIRAIRA.	
• 	 Respondent	 Claudius	 Atkinson	 was	 convicted	 of	 state	 criminal	 offenses	 in	
1991.	 He	 received	 a	 notice	 to	 appear	 in	 1997,	 notifying	 him	 that	 he	was	




The	 noncitizen	 filed	 his	 habeas	 petition	 after	 his	 reconsideration	 motion,	
based	on	St.	Cyr,	was	 denied.	 The	District	 Court	 held	 that	 the	 he	was	 not	
entitled	 to	 relief	because	he	 failed	to	 show	that	he	had	 relied	on	§	212(c)	
when	 he	was	 convicted	 in	 1991.	 In	 conformity	 with	 the	 REAL	 ID	 Act,	 the	
court	treated	the	habeas	petition	as	a	petition	for	review.	The	court	held	that	
the	noncitizen	was	not	precluded	 from	applying	 for	 §	 212(c)	 relief.	 IIRIRA	
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did	 not	 apply	 retroactively	 to	 noncitizens	 who	 were	 convicted	 of	
aggravated	 felonies	 prior	 to	 IIRIRA's	 effective	 date,	 regardless	 of	whether	
they	pleaded	guilty	or	were	convicted	by	a 	 jury.	
• 	 This	 case	 is	 important	 because	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 held	 that	 §	 212(c)	 is	
available	 to	 individuals	 who	 elected	 to	 go	 to	 trial	 and	were	 convicted	 (as	
opposed	to	entering	a	plea	agreement).	
	
MURALI	KRISHNA	PONNAPULA	v.	ASHCROFT,	373	 F.3d	 480	 (3d	Cir.	2004)	[Precedent]:	
ISSUE	 Whether	the	post-IIRAIRA	statutory	restrictions	on	discretionary	relief	apply	
to	 noncitizens	 who	 were	 convicted	 of	 a	 deportable	 crime	 prior	 to	 the	
enactment	of	IIRAIRA,	but	who	turned	down	a	misdemeanor	plea	deal?	
HOLDING	 A	 noncitizen	 who	 turned	 down	 a	 misdemeanor	 plea	 deal,	 and	 was	 later	
convicted	of	an	aggravated	felony	is	not	subject	to	the	statutory	restrictions	
of	IIRAIRA.	
• 	 Respondent	Murali	 Krishna	 Ponnapula	 was	 indicted	 for	 grand	 larceny	 and	
falsifying	 business	 records	 in	 violation	 of	 New	 York	 law	 after	 his	 brother	
submitted	 a	 loan	 application	 with	 the	 noncitizen's	 forged	 signature	 and	
without	 the	 noncitizen's	 knowledge.	 In	 reliance	 on	 counsel's	 advice,	 the	
noncitizen	 turned	 down	 a	 misdemeanor	 plea	 agreement,	 went	 to	 trial	
when	 former	 INA	§	212(c)	was	 still	 in	effect,	and	was	convicted.	The	 court	
rejected	 the	 Government's	 contention	 that	 St.	 Cyr	 precluded	 the	
noncitizen	 from	 claiming	 an	 impermissible	 retroactive	 effect	 of	 the	
repeal	 of	 §	 212(c).	 With	 respect	 to	 the	 noncitizen,	 who	 reasonably	 could	
have	 relied	 on	 the	potential	 availability	 of	 §	212(c)	 relief,	 the	 court	 found	
the	 repeal	 of	 §	 212(c)	 had	 an	 impermissible	 retroactive	 effect.	 Although	
the	court	 concluded	 that	actual	reliance	was	not	necessary,	the	court	found	
that	 the	noncitizen	 demonstrated	 clear	 and	 reasonable	 actual	 reliance	 on	
the	 former	 statutory	 scheme	 in	making	 the	decision	to	go	to	trial.	
• 	 This	case	is	important	because	the	noncitizen	reasonably	believed	that	even	
if	he	was	convicted	of	a	felony	after	trial	he	would	still	 likely	be	eligible	for	
hardship	 relief	 from	 deportation	 pursuant	 to	 former	 §	 212(c).	 In	 reliance	
of	 this,	 the	 noncitizen	 decided	 to	 turn	 down	 the	misdemeanor	 offer	 and	









Of	 the	 following	 guidance	 from	 stakeholders,	 some	 are	 direct	 quotes	 and	 some	 have	
been	paraphrased.	Some	practitioner	comments,	as	 labeled	 in	the	footnotes,	are	from	
2009	and	some	are	from	2016.	Please	note	that	the	practitioner	comments	are	provided	









who	 is	 prima	 facie	 eligible	 for	 relief	 may	 apply	 for	 LPR	 Cancellation.	 An	 attorney	
should	 first	 determine	 whether	 the	 LPR	 is	 eligible	 for	 LPR	 Cancellation	 under	 INA	
§240A(a)	 by	 interviewing	 the	 LPR	 and	 obtaining	 his	 or	 her	 criminal	 and	 immigration	
records.	If the	attorney	 determines	that	the	LPR	 is	eligible,	the	attorney	should	obtain	
relevant	 and	 necessary	 information	 from	 the	 LPR	 and	 complete	 an	 LPR	 Cancellation	
application.	In	order	to	prepare	the	application,	the	attorney	should	do	the	following:	70	
 
(1) Complete	 Form	 EOIR-42A,	 Application	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 for	 Certain	
Permanent	 Residents. 71 	This	 Form	 requires	 the	 applicant	 to	 supply	 basic	
information	about	his	 or	 her	 self,	 information	about	his	 or	 her	presence	 in	 the	
U.S.,	marital	status	and	spouse,	employment	and	financial	status,	and	family.	
 
(2) Include	 a	 birth	 certificate	 of	 the	 applicant	 or	 other	 identification	 with	 a	
translation	 if	 it	 is	not	 in	English,	 a	 copy	of	 the	LPR	 card	 (Green	Card),	passport	
																																								 										
	






Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review	 	 (follow	 "Form	 EOIR-42A"	 hyperlink)	 available	 at	
www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
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stamp,	DHS	Form	 I-94,	 proof	of	 fee	payment	 and	biometrics,	 a	 full	 copy	of	 the	
applicant's	 criminal	 record,	 affidavits	 from	 the	applicant	 and	 others72,	a	 brief	 in	
support	of	the	application,	and	other	supporting	documentation.	
	





(4) Complete	 Form	 EOIR-28,	 Notice	 of	 Entry	 of	 Appearance	 as	 Attorney	 or	
Representative	 Before	 the	 Immigration	 Court. 74 	This	 Form	 requires	 the	





applicable"	 rather	 than	 leaving	 it	 blank.76	In	 addition,	 an	 attorney	 should	 note	
that	 all	 documents	 filed	 with	 the	 Immigration	 Court	 must	 be	 in	 English	 or	









75	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Immigration	 Court	









www.firrp.org	 (choose	 "Resources"	 and	 follow	 "How	 to	 Defend	 Your	 Case”	 hyperlink,	 scroll	 to	
“Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 for	 Legal	 Permanent	 Residents	 (green	 card	 holders)	 and	 select	 “English”	
hyperlink),	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
77	8	C.F.R.	§§	1003.33,	1003.23(b)(1)(i)	(2016).	




interpretation	 stating	 that	 the	 affidavit	 or	 declaration	 has	 been	 read	 to	 the	
person	 in	 a	 language	 that	 the	 person	 understands	 and	 that	 s/he	 understood	 it	
before	signing.78		
	
(6) Include	 a	 witness	 list	 with	 the	 application.	 The	 witness	 list	 should	 include	 the	
following	 information	 for	each	witness,	except	 the	applicant:79	the	name	of	 the	






In	 addition	 to	 filing	 Form	 EOIR-42A	 and	 Form	 G-325A,	 an	 attorney	 should	 attach	
supporting	documents	on	behalf	of	an	 LPR.	These	documents	 should	 correspond	with	





An	 attorney	 should	 attach	 the	 supporting	 documents	 to	 the	 application	 for	 LPR	
cancellation	 and	 include	 a	 table	 of	 contents	 with	 the	 documents.80	Also,	 an	 attorney	






78	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Immigration	 Court	




80	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Immigration	 Court	









An	 attorney	 must	 complete	 Form	 G-325A	 for	 Biographic	 Information	 to	 submit	 with	
an	 LPR	Cancellation	application	 for	applicants	 14	years	of	age	or	older.83	Form	G-325A	
is	 available	 for	 download	 from	 the	 Internet	 through	 USCIS 84 	and	 requires	 an	
applicant	 to	 supply	 information	 pertaining	 to	 his	 or	 her	 residence	 in	 the	 last	 five	




and	 fingerprinting	 will	 be	 handled	 by	 the	 facility	 in	 which	 s/he	 is	 detained.86	DHS	 is	




to	 the	 Department	 of	 Homeland	 Security,	 s/he	 will	 be	 given	 instructions	 on	 how	 to	
complete	the	biometrics	requirement	and	pay	the	application	fees.	The	instructions	are	
called	 "Instructions	 for	 Submitting	 Certain	 Applications	 in	 Immigration	 Court	 and	 for	
Providing	 Biometric	 and	 Biographic	 Information	 to	 U.S.	 Citizenship	 and	 Immigration	





83	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Executive	 Office	 for	
Immigration	 Review,	 Application	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 	 for	 Certain	 Permanent	 Residents,	
Instructions,	1,	available	at	www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
84 	United	 States	 Citizenship	 and	 Immigration	 Services,	 available	 at	 www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis	
(follow	"Forms"	hyperlink;	then	follow	"	follow	"Form	G-325A"	hyperlink),	(last	visited	May	12,	2016)	
85	See	Id.	
86	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Immigration	 Court	





Immigration	 Benefits	 in	 EOIR	 Removal	 Proceedings,	 2,	 available	 at	
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/PreOrderInstr.pdf	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
89	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Executive	 Office	 for	
Immigration	 Review,	 Application	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 	 for	 Certain	 Permanent	 Residents,	
Instructions,	1,	available	at	www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
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and	time	 for	his	or	her	appointment.90	When	s/he	goes	 to	 the	 interview	noted	on	the	
receipt	 issued	 by	 the	 DHS,	 the	 applicant's	 fingerprints	 will	 be	 taken	 and	 s/he	will	 be	




An	 attorney	 must	 pay	 a	 required	 $100	 filing	 fee	 and	 $85	 biometrics	 fee	 to	 the	
Department	 of	Homeland	 Security	 before	 filing	 Form	 EOIR-42A	 with	 the	 Immigration	
Court.92 The	 Immigration	 Court	 does	 not	 collect	 fees.93	Evidence	 of	 payment	 of	 these	
fees	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 copy	of	a	DHS	notice	of	fee	receipt	and	biometrics	appointment	
instructions	must	accompany	the	Form	EOIR-42A	when	 it	 is	filed	with	the	Immigration	
Court.94	The	attorney	should	submit	the	 fees	in	the	exact	amount	to	the	DHS.	The	DHS	
will	 not	 accept	 a	 payment	 of	 cash;	 it	 will	 only	 accept	 payments	 made	 by	 personal	
check,	 cashier's	 check,	 certified	 bank	 check,	 bank	 international	 money	 order,	 or	
foreign	 draft	 drawn	 on	 a	 financial	 institution	 in	 the	 U.S.	 and	 payable	 to	 the	
"Department	of	Homeland	Security"	in	U.S.	currency.95	If a	check	is	drawn	on	an	account	
of	a	person	other	than	the	LPR	applicant,	the	name	and	alien	registration	number	of	the	
applicant	must	 be	 entered	 on	 the	 face	of	 the	 check.96	 In	 addition,	 all	 checks	must	be	








93	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Immigration	 Court	
Practice	 Manual,	 Chapter	 3:	 Filing	 with	 the	 Immigration	 Court,	 64,	 available	 at	
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-08-
2016_update.pdf	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
94	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Executive	 Office	 for	





98	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Immigration	 Court	
Practice	 Manual,	 Chapter	 3:	 Filing	 with	 the	 Immigration	 Court,	 66,	 available	 at	
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-08-
2016_update.pdf	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).		





if	 the	 applicant	 shows	 that	 s/he	 is	 unable	 to	 pay	 the	 fee.99	If	 an	 applicant	 wants	 to	
request	a	fee	waiver,	his	or	her	attorney	should	notify	the	IJ	and	submit	an	affidavit,	or	
unsworn	declaration	made	pursuant	 to	28	U.S.C.	§1746,	 substantiating	 the	applicant's	











the	 required	 $100	 filing	 fee	 and	 $85	 biometrics	 fee	 with	 the	 DHS	 at	 the	
appropriate	 USCIS	 Service	 Center	 before	 filing	 the	 application	 with	 the	
Immigration	 Court.	 The	 DHS	 will	 send	 a	 copy	 of	 a	 notice	 of	 fee	 receipt	 and	
biometrics	appointment	instructions	to	the	applicant.	
(2) If	 the	 applicant	 is	 detained,	 DHS	 is	 responsible	 for	 obtaining	 biometrics.	 If	 the	
applicant	 is	 not	 detained,	 instruct	 him	 or	 her	 to	 go	 to	 his	 or	 her	 biometrics	
interview	 noted	 on	 the	 receipt	 from	 the	 DHS	 with	 the	 required	 documents	
designated	on	the	receipt.	The	applicant	will	have	fingerprints	taken	and	receive	
a	written	confirmation	once	biometrics	are	complete.	
(3) File	 the	 original	 application	 and	 copies	 of	 all	 supporting	 documents	 with	 the	
Immigration	Court	with	evidence	of	payment	of	 the	 fees	and	biometrics.103	This	







102	United	 States	Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	Office	 for	 Immigration	Review,	 Executive	Office	 for	
Immigration	 Review,	 Application	 for	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 	 for	 Certain	 Permanent	 Residents,	
Instructions,	2,	available	at	www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
103	8	C.F.R.	§	1240.20	(2016).	





















104	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Immigration	 Court	









subject	 to	 mandatory	 detention106	or	 is	 considered	 an	 “arriving	 alien.”107	Immigration	
and	Customs	Enforcement	(ICE)	will	make	an	initial	determination	about	bond	eligibility.	
However,	 if	 the	noncitizen	does	not	agree	with	 ICE,	 s/he	 is	able	 to	motion	 for	a	bond	
redetermination	 in	 front	 of	 an	 Immigration	 Judge	 (IJ). 108 	Bond	 redetermination	 is	
discretionary,	and	the	IJ	will	consider	whether	the	noncitizen	poses	a	flight	risk,	danger	










good	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 likelihood	 of	 removal	 in	 the	
reasonably	foreseeable	future,	the	Government	must	respond	with	evidence	sufficient	
to	 rebut	 that	 showing.”112	“[A]n	 alien	 may	 be	 held	 in	 confinement	 until	 it	 has	 been	
determined	 that	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 likelihood	 of	 removal	 in	 the	 reasonably	
foreseeable	future.”113		
	
In	 the	 Diop	 case,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 held	 that	 a	 respondent	 who	 had	 been	 granted	














habeas	 corpus	 appeal.114	The	 court	 concluded	 that	 the	 respondent’s	 35	 months	 of	
detention	 “without	 any	 post-Joseph	 hearing	 inquiry	 into	whether	 it	was	 necessary	 to	
accomplish	 the	 purposes	 of	 §	 1226(c)	 was	 unreasonable.”115 	The	 Government	 had	
argued	 that	 the	 respondent’s	 habeas	 case	 was	 moot	 because	 he	 had	 been	 released	
from	 custody	 after	 the	 crime	 for	which	 he	was	mandatorily	 detained	was	 vacated.116	
However	 the	Third	Circuit	Court	 found	 that	 the	 respondent	 could	again	be	 taken	 into	





Appeals	 applied	 the	 reasonableness	 test	 to	 cases	 where	 the	 noncitizen	 has	 been	
detained	for	over	the	“6-month”	period.119		
	




Bond	 Procedures	 for	 Non-Citizens	 Without	 Criminal	 Convictions	 (July	 2008),	
http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/resources/AIC_on_detention_etc_DDCBE
EBCFCBD0.pdf.		
• American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union,	 Practice	 Advisory:	 Prolonged	 Mandatory	




















The	 following	 is	 applicable	 to	 FOIA	 requests	 processed	 by	 the	 following	 agencies:	
Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review	 (EOIR),	 U.S.	 Immigration	 and	 Customs	




FOIA	 requests	are	placed	on	one	of	 three	 (3)	 tracks.	Requests	are	entered	 into	 tracks	
based	upon	the	complexity	of	the	request:	
	










FOIA	 does	 permit	 a	 10-day	 extension	 of	 this	 time	 period.	 If	 the	 request	 involves	 a	










titled	 “FOIA	 Legal	 Information”,	 scroll	 down	 to	 “Multi-Track	 Processing”),	 available	 at,	
https://www.ice.gov/foia/overview	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
121	Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Freedom	 of	 Immigration	 Act:	 How	 to	 Submit	 a	 FOIA/PA	
Request,	available	at,	https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-facts	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
122 	U.S.	 Immigration	 and	 Customs	 Enforcement,	 Submitting	 FOIA	 Request,	 available	 at,	
https://www.ice.gov/foia/request#wcm-survey-target-id	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
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Executive	Office	for	Immigration	Review	(EOIR)	FOIA	Request124	








(1) Include	 in	 the	 request	an	authorization	 to	 release	 information	 from	 the	person	
who	is	the	subject	of	the	request	(or	include	an	explanation	about	how	the	public	
interest	outweighs	the	privacy	interest	of	the	subject	of	the	record.		
(2) The	person	who	 is	 the	subject	of	 the	FOIA	request	must	certify	as	 to	his	or	her	
identity	by	completing	Form	DOJ-361	or	reasonably	describing	the	records	sought	























124	Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Freedom	 of	 Immigration	 Act:	 How	 to	 Submit	 a	 FOIA/PA	
Request,	available	at,	https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-facts	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).		




ICE	 FOIA	 requests	 must	 be	 submitted	 in	 writing.	 The	 request	 can	 be	 made	 using		
Form	G-639	or	by	using	the	online	FOIA	Request	Form.	Requests	must	be	for	access	to	

































125 	U.S.	 Immigration	 and	 Customs	 Enforcement,	 Submitting	 FOIA	 Request,	 available	 at,	
https://www.ice.gov/foia/request#wcm-survey-target-id	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).			





































which	 agency	 the	 FOIA	 request	 should	 be	 submitted),	 available	 at,	 https://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/freedom-information-and-privacy-act-foia/how-file-foia-privacy-act-request/submitting-foia-
requests	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).		





































and	enter	 the	 “Control	Number”	 that	was	provided	after	 receipt	of	 the	FOIA	 request.	
The	“Control	Number”	will	begin	with	the	letters	NRC,	COW,	etc..	







and-privacy-act-foia/how-file-foia-privacy-act-request/how-file-foiapa-request	 (last	 visited	 May	 12,	
2016).		
128	For	assistance	contact	USCIS	by	Telephone	800-375-5283;	Fax	802-288-1793	or	816-350-5785;	Email	
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Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	(FBI)	Background	Check	










• The	noncitizen’s	name	and	date	of	birth must	be provided	on	the	card.	
• The	fingerprinting	must	include	rolled	impressions	of	all	10	fingerprints	(these	
are	sometimes	referred	to	as	plain	or	flat	impressions).	
o Fingerprints	 taken	 with	 ink	 or	 via	 live	 scan	 are	 acceptable.	 If	
fingerprints	are	not	legible,	the	fingerprint	card	will	be	rejected.	
o If	possible,	have	the	fingerprints	taken	by	a	fingerprinting	technician.		 	
§ e.g.	 UPS	 in	 Pennsylvania	 does	 fingerprinting.	 However,	 UPS	

















133	Application	 Information	 Form,	 available	 at,	 https://forms.fbi.gov/identity-history-summary-checks-
review/q384893984839334.pdf	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
134 	Form	 FD-	 258,	 see,	 https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks/fd-258-1	
(last	visited	May	12,	2016).		












Online Request Steps 





(5) Complete	questions	as	prompted.	Prompts	will	 include	background	 information	




(b) Information	 about	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 background	 check	will	 include:	 1)	 Full	
name,	 2)	 Social	 Security	 number,	 3)	 Date	 of	 birth	 4)	 Sex,	 5)	 Race,	 and	 6)	
Aliases	and/or	maiden	name.	
(6) Complete	 payment	 information.	 For	 each	 request,	 there	 is	 a	 $8.00	 non-
refundable	fee.		
(7) If	 the	 person	 has	 no	 criminal	 record,	 this	 information	 will	 be	 provided	
immediately.	Otherwise,	 record	 the	 control	number	 to	 check	 status	of	 request,	






137	Please	 note	 that	 different	 fees	 apply	 to	 different	 requests.	 If	 the	 person	 requesting	 the	 criminal	
record	 is	 a	 “volunteer”	 the	 person	may	not	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 fee.	 A	 volunteer	may	press	 “New	Record	
Check”	to	request	criminal	records.	
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which	can	be	 found	 in	 the	original	PATCH	webpage.	 If	 the	request	continues	 to	
state	pending	after	24	hours,	call	1-888-783-7972.	













In	 New	 Jersey,	 criminal	 history	 background	 checks	 are	 obtained	 through	 live	 scan	
fingerprinting.	Follow	the	steps	below	to	be	fingerprinted:	
(1) Download	 and	 complete	 the	 Universal	 Form	 which	 can	 be	 found	 at	
http://www.njsp.org/info/pdf/20150129_universforma.pdf.		
(2) Visit	 www.bioapplicant.com/nj	 or	 call	 1-877-503-5981	 to	 schedule	 a	 live	 scan	
fingerprinting	appointment.	















140 	See	 State	 of	 Delaware,	 State	 Bureau	 of	 Identification,	
http://dsp.delaware.gov/state_bureau_of_identification.shtml	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).		





(b) Thurman	 Adams	 State	 Service	 Center,	 546	 S.	 Bedford	 Street,	 Room	 202,	
Georgetown,	 DE	 19947.	 Hours	 of	 operation	 are	 Monday	 through	 Thursday	
8:30am	 to	 3:30pm.	 To	 schedule	 an	 appointment,	 call	 302-739-2528.	 Cash	 is	








(3) Pay	 at	 fingerprinting	 site.	 Payment	 options	 include	 cash,	 credit,	 debit,	 certified	
checks,	 money	 orders	 or	 company	 checks	made	 out	 to	 Delaware	 State	 Police.	
American	Express	or	personal	checks	are	not	accepted.	The	fee	is	$52.50.	
Steps for Out-of-State Requestors 
(1) Get	fingerprints	taken	at	local	police	agency	or	any	fingerprinting	agency	
(2) Obtain	 fingerprint	 cards.	 If	 the	 fingerprint	 agency	 does	 not	 provide	 fingerprint	



















Noncitizens	 who	 do	 not	 meet	 the	 statutory	 requirements	 of	 INA	 §	 240A(a)	 LPR	
Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 may	 be	 eligible	 to	 apply	 for	 the	 alternative	 forms	 of	 relief	
discussed	below.	 In	addition	to	meeting	 the	 statutory	requirements	 for	some	of	these	
alternative	 forms	of	 relief,	 the	REAL	 ID	Act	 of	 2005	 allows	 the	 Immigration	 Judge	 (IJ)	
greater	 independence	 in	determining	 credibility	 and	 requiring	 corroboration	evidence	
from	 the	 noncitizen.141	The	 IJ	 has	 greater	 discretion	 in	 determining	 whether	 or	 not	
the	 testimony	 of	 the	 noncitizen	 or	 other	 witness	 in	 support	 of	 the	 noncitizen	 is	





Cancellation	 of	Removal	 for	 non-lawful	permanent	resident	 is	 available	 to	noncitizens	
who	have	been	physically	present	in	the	United	States	for	at	least	10	years,	are	of	good	
moral	 character,	 have	 not	 been	 convicted	 of	 any	 crimes	 that	 would	 make	 the	
individual	 inadmissible	 or	 deportable,	 and	 can	 show	 that	 upon	 removal	 a	 qualifying	
relative	 would	 suffer	 “exceptional	 and	 extremely	 unusual	 hardship.” 143 	Lawful	
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Incomplete	Notice	to	Appear	(Third	Circuit	Court	Jurisdiction)	
In	 Orozco-Velasquez	 V.	 Attorney	 General,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 overturned	 the	 Board	
precedent,	Matter	of	Camarillo,	25	I.	&	N.	Dec.	644	(BIA	2011)	by	holding	that	that	the	
NTA	needs	to	include	all	statutory	stipulations	in	order	to	stop	the	time	for	purposes	of	
continuous	 physical	 presence,	 stipulations	 which	 include	 the	 date	 and	 time	 of	 the	
removal	 hearing.145	The	 court	 held	 that	 8	 U.S.C.	 §	 1229(a)(1),	 necessarily	 requires	
specification	 of	 the	 “time	 and	 place	 at	 which	 the	 proceedings	 shall	 be	 held.”146	The	
Court	found	that	the	word	“shall”	in	the	statute	is	a	requirement,	and	in	the	absence	of	
another	 conflicting	 canon	of	 statutory	 construction	 such	 a	 requirement	 is	mandatory.	
Because	the	statute	requires	that	an	“alien	[be]	served	a	notice	to	appear	under	8	U.S.C.	
§	 1229(a)”	 the	 statute	 also	 “compels”	 the	 government	 to	 follow	 all	 the	 statutory	
stipulations	 set	 forth	 for	 an	 NTA,	 which	 includes	 stating	 the	 time	 and	 place	 of	 the	
hearing.147	Until	 the	 government	 has	 set	 forth	 all	 such	 stipulations,	 the	NTA	 “will	 not	
stop	 the…clock”	 for	 purposes	 of	 Cancellation	 of	 Removal	 eligibility. 148 	Thus,	 the	
incomplete	NTA	will	not	preclude	the	noncitizen	from	continuing	to	accrue	continuous	




A	 section	 212(c)	 discretionary	 waiver,	 now	 repealed	 under	 the	 INA,	 provides	 that	
noncitizens	 lawfully	 admitted	 for	 permanent	 residence,	 who	 committed	 a	 crime	 or	
other	act	rendering	him	or	her	inadmissible	or	deportable	from	the	U.S.;	who	has	not	had	
an	order	of	 deportation,	 and	who	 has	 had	 a	 lawful	 unrelinquished	 domicile	 of	 seven	
consecutive	years,	may	be	eligible	for	a	waiver	of	deportation.149	However,	this	relief	 is	
only	 available	 to	 those	who	pleaded	 guilty	 prior	 to	 April	 1,	 1997	 with	 the	 intention	
to	 apply	 for	§	212(c)	 relief.150	The	IJ	weighs	the	negative	factors,	such	as	the	severity	of	
the	 crime,	 against	 positive	 factors,	 such	 as	 the	 noncitizen's	 rehabilitation	 and	
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§	212(h)	Waiver	
Noncitizens	 who	 have	 committed	 crimes	 of	moral	 turpitude,	 have	 a	 single	controlled	
substance	 violation	 involving	 possession	 of	 thirty	 grams	 or	 less	 of	 marijuana,	 have	
engaged	 in	prostitution,	 or	have	 received	 immunity	 from	prosecution,	may	obtain	a	§	
212(h)	waiver.	 Such	 individuals	may	qualify	 for	a	§	212(h)	waiver	 if	 (1)	 the	 crime	was	
committed	more	than	 fifteen	 years	 before	 the	 application	 or	 admission	 or	 if	 it	was	 a	
prostitution	 offense,	 the	noncitizen	has	been	rehabilitated	and,	 (2)	the	individual	is	the	
spouse,	 parent,	 son,	 or	 daughter	 of	 a	 U.S.	 citizen	 or	 permanent	 legal	 resident	 and	
denying	the	waiver	would	cause	extreme	hardship	to	the	citizen	or	permanent	resident;	




and	 that	 the	 noncitizen	 has	 been	 rehabilitated.153	One	 bar	 from	 relief	 under	 §	 212(h)	
states	 that	 “[n]o	waiver	 shall	 be	 granted…in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 alien	who	 has	 previously	
been	 admitted	 to	 the	 United	 States	 as	 an	 alien	 lawfully	 admitted	 for	 permanent	
residence	 if…	 since	 the	 date	 of	 such	 admission	 the	 alien	 has	 been	 convicted	 of	 an	




the	 U.S.	 as	 an	 LPR,	 but	 who	 adjusted	 to	 lawful	 permanent	 residence	 status	 while	









while	 present	 in	 the	 U.S.);	 Hanif	 v.	 United	 States,	 694	 F.3d	 479,	 48	 (3d	 Cir.	 2012)	 (holding	 that	 the		
§	 212(h)	 bar	 to	 eligibility	 for	 relief	 did	 not	 included	 those	 who	 adjusted	 their	 status	 to	 a	 lawful	
permanent	resident	in	the	U.S.);	Bracamontes	v.	Holder,	675	F.3d	380,	387-388	(4th	Cir.	2012)	(holding	




to	eligibility	 for	 relief	 included	 those	who	adjusted	 their	 status	 to	 a	 lawful	 permanent	 resident	 in	 the	
U.S.).	
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A	 person	may	 apply	 for	 asylum	 as	 a	 defense	 to	 removal	 if	 the	 noncitizen	meets	 the	
definition	of	"refugee"	under	the	Act	and	is	not	subject	to	one	of	the	statutory	bars.156	A	
“refugee”	 is	 defined	 as	 “any	 person	 who	 is	 outside	 any	 country	 in	 which	 such	
person’s	nationality	or…any	 country	 in	which	 such	 person	 last	 habitually	 resided,	 and	
who	 is	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	return	 to,	 and	 is	unable	or	unwilling	 to	avail	 himself	 or	
herself	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 that	 country	 because	 of	 persecution	 or	 a	 well-founded	




A	noncitizen	 in	removal	proceedings	may	apply	 for	withholding	of	 removal	if	s/he	can	
show	 that	 s/he	 may	 not	 be	 returned	 to	 a	 place	 where	 s/he	 will	 face	 persecution	
because	of	 his	 or	 her	 race,	 religion,	 nationality,	membership	 in	 a	particular	 group,	 or	
political	 opinion.158	Withholding	 is	 similar	 to	 asylum	 in	 that	 it	 provides	 protection	 for	
persons	 fleeing	 persecution	 on	 account	 of	 one	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 five	 grounds,	
but	withholding,	 in	 fact,	 requires	 a	higher	 standard	of	 proof.	 Thus,	 in	order	 to	obtain	
withholding	 of	 removal,	 the	 noncitizen	 must	 show	 by	 a	 clear	 probability	 that	 s/he	





The	 Convention	 Against	 Torture	 and	 Other	 Cruel,	 Inhuman	 or	 Degrading	 Treatment	
of	 Punishment,	 which	 Congress	 codified	 into	 U.S.	 law,	 prohibits	 the	 removal	 of	 a	
noncitizen	 to	 a	 country	 where	 there	 are	 substantial	 grounds	 for	 believing	 that	 the	
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torture.160	A	noncitizen	in	removal	proceedings	may	apply	for	this	form	of	relief	if	s/he	
can	establish	that	 it	 is	more	 likely	than	not	 that	s/he	would	be	tortured	 if	 removed	to	
the	proposed	country	of	removal.”161	
	
Temporary	 Protected	 Status	 (TPS)		
Noncitizens	 from	certain	 countries	may	 request	 this	 form	of	relief.162	The	Secretary	of	












Noncitizens	 in	 removal	 proceedings	 who	 meet	 the	 statutory	 requirements	 of	 INA	 	
§	 240B	 may	 request	 voluntary	 departure	 instead	 of	 receiving	 a	 formal	 removal	
order.165	There	 are	 three	 different	 forms	 of	 voluntary	 departure,	 depending	 on	 the	
stage	of	the	proceeding	when	granted.	Voluntary	 departure	can	be	granted:	(1)	before	
the	 removal	 hearing;	 (2)	 during	 the	 removal	 hearing;	 and	 (3)	 after	 the	 removal	
hearing.166	Under	 §	 240B(a),	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Homeland	 Security	may	 permit	 certain	
noncitizens	 to	 depart	 voluntarily,	 either	 in	 lieu	 of	 removal	 proceedings	 or	 before	
																																								 										
	
160	Convention	Against	 Torture	and	Other	Cruel	 and	 Inhuman	or	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment,	
Dec.	10,	1984,	1465	U.N.T.S.	85.	The	CAT	was	incorporated	into	United	States	law	by	the	Foreign	Affairs	
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removal	 proceedings	 have	 been	 completed,	 at	 the	 noncitizen's	 own	 expense.167	If	
granted	 pre	 or	 post-hearing	 departure,	 the	 noncitizen	 has	 to	 depart	 within	120	days	
and	 s/he	 may	 be	 required	 to	 post	 bond.168	Under	 §	 240B(b)	 noncitizens	 may	 get	
voluntary	departure	at	 the	conclusion	of	 the	removal	proceedings,	 at	 the	noncitizen's	
expense.169	Bond	 for	 subsection	 (b)	 applicants	 is	 mandatory.170	If	 voluntary	 departure	
is	 granted	under	subsection	 (b),	 the	maximum	 period	 the	 noncitizen	 has	 to	 depart	 is	
60	 days.171	Persons	 who	 have	 been	 convicted	 of	 an	 aggravated	 felony	 or	 who	 are	
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(b).	Prosecutorial	Discretion	
Prosecutorial	 discretion	 refers	 to	 decision	 the	 DHS	 makes	 about	 whether	 to	 enforce	
immigration	laws	against	a	person.175	According	to	the	2014	Jeh	Johnson	Memorandum,	
the	“DHS	must	exercise	prosecutorial	discretion	 in	 the	enforcement	of	 law,”	meaning,	
the	DHS	officer	can	make	a	decision	not	to	enforce	the	law.176	The	use	of	Prosecutorial	
Discretion	applies	to	a	variety	of	enforcement	actions	including:	(1)	“whether	to	parole	
an	alien	 into	 the	United	States;”	 (2)	“whether	 to	commence	removal	proceedings	and	
what	charges	to	lodge	against	the	respondent;”	(3)	“whether	to	pursue	formal	removal	
proceedings;”	 (4)	 “whether	 to	 cancel	 a	Notice	 to	Appear	 or	 other	 charging	document	










consider	 in	 determining	 whether	 to	 exercise	 Prosecutorial	 Discretion	 include:	
“extenuating	circumstances	involving	the	offense	of	conviction;	extended	length	of	time	
since	 the	 offense	 of	 conviction;	 length	 of	 time	 in	 the	 U.S.;	 military	 service;	 family	 or	





175 	Wadhia,	 Shoba	 Sivaprasad,	 The	 History	 of	 Prosecutorial	 Discretion	 In	 Immigration	 Law	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605164	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
176	See	 Memorandum	 from	 Jeh	 Charles	 Johnson,	 Sec’y,	 U.S.	 Dep’t	 of	 Homeland	 Sec.,	 to	 Thomas	 S.	







178	Center	 for	 Immigrants’	 Rights	 and	 the	American	Bar	Association,	 To	 File	 or	Not	 to	 File	 a	Notice	 to	
Appear:	Improving	the	Government’s	Use	of	Prosecutorial	Discretion	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).		
179	Id.	
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motion	 with	 an	 IJ	 or	 the	 Board.	 The	 central	 purpose	 of	 a	motion	 to	 reopen181	 is	 to	
introduce	 new	 and	 additional	 evidence	 that	 is	 material	 and	 that	 was	 unavailable	 at	
the	original	hearing.	 A	motion	 to	 reconsider182	 seeks	a	reexamination	 of	 the	decision	
based	on	alleged	errors	of	 law	and	facts.	Unless	 an	exception	applies,	a	party	may	 file	
only	 one	motion	 to	 reopen	and	 one	 motion	 to	 reconsider.	With	 a	 few	 exceptions,	 a	
motion	 to	 reopen	proceedings	must	be	filed	within	90	days	of	the	final	removal	order,	
while	 a	motion	 to	 reconsider	 must	 be	 filed	 within	 30	 days	 of	 the	 date	 of	 the	 final	
order.	 The	 filing	 of	 such	 motions	 does	 not	 suspend	 the	 execution	 of	 the	 removal	
decision	 unless	 a	 stay	 is	 ordered	 by	 the	 IJ,	 the	 Board,	 DHS,	 or	 the	 alien	 seeks	 to	




A	Stay	 of	 Removal	prevents	DHS	from	executing	an	 order	of	 removal,	deportation,	 or	
exclusion.	 Depending	 on	 the	 situation,	 a	 stay	 of	 removal	 may	 be	 automatic	 or	
discretionary.	A	noncitizen	is	entitled	to	an	automatic	 stay	of	removal	 during	the	time	
allowed	 to	 file	 an	 appeal	 (unless	 a	 waiver	 of	 the	 right	 to	 appeal	 is	 filed),	 while	 an	





180 	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 available	 at	
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.pdf			(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
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Except	in	 cases	 involving	 in	absentia	orders,184	filing	a	 motion	to	reopen	or	 reconsider	
will	 not	 stay	 the	 execution	 of	 any	 decision	 made	 in	 a	 case185.	 Similarly,	 filing	 a	
petition	 for	 review	 in	 federal	 court	 also	 does	 not	 result	 in	 an	 automatic	 stay	 of	 a	
removal	 order.	 Thus,	 a	 removal	 order	 can	proceed	 unless	 the	alien	applies	 for	and	 is	
granted	 a	 stay	of	execution	 as	a	discretionary	 form	of	 relief	 by	 the	 Board,	IJ,	DHS,	or	
a	federal	 court.	Such	a	stay	is	temporary	 and	is	often	coupled	with	a	written	motion	to	




	The	 Immigration	 and	 Nationality	 Act	 confers	 federal	 courts	 jurisdiction	 over	 certain	






The	 Board	 is	 the	 highest	 administrative	 body	with	 the	 authority	 to	 interpret	 federal	
immigration	 laws.	 The	Board	has	jurisdiction	to	hear	 appeals	 from	decisions	of	IJs	and	
certain	decisions	of	DHS.	Either	a	noncitizen	or	DHS	may	appeal	a	decision	from	 the	IJ.	
In	 deciding	cases,	 the	Board	can	dismiss	or	sustain	 the	appeal,	remand	the	case	 to	 the	
deciding	 IJ,	or,	 in	 rare	 cases,	 refer	 the	 case	 to	 the	Attorney	General	 for	a	decision.	A	
precedent	 decision	 by	 the	 Board	 is	 binding	 on	 DHS	 and	 IJs	 throughout	 the	 country	
unless	 the	 Attorney	 General	 modifies	 or	 overrules	 the	 decision.	 With	 respect	 to	 the	















The	 Florence	 Immigrant	 and	Refugee	Rights	 Project,	available	 at	http://www.firrp.org	
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A Roadmap to Winning Your Case for  




This guide was prepared and updated by the staff of the Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project and was 
written for immigrant detainees in Arizona who are representing themselves pro se in their removal 
proceedings.  This guide is not intended to provide legal advice or serve as a substitute for legal counsel.  The 
Florence Project is a nonprofit legal services organization and does not charge for its services to immigrant 
detainees in Arizona.  This guide is copyright protected but can be shared and distributed widely to assist 
indigent immigrants around the country.  All of our guides are available to download on our website: 
www.firrp.org.  We kindly ask that you give credit to the Florence Project if you are adapting the information in 
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2. What Does “LPR Cancellation of Removal Mean?” 
 
3. Hitting the Road to Cancellation of Removal: Your 
First Court Hearings 
 
a. Eligibility for “ LPR Cancellation of Removal” 
b. Filling out and turning in the application 
 
4. Steering Toward Success: Gathering Evidence for 
Your Case 
 
5. The Final Stretch: Preparing Your Testimony 
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Important Words to Know 
 
Immigration Law has a lot of technical words. Here’s a list of some of the 
words you’ll see a lot in this guide and an short explanation of what they 
mean. 
 
 Immigration Judge (“Judge”): this is the person who will make a 
decision about your case. He or she holds hearings in the 
courtroom and wears a black robe. This person doesn’t work for 
ICE. It’s her job to look at the facts of your case and apply the law 
fairly. 
 
 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”): this is the 
agency that has put you in deportation proceedings and is in 
charge of detaining you. ICE is part of the Department of 
Homeland Security, or “DHS.” 
 
 Government Attorney: this is the lawyer who represents ICE 
when you go to your court hearings. He or she sits at the table 
next to you and also talks to the Judge. It’s usually this attorney’s 
job to ask the Judge to order you deported. 
 
 Deportation: ICE has put you in deportation proceedings, which 
are also called “removal proceedings.” If the Judge orders you 
deported or “removed” from the United States, you will be sent 
back to the country where you are a citizen and will not be able to 
return legally to the U.S. for at least ten years. 
 
 The Florence Project: this is a group of lawyers and legal 
assistants who provide free legal help to people without lawyers. 
The Florence Project wrote this guide to help you understand 
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1. Introduction 
 
If you are legal permanent resident (LPR) of the United States (also 
called a “green card” holder) and you’ve been convicted of certain 
crimes or broken other immigration laws, ICE may put you into 
deportation proceedings. 
 
However, you may be able to apply for a one-time-only pardon that 
allows you to cancel your deportation. 
 
In order to get the pardon, you’ll have to show 
the Judge that the good things about you--like 
your family ties here, your work history, and 
your contributions to the community—
outweigh the bad things in your life, like your 




If you are eligible to apply for “LPR Cancellation of Removal”, there’s a 
pretty good chance that you’ll win your case—if you do your homework 
and prepare well, that is. Remember, you’ll have to apply while you’re in 
deportation proceedings—you can’t apply if you’ve been deported 
already. If you decide to take the deportation and not fight for “LPR 
Cancellation of Removal,” you’ll face some big consequences:  
 
 You will not able to apply for another 
chance to live in the United States for at 
least 10 years.   
 Depending on your convictions, you may 
never be able to apply for another 
chance to live here.   
 If you come back to the US without 
permission and get caught, you may be sentenced to years in 
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We know it’s not easy to be detained. But, 
taking the time to put together an “LPR 
Cancellation of Removal” case could let you 
go on living in the United States. This guide 
will give you a road map to winning your 
case. It can be a long road to release with a 
few detours along the way, but we hope to 
give you the tools you need for a safe and 
smooth trip. Best of luck with your case! 
 
2. What Does “LPR Cancellation of Removal Mean?” 
 
 It means that you may be able to stop your deportation and keep your 
green card if you meet ALL of the requirements below. 
 
 You’ve been a Legal Permanent Resident (green card holder) for 
at least the last five years 
 You’ve been in the United States with some form of legal status for 
at least seven years, without committing certain offenses or being 
put into deportation proceedings 
 You haven’t been convicted of an “aggravated felony.” An 
aggravated felony usually means any conviction with a sentence 
over one year. But, there are many exceptions. 
 
Remember, the requirements for “LPR 
Cancellation of Removal” can be a little technical 
and depend a lot on the details of your life.  
 
If you are eligible for “LPR Cancellation of 
Removal,” that doesn’t mean that you’ll 
automatically win your case. You’ll need to 
convince the Judge that you deserve a second 
chance here in the United States. You can do that 
by showing that your deportation would cause 
you and the people family a lot of suffering. You’ll also need to show that 
you understand that you’ve made mistakes in the past and that you 
won’t repeat them in the future.   
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3. Hitting the Road to Cancellation of Removal: Your First 
Court Hearings 
 
First, let’s talk about the basics of immigration court. If you feel 
confused about court, you’re not alone! Immigration law is complicated, 
even for lawyers. Let’s figure out who is going to in court and what’s 
going to happen in your first hearings.  
 
The Judge will be at the front of the room and 
will ask you questions. He will be dressed like 
the man on the left. The Judge will be making 
the decision about your case so it’s important 
to be respectful, polite, and prepared.  
 
 
 A government attorney. When you go to 
court, a lawyer representing ICE will be there. 
He’s called the government attorney. His job is to represent ICE 
and try to get an order of deportation against you.  
 
 An interpreter. Don’t worry if you don’t speak English—an 
interpreter will be there in person or over the phone. Just make 
sure you speak up and tell the IJ that you don’t speak or 
understand English well and need an interpreter. 
 
The first few hearings that you’ll go to 
will be “master calendar” hearings. At 
those hearings, you’ll be in court with 
a group of other detainees. At “master 
calendar” hearings, the Judge will 
check in with you about your case and 
see what you want to do. It isn’t time 
yet to show her all your evidence of 
the reasons why you should stay in the country. If you want more time 
to talk to an attorney, the judge will give you a few weeks to do so. You’ll 
then come back for another master calendar hearing. 
 
When you come back to court, the Judge will ask you if you want to 
admit or deny the changes against you. That means that the Judge wants 
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to know if you want to force the government attorney to prove the 
charges against you. If the government attorney says that you should be 
deported because of your criminal convictions, making him prove the 
charges against you can be an important step.  To learn more about how 
to do that, read the Florence Project’s guide on denying the charges 
against you.  
 
Certain types of criminal convictions, even for pretty minor crimes, can 
affect your deportation case, so it’s good to get some legal advice before 
admitting any criminal charges against you.  If you can’t speak to an 
attorney first, you might want to consider denying your criminal 
charges just to be safe. 
 
a. Eligibility for “ LPR Cancellation of Removal” 
 
If the Judge decides that at least some of the charges against you are 
correct, she’ll then ask you questions to figure out if you are eligible for 
“LPR Cancellation of Removal.” She’ll ask questions to make sure you 
meet the requirements to apply. Take a look at the requirements on 
page 6 if you can’t remember. If the Judge agrees that you are eligible to 
present your case for “LPR Cancellation” to her, she’ll give you a copy of 
the application.  
 
Remember, just because the Judge says you’re eligible for “LPR 
Cancellation” does not mean that you’ve won your case! It means that 
the Judge thinks that you’ve met the basic requirements and is giving 
you a chance to show her that you deserve to have your deportation 
cancelled.  
 
b. Filling out and turning in the application 
 
Before your final hearing, you’ll come back to court for one more 
“master calendar” hearing to turn in your application for “LPR 
Cancellation of Removal.” It’s important that you fill out the application 
completely so that the Judge will accept it and schedule a final hearing 
for you to present all your evidence. A short guide on how to fill out 
your application is at the end of this packet.  
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When you’ve completed the application, 
make two extra copies and bring them to 
court with you. The original will go to the 
Judge. Another copy will go to the 
government attorney and you’ll keep a 
copy for yourself. This is important, so 
don’t forget! 
 
Once you turn in your application, the Judge 
will give you a date for a final hearing. At this 
hearing, you’ll appear without a group of 
detainees. The hearing will last a few hours. 
This hearing will be your chance to present your case to the judge. 
 




As we talked about earlier, winning 
your case for “LPR Cancellation” is like 
following a roadmap for a long trip. You 
got started on your trip by going to 
your master calendar hearing and 
filling out your application. Now it’s 
time to hit the road and begin gathering 
evidence to support your case. Every piece of evidence you gather 
means that you’re a little further toward the finish line! 
 
Start gathering evidence as soon as you decide that you want to apply 
for “LPR Cancellation of Removal.” Take a look at the list of evidence 
in Appendix 3. This will give you ideas of what documents to 
gather. Many of these documents take time for your family to find and 
to mail to you. We know it’s not easy to gather all of these documents 
while you’re detained. Ask a trusted family member or friend to help 
you get these documents together. Make sure that he mails you copies, 
not originals, of these documents. 
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 The type of evidence that you’ll gather depends 
on the facts of your case. Try and think of 
evidence that shows that you or your family 
would suffer a lot if you were deported. For 
example, if you have health problems and would 
have a hard time getting treatment in your home 
country, that evidence would be very helpful to 
your case.  
 
Or, if you’re a single mom 
whose kids have never been to your country, you’ll 
want to get letters from their teachers about how 
they’re doing in school and whether they have any 
special needs. You’ll need copies of their birth 
certificates to show that they’re U.S. citizens. You’ll 
want to document all the opportunities that they 
have here—scholarships, job trainings, camps—
that they won’t have in your country. 
 
Every person applying for “LPR Cancellation of 
Removal” should get as many letters of reference 
as possible. These should be from friends, 
family, and employers and should talk about all 
the good contributions that you’ve made to the 
United States. Again, there is a long list of 




Remember, all the documents you submit need to be in English. If you 
receive documents in another language, you can translate them. Just put 
your translation in with the original letter and attach a signed copy of 
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1. Family Ties in the US (birth certificates, marriage certificates) 
2. Evidence of Hardship to Me if I Am Deported 
3. Evidence of Hardship to My Family 
4. Evidence of Employment History and Property in the US 
5. Evidence of Rehabilitation (if you have criminal history) 
 
Attach a signed and dated copy of “Certificate of Service” at the end of 
this packet to the last page of all your evidence. Then make two copies 
of all your evidence. Just like the application, the original will go to the 
Judge, a copy will go to the government attorney and you’ll keep a copy 
for yourself.  
 
If you want to send the documents to the 
Judge before your final date, put a cover sheet 
with your name and A-number on top. Then 
put the packets in envelopes. One should say 
“To the Immigration Judge” and the other 
should say “To ICE Litigation.” Ask detention 
staff to make sure they are delivered or put 
them in the detention center’s mailboxes that 










Once you have all your documents 
together, you’ll want to organize 
them. Make a list of everything you 
have and then put it on top. You can 
divide your documents into 
categories like these: 
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5. The Final Stretch: Preparing Your Testimony 
 
You’re almost done with your journey toward 
“LPR Cancellation of Removal” and are about to 
see the finish line! Spending time preparing 
your testimony for the final hearing will help 
you with this final stretch of your case.  
 
At your final hearing, you’ll have an 
opportunity to tell the judge why you think you 
should stay in the United States. Keep these 
tips in mind when practicing your testimony: 
 
 Be prepared. Write a list of the specific reasons why you and 
your family would suffer if you were deported. Don’t just say 
things like “they’ll miss me” or “they need me to pay the bills.” 
That won’t be much help—all families go through that. Think 
about the reasons why your family will suffer much more 
than normal if you’re deported and explain those reasons to 
the Judge. Write them down on a piece of paper.  
 
For example, you’ll need to explain how much your 
child’s cancer treatment costs, how you take care of her 
when she’s sick, how this treatment isn’t available in 
your home country, and how you pay all the family’s 
medical bills. Practice explaining this to a friend or a 





 Be honest. Your job is to tell the Judge about the circumstances of 
your life. If you have criminal convictions and the Judge asks you 
about them, tell her what happened. Lying will just make things 
worse, and the Judge and government attorney often have ways to 
figure out if you are lying.  
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 Turn negatives into positives. If you had a problem with drugs 
and alcohol in the past, explain how you’ve overcome those 
problems—did you go to AA meetings or complete a 
rehabilitation program? Tell the Judge about those things, too.  
 
 Don’t be defensive. Admitting that you made mistakes can show 
the Judge that you are sorry. It can also show the Judge that you 
won’t repeat those mistakes in the future.  
 
 Speak from the heart. Judges see a 
lot of people every day. You can make your 
testimony stand out by speaking sincerely. 
Think of a funny story about your family to 
share. Think about a story that will show 
the Judge how much your family needs 
you. Explain to the Judge why your 
deportation would hurt you and your 
family very much. Don’t worry if you 
become nervous or emotional in court—it happens to almost 
everyone. 
 
 Ask your family members to testify in court. Your family can 
come and tell the judge about the reasons why you should stay in 
the United States. Help your family member prepare by asking her 
to list all the reasons why she would suffer if you were in another 
country. Make sure she practices and writes the reasons down to 
have with her in court. Your family members can also come and 
watch your final hearing to show the Judge that they support you. 
Remember, some of the detention centers won’t let small children 
come to court, so have your family members call the detention 
center and ask about the rules before the come. 
 
 Answer the judge’s questions. The judge may want to ask you 
some specific questions. A list of what she may ask is at the end of 
this guide. In addition to practicing your testimony, you should 
practice responses to those questions so you’ll be prepared. 
Remember, be respectful when the judge speaks. Refer to the 
judge as “Your Honor,” “Ma’am,” or “Sir.” 
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6. Weighing the Evidence: The Judge’s 
Decision 
 
In most cases, the Judge will give you her 
decision at the end of your final hearing. She’ll 
tell you whether or not she’ll approve your 
application for “LPR Cancellation of Removal.” 
Other times, the Judge will tell you that she 
wants time to think about your case. She will 
write a decision and send it to you through the 
detention center’s mail within a few weeks. 
 
There are a few possibilities for the Judge’s decision: 
 
 If the Judge approves your application and the government 
attorney does not want to appeal that decision, you’ll likely be 
released the same day. 
 
 If the Judge approves your application and the government 
attorney appeals that decision, you’ll likely have to wait until the 
Board of Immigration Appeals gives you a final decision. It usually 
takes at least three months. 
 
 If the Judge denies your application, you have the choice of 
appealing that decision and saying that the Judge was wrong. 
You’ll need to tell the Judge at your final hearing that you want to 
appeal. She’ll give you some paperwork that needs to be mailed 
within 30 days of her decision. Take a look at the Florence 
Project’s guide to appealing your case or schedule an appointment 




As you’ve seen, winning a case for “LPR Cancellation of Removal” is not 
easy. You need to show that you and your family would suffer if you 
were deported. It takes planning, lots of work gathering evidence, and 
really practicing your testimony. We wish you the best of luck with your 
case! 
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Appendix 1. Filling Out Your Application 
 
This section addresses some common questions and mistakes that can 
happen when you’re filling out your application for Cancellation of 
Removal application. If you need an extra copy, it’s available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm. 
 
You must use a pen or typewriter to fill out the form. Do not use a pencil.  
Most importantly, if you are unsure or do not know the answer to a 
question, write that on the form.  For example, if you can’t remember 
something about your criminal record, write down as much as you 
know and put “I can’t remember” or “this is to the best of my memory.” 
or indicate that you might have missing or incorrect information.  If a 
question does not apply to you simply put “N/A” in the box, for example 
if you are not married and the question asks for information about your 
wife. 
 
If there is not enough room on the form for you to answer a question 
completely, continue your answer on another piece of paper. Just make 
sure to write your name and A-number at the top of each piece of paper. 
 
These are questions to watch out for: 
 
42A Application for Cancellation of Removal 
 
 Part 1 
 





 If you first entered the U.S. as a legal permanent resident, write 
down the date you entered and where.  If you first entered the U.S. 
illegally and later applied for and received your legal permanent 
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Part 3 
 
 If you used a different name when you entered the U.S. include 
that information here. 
 
 Mark here what your immigration status was when you entered 
the U.S. If you entered without papers, mark “entered without 
inspection”. 
 
 Watch out for the question that asks you to list all of your entries 
and departures from the U.S. You should list every trip you’ve 
made out of the U.S., even if it was for less than one day. If you left 
and came back many times for the same reason (for example, if 
you went to Mexico several times just for the day to go shopping 
or to visit family) then you can write something like “day trip once 
a month to Mexico for shopping”.  You may need another piece of 




 If you have never married, please mark “I am not married” and 
skip to question #36.  If you have only been married ONE time, 
please answer questions 25-34 in full and on #35 mark “I have not 




 When listing your work history, begin with the job you had just 
before coming to detention and work backwards.  If you cannot 
remember all of the details of your work history include as much 




 Please include ALL children and listed relatives (parents, 
brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and grandparents), whether they 
are in the U.S. or another country.  If they live outside the U.S., 
then only put the country where they live. If necessary, continue 
information on additional pieces of paper.  
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Part 7  
 
 THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION on the application is the one 
that asks about your criminal history.  It is VERY important to 
include any and all arrests, court appearances, convictions, even if 
you think that ICE does not know about it or the charges were 
dismissed.  This also includes any fines or traffic violations.  ICE 
will obtain your “rap sheet” and other conviction documents 
before your hearing.  If you do not list the charges on your 
application and they later come out at the hearing, the judge may 
think you trying to hide something and it will hurt your case.  If 
you think that you may not remember your criminal history 
perfectly, then you can note that the answers provided are “to the 
best of your recollection” and that you “might be missing or 




 If you’ve never been married before, just list N/A 
 List your addresses from the most recent to the lease recent. If 
you’re currently detained, use the detention center’s address 
 If you can’t remember exactly when you lived someplace, use the 
abbreviation “apprx” or “+/-“ to show that you’re making an 
estimation 
 List your previous jobs from most recent to least recent 
 Check the box to indicate that the form is filed along with an 




 If you are currently detained and not paying any bills, you can put 
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1. Have you used any aliases in the United States? 
 
2. When did you first enter the United States? 
 
3. How did you enter? 
 
4. How did you get your green card?  
 
5. Have you left the U.S. since you got your green card? How many 
times? What is the longest amount of time you have spent outside of 




1. Are you married? When did you get married (make sure you know 
the date!!!)? Where does s/he live? What is your husband or wife’s 
immigration status?  Have you ever filed a petition for him or her?  
Why not? 
 
2. If not married but living with someone, why haven’t you gotten 
married? Have you ever made plans to marry this person that you 
live with? How long have you lived together? 
 
3. Do you have children?  When were they born (know dates!!!)?  How 
old are your kids? Who do they live with?  What immigration status 
do they have? 
 
4. Are your parents still living?  Where do they live?  What is their 
immigration status? 
 
5. Do you have any other relatives or family in the United States?  What 
is their immigration status? 
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6. Do you have any relatives or family living in your country of origin?  
Could you go live with them if you are removed?  Why not? 
 
7. The Judge will also want to know about your involvement and the 
quality of your relationship with all of the people mentioned above: 
 
How often do you speak to each other? 
How often do you see each other? 
How is your relationship with this person? 




1. Will your wife or kids go with you if you are deported?  Why not? 
 
2. Do you have any medical conditions?  Do you take any 
medication? 
 
3. Do any of your relatives have medical conditions?  What?  Do you 
take care of them?  How? 
 
4. What will you do if you are deported?  Where will you go?  Who 
will you live with?  How will you get your medicine?  How will you 
work? 
 
Employment, Education, Community Involvement 
 
1. How far did you get with your schooling? 
 
2. What was the last job you had? How much were you making per 
week? How long were you working there?  
 
3. The judge will want to get a sense of your employment history for at 
least the last 5 to 10 years, if not the entire time that you have lived 
in the United States. 
 
4. If you have had long periods of unemployment, be prepared to 
discuss what you were doing during that time and why. 
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5. Where will you work or how will you support yourself if you win 
your case? 
 
6. Have you done volunteer work or community service?  Was it court 
ordered or of your own choice? 
 
7. Do you go to church or participate in any other types of community 
organizations?  Which ones?  How often? 
 
8. Have you always filed taxes?  If not, why not? 
 
9. Have you ever received public assistance or benefits?  For how long? 
Why? 
 
10. If you are a man who lived in the United States between ages 18 
and 25, did you register for the Selective Service?  (Note: if you did 
not know that you were required to register, make sure to tell the 




1. Do you own a house? A car? Other property? 
  
Criminal Record and Other Negatives 
 
1. Have you had any incident reports while in detention?  What for? 
 
2. What has been your most recent offense (the conviction that 
brought you to immigration’s attention and custody)? What 
happened? 
 
3. Do you have any other convictions? (List them all!  Let the judge 
know if you can’t remember all of them and why you have trouble 
remembering!) 
 
4. What happened in each of those incidents? 
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5. Do you have any other arrests?  What were those for?  What 
happened in each of those incidents? 
 
6. Make sure to explain your criminal record in a way that is honest 
and reflective: 
 
a. First, explain exactly what happened and focus on the facts. 
b. Second, explain what you did wrong in the situation. 
c. Third, explain what you would do differently if you were in 
that situation again. 
d. Fourth, explain you plan to do to make sure that you are 
never in that kind of situation again. 
e. Fifth, explain to the judge what you have learned from this 
process. 
f. Sixth, explain to the judge if you have changed, how you 
have changed, and why you have changed. 
 
Drug or Alcohol use: 
 
1. Do or did you have a drug or alcohol problem?  
 
2. What drugs have you tried?  How often do you use? 
 
3. When did you first begin to use or consume drugs or alcohol? 
 
4. Did you consume or use in front of your kids?  While pregnant? 
 
5. Do you drive while under the influence? 
 
6. When did you stop using?  Why did you stop? 
 
7. What do you plan to do if you are out and feel the urge to consume 
drugs or alcohol again? 
 
8. What is your plan to stay away from drugs or alcohol in the 
future? 
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9. Have you ever participated in a drug or alcohol program before?  
How far did you get in the program?  Name some steps in AA or 
NA. 
 
10. What’s different this time?  Why didn’t it work before? 
 
Assault, Battery, Domestic Violence, Restraining orders: 
 
1. What do you plan to do next time you get in an argument with 
your spouse or someone else? 
 
2. Who was the victim of your acts? Did you hit him or her?  
 
3. Have you hit or beat this victim or others before? How many 
times? 
 
4. Please describe in detail how you hit the victim (punched? pulled? 
slapped? open fist? any scars left? who was there? who called the 
police?) 
 
5. Do you believe you have problems with your spouse or with 
managing your anger?  
 
6. How have you solved these problems?  How? 
 
7. Is your victim here to testify on your behalf? Has he or she written 
a letter of support? Why not? Is he or she afraid of you?  
 
8. Is there a restraining order?  Have you violated it? 
 




1. What do you plan to do if you win your case and get out? 
 
2. How will you stay out of trouble? 
 
3. Where will you live?   
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4. Where do you plan to work?  What will you study? 
 
 
Appendix 3. Checklist of Documents 
 
We recommend that you try to obtain as many of the following types of 
documents as possible, BUT please do not become discouraged or feel 
that you have no chance if you do not have a lot of documents to submit 
or if you don’t have many family or friends.  There are many ways to 
explain why these people are missing, to supplement your application in 
other ways, and to win your case even with a packet of evidence that is 
small. 
 
                
Received 
Letters of support from as many family members as possible 
(including drawings from children) 
 
Letters of support from friends  
Letters from people who know me (neighbors, landlord, etc.)  
Letters showing community involvement (church, volunteering)  
Proof of financial support my family (rent receipt, child support)  
Letters from past employers  
Letters from religious organizations I belong to  
Photos of family (birthday parties, holidays, pets, babies, etc.)  
 
Certificates from Rehabilitation Programs   
Informational Pamphlets on rehabilitation programs in my area 




Letter to my probation/parole officer explaining that I am in 




Tax Records  
Pay Stubs  
Social Security Records  
Letter showing that I have a job when I get out of detention  
Proof of English Language Training, GED, college, etc.  
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Certificates and diplomas  
 
Copies of children’s school records, including letters from 
teachers about my children’s classroom performance.    
 
Copies of my medical records and my close relatives  
Copies of my children’s birth certificates  
A copy of my green card  
Copy of my marriage certificate  
Proof of any debt that I have (mortgage, car loans, medical, etc.)  
Proof of insurance (car, medical, etc.)  
Proof of Property that I own in the U.S.  
Articles about the situation in my country of origin (eg. poor 
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Appendix 4. Certificate of Service 
 
 
Use the following certificate if you will give the documents to the 
government attorney and the judge in court. 
 
I, ________________________(your name here), hereby certify that I hand-
delivered a copy of this document to a representative of ICE Litigation 






Use the following certificate if you will mail the documents to the 
ICE attorney and judge before the hearing. 
 
I, ________________________(your name here), hereby certify that I placed a 
copy of this document in the mail to ICE Litigation at 
_________________________________ 
(list address for the ICE office at the detention center where you are 
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Appendix 5. Sample Certificate of Translation 
 
 
I, ________________________(name of translator), certify that I am competent 
to translate this document from its original language into English and 
that the translation is true and accurate to the best of my abilities. 
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ADVICE TO APPLICANT
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY. FEES WILL NOT BE RETURNED.
I. Permanent Resident Aliens Eligible for Cancellation of Removal: You may be eligible to have your
removal cancelled under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). To qualify for this 
benefit, you must establish in a hearing before an Immigration Judge that:
A. You have been a permanent resident for at least five (5) years;
B. Prior to service of the Notice to Appear, or prior to committing a criminal or related offense referred
to in sections 212(a)(2) and 237(a)(2) of the INA, or prior to committing a security or related offense
referred to in section 237(a)(4) of the INA;
-- you have at least seven (7)years continuous residence in the United States after having been 
lawfully admitted in any status; and
C. You have not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
NOTE: If you have served on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States for at least 24 months, you do
not have to meet the requirements of continuous residence in the United States. You must, however, have
been in the United States when you entered the Armed Forces. If you are no longer in the Armed Forces,
you must have been separated under honorable conditions.
II. Permanent Resident Aliens NOT Eligible for Cancellation of Removal: You are not eligible to have
your removal cancelled under section 240A(a) of the INA if you:
A. Entered the United States as a crewman after June 30, 1964;
B. Were admitted to the United States as, or later became, a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in
section 101(a)(15)(J) of the INA in order to receive a graduate medical education or training,
regardless of whether you are subject to or have fulfilled the 2-year foreign residence
requirement of section 212(e) of the INA;
C. Were admitted to the United States as, or later became, a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in
section 101(a)(15)(J) of the INA, other than to receive graduate medical education or training, and
are subject to the 2-year foreign residence requirement of section 212(e) of the INA but have
neither fulfilled nor obtained a waiver of that requirement;
D. Are an alien who is either inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) of the INA or deportable under
section 237(a)(4) of the INA;
E. Are an alien who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an
individual because of the individual's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion; or
F. Are an alien who was previously granted relief under section 212(c) of the INA, or section 244(a) of
the INA as such sections were in effect prior to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, or whose removal has previously been cancelled under section
240A of the INA.
Form EOIR-42A      
Revised July 2015
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
OMB#ll25-0001
Application for Cancellation of Removal for
Certain Permanent Residents
III. How Permanent Resident Aliens Can Apply for Cancellation of Removal
If you believe that you have met all the requirements for cancellation of removal, you must answer all the
questions on the attached Form EOIR-42A fully and accurately.  You must pay the filing and biometrics fees
and comply with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) instructions for providing biometric and
biographic information to USCIS [available at http://uscis.gov]. You must also serve a copy of your application on
the Assistant Chief Counsel for the DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as required in the
proof of service on page 7 of this application, and you must file your application with the appropriate
Immigration Court. Please read the following instructions carefully before completing your application.
Form EOIR-42A 
Revised July 2015
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
OMB#ll25-0001
Application for Cancellation of Removal for
Certain Permanent Residents
INSTRUCTIONS
1. PREPARATION OF APPLICATION.
To apply for cancellation of removal as a permanent resident alien under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), you must fully and accurately answer all questions on the attached Form EOIR-42A. You must
also comply with all of the instructions on this form. These instructions have the force of law. A separate application
must be prepared and executed for each person applying for cancellation of removal. An application on behalf of an
alien who is mentally incompetent or is a child under 14 years of age shall be executed by a parent or guardian.
Your responses must be typed or printed legibly in ink. Do not leave any questions unanswered or blank. If any
questions do not apply to you, write "none" or "not applicable" in the appropriate space.
To the extent possible, answer all questions directly on the form. If there is insufficient room to respond fully to a
question, please continue your response on an additional sheet of paper. Please indicate the number of the question being
answered next to your response on the additional sheet, write your alien registration number, print your name, and sign,
date, and securely attach each additional sheet to the Form EOIR-42A.
2. BURDEN OF PROOF.
The burden of proof is on you to prove that you meet all of the statutory requirements for cancellation of removal for
certain permanent resident aliens under section 240A(a) of the INA and that you are entitled to such relief as a matter of
discretion. To meet this burden, your responses to the questions on the application should be as detailed and complete as
possible. You should also attach to your application any documents that demonstrate your eligibility for relief
(see "SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS" below).
3. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
You should submit with your application copies of any documents which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service, issued to you.  You should also submit all documents related to your 
criminal history, including all conviction records.  The Immigration Judge may require you to submit additional records
relating to your request for cancellation of removal. 
The original of all supporting documents must be available for inspection at the hearing. If you wish to have the original
documents returned to you, you should also present reproductions.
4. REQUIRED BIOMETRIC AND BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.
Each applicant 14 years of age or older must also comply with the requirement to supply biometric and biographic infor-
mation. You will be given instructions on how to complete this requirement. You will be notified in writing of the loca-
tion of the Application Support Center (ASC) or the designated Law Enforcement Agency where you must go to provide
biometric and biographic information. You will also be given a date and time for the appointment. It is important to fur-
nish all the required information. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in a delay in your appointment or in
your application being deemed abandoned and dismissed by the Immigration Court.
5. TRANSLATIONS.
Any document in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English language translation and a certificate signed by
the translator stating that he/she is competent to translate the document and that the translation is true and accurate to the
best of the translator's abilities. Such certification must be printed legibly or typed.
Form EOIR-42A      
Revised July 2015
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
OMB#ll25-0001
Application for Cancellation of Removal for
Certain Permanent Residents
6. FEES.
Before you file your Form EOIR-42A with the Immigration Court, you must pay the required $100 filing fee and the
biometrics fee to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Evidence of payment of these fees in the form of a copy
of the DHS, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) ASC notice of fee receipt and biometrics appointment
instructions must accompany your Form EOIR-42A. These fees will not be refunded, regardless of the action taken on
your application. Therefore, it is important that you read the advice, instructions, and application carefully before
responding. If you are unable to pay the filing fee, you may ask the Immigration Judge to permit you to file your
Form EOIR-42A without fee (fee waiver).
DO NOT SEND CASH. All fees must be submitted in the exact amount. Remittance may be made by personal check,
cashier's check, certified bank check, bank international money order, or foreign draft drawn on a financial institution in
the United States and payable to the "Department of Homeland Security'' in United States currency. If the applicant
resides in the Virgin Islands, the check or money order must be payable to the "Commissioner of Finance of the Virgin
Islands." If the applicant resides in Guam, the check or money order must be made payable to the "Treasurer, Guam."
Personal checks are accepted subject to collectibility. An uncollectible check will render the application and any docu-
ments issued pursuant thereto invalid. A charge of $30.00 will be imposed if a check in payment of a fee is not honored
by the bank on which it is drawn. When the check is drawn on an account of a person other than the applicant, the name
and alien registration number of the applicant must be entered on the face of the check. All checks must be drawn on a
bank located in the United States.
7. SERVING & FILING YOUR APPLICATION.
A. You must first comply with the DHS instructions for providing biometric and biographic information to 
USCIS, which involves sending a copy of the application to the appropriate USCIS Service Center. The 
DHS instructions also address payment of the application fees.
B. You must then serve the following documents on the Assistant Chief Counsel for DHS, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE):
- a copy of your Form EOIR-42A, Application for Cancellation of Removal, with all supporting docu-
ments and additional sheets; 
- a copy of the USCIS ASC notice of fee receipt and biometrics appointment instructions; and
- the original Biographical Information Form G-325A.
You must file the following documents with the appropriate Immigration Court:
- the original Form EOIR-42A with all supporting documents and additional sheets; 
- a copy of the USCIS ASC notice of fee receipt and biometrics appointment instructions;
- a copy of the Biographical Information Form G-325A; and
- a completed certificate showing service of these documents (See Part 10 of the Application on page 7)
on the ICE Assistant Chief Counsel, unless service is made on the record at the hearing.
Retain your USCIS ASC biometrics confirmation document or a copy of your Fingerprint Card, FD-258,
if applicable, as proof that your biometrics were taken, and bring it to your future Immigration Court hearings.
8. PENALTIES.
You must answer all questions on Form EOIR-42A truthfully and submit only genuine documents in support of your
application. You will be required to swear or affirm that the contents of your application and the supporting docu-
ments are true to the best of your knowledge. Your answer to the questions on this form and the supporting documents
you present will be used to determine whether your removal should be cancelled and whether you should be permitted to
retain your permanent resident status. Any answer you give and any supporting document you present may also be used as
evidence in any proceeding to determine your right to be admitted or readmitted, re-enter, pass through, or reside in the
United States. Your application may be denied if any of your answers or supporting documents are found to be false.
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Presenting false answers or false documents may also subject you to criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. section 1546
and/or subject you to civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. section 1324c if you submit your application knowing that the appli-
cation, or any supporting document, contains any false statement with respect to a material fact, or if you swear or affirm
that the contents of your application and the supporting documents are true, knowing that the application or any support-
ing documents contain any false statement with respect to a material fact. If convicted, you could be fined up to
$250,000, imprisoned for up to ten (10) years, or both. 18 U.S.C. sections 1546(a), 3559(a)(4), 3571(b)(3). If it is deter-
mined you have violated the prohibition against document fraud and a final order is entered against you, you could be
subject to a civil penalty up to $2,000 for each document used or created for the first offense, and up to $5,000 for any
second, or subsequent offense. In addition, if you are the subject of a final order for violating 8 U.S.C. section 1324c,
relating to civil penalties for document fraud, you will be removable from the United States.
9. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT NOTICE.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays 
a currently valid OMB control number. We try to create forms and instructions that are accurate, can easily be under-
stood, and which impose the least possible burden on you to provide us with information. Often, this process is difficult 
because some immigration laws are very complex. The reporting burden for this collection of information is computed 
as follows: (1) learning about the form, 50 minutes, (2) completing the form, 2 hours, and (3) assembling and filing the 
form, 3 hours, for an average of 5 hours, 50 minutes per application. If you have comments regarding the accuracy of 
this burden estimate, or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this bur-
den, you may write to the U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of the General 
Counsel, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600, Falls Church, Virginia 22041.
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PLEASE READ ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE FILLING IN FORM
PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT
Fee Stamp (Official Use Only)
PART 1 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELF
1) My present true name is: (Last, First, Middle)
3) My name given at birth was: (Last, First, Middle)
5) Date of Birth: (Month, Day, Year)
10) Current Nationality and Citizenship:
6) Gender:
❏ Male     ❏ Female
11) Social Security Number:
2) Alien Registration (or “A”) Number(s):
4) Birth Place: (City and Country)
7) Height: 8) Hair Color: 9) Eye Color:
12) Home Phone Number:
( )
13) Work Phone Number:
( )
14) I currently reside at:
Apt. number and/or in care of
Number and Street
City or Town State                                Zip Code
15) I have been known by these additional name(s):
16) I have resided in the following locations in the United States: (List PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST, and work back in time for at least 7 years.)





17) I, the undersigned, hereby request that my removal be cancelled under the provisions of section 240A(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). I believe that I am eligible for this relief because I have been a lawful permanent resident alien for 5 or more
years, have 7 years of continuous residence in the United States, and have not been convicted of an aggravated felony. I was




PART 2 - INFORMATION ABOUT THIS APPLICATION
Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(1)
33) If your spouse is other than a native born United States citizen, answer the following:
He/she arrived in the United States at: (Place or Port, City and State)                                                    .
He/she arrived in the United States on: (Month, Day, Year) .
His/her alien registration number(s) is: A# .
He/she was naturalized on: (Month, Day, Year) .
(City and State)
PART 3 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
18) My first arrival into the United States was under the name of: (Last, First, Middle) 19) My first arrival to the United States was on: (Month, Day, Year)
20) Place or port of first arrival: (Place or Port, City, and State)
21) I:  ❏ was inspected and admitted.
❏ I entered using my Lawful Permanent Resident card which is valid until  . 
❏ I entered using a visa which is valid until  . 
❏ was not inspected and admitted.
❏ I entered without documents. Explain: .
❏ I entered without inspection. Explain: .
❏ Other. Explain: .
22) I applied on for additional time to stay and it was  ❏ granted on
and valid until , or ❏ denied on .
23) Since the date of my first entry, I departed from and returned to the United States at the following places and on the following dates:
(Please list all departures regardless of how briefly you were absent from the United States.)
If you have never departed from the United States since your original date of entry, please mark an X in this box:  ❏
1
2
Port of Departure (Place or Port, City and State)
Port of Return (Place or Port, City and State)
Port of Departure (Place or Port, City and State)






Inspected and Admitted?  
❏ Yes   ❏ No
Destination
Departure Date (Month, Day, Year)
Return Date (Month, Day, Year)
Departure Date (Month, Day, Year)
Return Date (Month, Day, Year) Inspected and Admitted?
❏ Yes   ❏ No
24) Have you ever departed the United States: a) under an order of deportation, exclusion, or removal?......................................❏ Yes ❏ No
b) pursuant to a grant of voluntary departure?...................................................... ❏ Yes ❏ No
PART 4 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR MARITAL STATUS AND SPOUSE (Continued on page 3)
25) I am not married:
I am married: 
26) If married, the name of my spouse is: (Last, First, Middle) 27) My spouse’s name before marriage was:
28) The marriage took place in: (City and Country) 29) Date of marriage: (Month, Day, Year)
31) Place and date of birth of my spouse: (City & Country; Month, Day, Year)30) My spouse currently resides at:
Apt. number and/or in care of
Number and Street
City or Town State/Country      Zip Code
32) My spouse is a citizen of: (Country)
34) My spouse  ❏ - is  ❏ - is not employed.  If employed, please give salary and the name and address of the place(s) of employment.





Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(2)
(Month, Day, Year)
(Month, Day, Year)(Specify Type of Visa)
(Month, Day, Year)(Month, Day, Year)
(Month, Day, Year) (Month, Day, Year)
❏
❏
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PART 4 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR MARITAL STATUS AND SPOUSE (Continued)
35) I ❏ - have  ❏ - have not been previously married: (If previously married, list the name of each prior spouse, the dates on which each
marriage began and ended, the place where the marriage terminated, and describe how each marriage ended.)
36) Have you been ordered by any court, or are otherwise under any legal obligation, to provide child support and/or spousal maintenance as a
result of a separation and/or divorce?  ❏ - Yes    ❏ - No
37) Since my arrival into the United States, I have been employed by the following named persons or firms: (Please begin with present employment and
work back in time.  Any periods of unemployment or school attendance should be specified. Attach a separate sheet for additional entries if necessary.)
PART 5 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL STATUS
38) If self-employed, describe the nature of the business, the name of the business, its address, and net income derived therefrom:
39) My assets (and if married, my spouse’s assets) in the United States and other countries, not including clothing and household necessities, are:
Self Jointly Owned With Spouse
Cash, Stocks, and Bonds................................ $ Cash, Stocks, and Bonds................................ $
Real Estate...................................................... $ Real Estate...................................................... $
Auto (dollar value minus amount owed)....... $ Auto (dollar value minus amount owed)........ $
Other (describe on line below)....................... $ Other (describe on line below)....................... $
TOTAL $ TOTAL $
Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(3)




Description or manner of how marriage was 
terminated or ended:




Description or manner of how marriage was 
terminated or ended:












40) I  ❏ - have   ❏ - have not received public or private relief or assistance (e.g. Welfare, Unemployment Benefits, Medicaid, TANF, AFDC, etc.).
If you have, please give full details including the type of relief or assistance received, date for which relief or assistance was received, place, and
total amount received during this time:
41) Please list each of the years in which you have filed an income tax return with the Internal Revenue Service:
Form EOIR-42A      
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PART 6 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR FAMILY (Continued on page 5)
42) I have (Number of) children. Please list information for each child below, include assets and earnings information for 
children over the age of 16 who have separate incomes:
43) If your application is denied, would your spouse and all of your children accompany you to your:
Country of Birth - ❏ Yes   ❏ No
Country of Nationality - ❏ Yes ❏ No
Country of Last Residence - ❏ Yes  ❏ No
44) Members of my family, including my spouse and/or child(ren) ❏ - have ❏ - have not received public or private relief or assistance (e.g.,
Welfare, Unemployment Benefits, Medicaid, TANF, AFDC, etc.).  If any member of your immediate family has received such relief or assistance, please 
give full details including identity of person(s) receiving relief or assistance, dates for which relief or assistance was received, place, and
total amount received during this time:
Name of Child: (Last, First, Middle)
Child’s Alien Registration Number:
Citizen of What Country: 
Birth Date: (Month, Day, Year)
45) Please give the requested information about your parents, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and grandparents, living or deceased.  As to residence,
show street address, city, and state, if in the United States; otherwise show only country:
Now Residing At: (City and Country)
Birth Date: (City and Country)
A#:
Estimated Total of Assets: $ Estimated Average Weekly Earnings: $ 
A#:
Estimated Total of Assets: $ Estimated Average Weekly Earnings: $ 
A#:
Estimated Total of Assets: $ Estimated Average Weekly Earnings: $ 
Immigration Status
of Child
Name: (Last, First, Middle)
Alien Registration Number:
Citizen of What Country: 
Birth Date: (Month, Day, Year)
Relationship to Me:
Birth Date: (City  and Country)
A#:




Complete Address of Current Residence, if Living: 
Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(4)
If you answered “No” to any of the
responses, please explain:
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PART 7 - MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION (Continued on page 6)
Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(5)
50) Have you ever served in the Armed Forces of the United States? ❏ - Yes ❏ - No. If “Yes” please state branch (Army, Navy, etc.) and
service number:
Place of entry on duty: (City and State)
Date of entry on duty: (Month, Day, Year) Date of discharge: (Month, Day, Year)
Type of discharge: (Honorable, Dishonorable, etc.)
I served in active duty status from: (Month, Day, Year) to  (Month, Day, Year)                                                                        .
51) Have you ever left the United States or the jurisdiction of the district where you registered for the draft to avoid being drafted into the military
or naval forces of the United States?
❏ Yes ❏ No
46) I  ❏ - have   ❏ - have not entered the United States as a crewman after June 30, 1964.
47) I  ❏ - have   ❏ - have not been admitted as, or after arrival in the United States acquired the status of, an exchange alien.
49) I  ❏ - have      ❏ - have never (either in the United States or in any foreign country) been arrested, summoned into court as a defendant, convicted, fined,
imprisoned, placed on probation, or forfeited collateral for an act involving a felony, misdemeanor, or breach of any public law or ordinance (including, but
not limited to, traffic violations or driving incidents involving alcohol). (If answer is in the affirmative, please give a brief description of each offense 
including the name and location of the offense, date of conviction, any penalty imposed, any sentence imposed, and the time actually served. You are 
required to submit documentation of any such occurrences.) 
48) I ❏ - have   ❏ - have not submitted address reports as required by section 265 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
52) Have you ever deserted from the military or naval forces of the United States while the United States was at war? ❏ Yes ❏ No
53) If male, did you register under the Military Selective Service Act or any applicable previous Selective Service (Draft) Laws? ❏ Yes ❏ No
If “Yes,” please give date, Selective Service number, local draft board number, and your last draft classification:
54) Were you ever exempted from service because of conscientious objection, alienage, or any other reason? ❏ Yes ❏ No
55) Please list your present or past membership in or affiliation with every political organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club, society,
or similar group in the United States or any other place since your 16th birthday.  Include any foreign military service in this part. If none, write
“None.” Include the name of the organization, location, nature of the organization, and the dates of membership.
Name of Organization Location of Organization Nature of Organization Member From:(Month, Day, Year)
Member To:
(Month, Day, Year)
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PART 7 - MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION (Continued)
Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(6)
56) Have you ever:
❏ Yes ❏ No  been ordered deported, excluded, or removed?
❏ Yes ❏ No overstayed a grant of voluntary departure from an Immigration Judge or the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)?
❏ Yes ❏ No  failed to appear for deportation or removal?
57) Have you ever been:
❏ Yes  ❏ No a habitual drunkard?
❏ Yes  ❏ No one whose income is derived principally from illegal gambling?
❏ Yes ❏ No one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits?
❏ Yes ❏ No one who has engaged in prostitution or unlawful commercialized vice?
❏ Yes ❏ No involved in a serious criminal offense and asserted immunity from prosecution?
❏ Yes ❏ No a polygamist?
❏ Yes ❏ No one who brought in or attempted to bring in another to the United States illegally?
❏ Yes ❏ No a trafficker of a controlled substance, or a knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others in any such controlled 
substance offense (not including a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana)?
❏ Yes ❏ No inadmissible or deportable on security-related grounds under sections 212(a)(3) or 237(a)(4) of the INA?
❏ Yes ❏ No  one who has ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual on account of his
or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion?
❏ Yes ❏ No a person previously granted relief under sections 212(c) or 244(a) of the INA or whose removal has previously been
cancelled under section 240A of the INA?
If you answered “Yes” to any of the above questions, explain:
58) The following certificates or other supporting documents are attached hereto as a part of this application: (Refer to the Instructions for 
documents which should be attached.)
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PART 8 - SIGNATURE OF PERSON PREPARING FORM, IF OTHER THAN APPLICANT
Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(7)
(Read the following information and sign below)
I declare that I have prepared this application at the request of the person named in Part 1, that the responses provided are based
on all information of which I have knowledge, or which was provided to me by the applicant, and that the completed applica-
tion was read to the applicant in a language the applicant speaks fluently for verification before he or she signed the applica-
tion in my presence. I am aware that the knowing placement of false information on the Form EOIR-42A may subject me to
civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. 1324c.
APPLICATION NOT TO BE SIGNED BELOW UNTIL APPLICANT APPEARS BEFORE
AN IMMIGRATION JUDGE
I swear or affirm that I know the contents of this application that I am signing, including the attached documents and supplements, and that they
are all true to the best of my knowledge, taking into account the correction(s) numbered              to              , if any, that were made by me or at
my request.
(Signature of Applicant or Parent or Guardian)
Subscribed and sworn to before me by the above-named applicant at
Immigration Judge
Date: (Month, Day, Year)
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Form EOIR-42A was: ❏ - delivered in person ❏ - mailed first class, postage prepaid
on  to the Assistant Chief Counsel for the DHS (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement-ICE) 
at
(Number and Street, City, State, Zip Code)
Signature of Applicant (or Attorney or Representative)
Signature of Preparer: Print Name: Date:
Daytime Telephone #:
( )
Address of Preparer: (Number and Street, City, State, Zip Code)
PART 10 - PROOF OF SERVICE
PART 9 - SIGNATURE
Form EOIR-42A      
Revised July 2015
(Month, Day, Year)
U.S. Department of Justice 
Executive Office for Immigration Review 
Immigration Court 
OMB#1125-0006 
Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or 
Representative Before the Immigration Court 
(Type or Print) 
NAME AND ADDRESS OF REPRESENTED PARTY 
______________________________________________________ 
(First)   (Middle Initial)   (Last) 
______________________________________________________ 
(Number and Street)    (Apt. No.) 
______________________________________________________ 
(City)        (State)               (Zip Code) 
 
ALIEN (“A”) NUMBER 
(Provide A-number of the party 
represented in this case.) 
 
 
Entry of appearance for  
(please check one of the following): 
All proceedings 
Custody and bond proceedings only 
All proceedings other than custody 
and bond proceedings 
 
Attorney or Representative (please check one of the following): 
I am an attorney eligible to practice law in, and a member in good standing of, the bar of the highest court(s) of the following 
states(s), possession(s), territory(ies), commonwealth(s), or the District of Columbia (use additional space on reverse side if 
necessary) and I am not subject to any order disbarring, suspending, enjoining, restraining or otherwise restricting me in the 
practice of law in any jurisdiction (if subject to such an order, do not check this box and explain on reverse). 
Full Name of Court __________________________________ Bar Number (if applicable) __________________________ 
I am a representative accredited to appear before the Executive Office for Immigration Review as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 
1292.1(a)(4) with the following recognized organization: 
____________________________________________________________________
I am a law student or law graduate of an accredited U.S. law school as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(2). 
I am a reputable individual as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(3). 
I am an accredited foreign government official, as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1291.1(a)(5), from _____________________ (country). 
I am a person who was authorized to practice on December 23, 1952, under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(b). 
Attorney or Representative (please check one of the following): 
 
I hereby enter my appearance as attorney or representative for, and at the request of, the party named above. 
EOIR has ordered the provision of a Qualified Representative for the party named above and I appear in that capacity. 
I have read and understand the statements provided on the reverse side of this form that set forth the regulations and conditions 
governing appearances and representations before the Immigration Court. By signing this form, I consent to publication of my name 
and any findings of misconduct by EOIR, should I become subject to any public discipline by EOIR pursuant to the rules and 
procedures at 8 C.F.R. 1003.101 et seq. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
     SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OR REPRESENTATIVE  EOIR ID NUMBER  DATE 
 
X __________________________________________________________________________________________________
NAME OF ATTORNEY OR REPRESENTATIVE, ADDRESS, FAX & PHONE NUMBERS, & EMAIL ADDRESS 
Name: ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(First)    (Middle Initial)    (Last) 
Address: __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(Number and Street) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(City)     (State)    (Zip Code) 
Telephone: _________________ Facsimile: _________________ Email: ______________________________________________ 
Check here if new address 
Form EOIR - 28 
Rev. Dec. 2015 
Indicate Type of Appearance: 
       Primary Attorney/Representative                 Non-Primary Attorney/Representative 
       On behalf of ______________________________ (Attorney’s Name) for the following hearing: _________________ (Date) 
I am providing pro bono representation.  Check one:          yes          no 
Proof of Service 
I (Name) _____________________________ mailed or delivered a copy of this Form EOIR-28 on (Date) __________________ 
to the DHS (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE) at _________________________________________________ 
X ___________________________________________________________
Signature of Person Serving 
APPEARANCES - An attorney or Accredited Representative (with full accreditation) must register with the EOIR eRegistry in 
order to practice before the Immigration Court (see 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(f)).  Registration must be completed online on the EOIR 
website at www.justice.gov/eoir.  An appearance shall be filed on a Form EOIR-28 by the attorney or representative appearing in 
each case before an Immigration Judge (see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17).  A Form EOIR-28 shall be filed either as an electronic form, or as 
a paper form, as appropriate (for further information, please see the Immigration Court Practice Manual, which is available on the 
EOIR website at www.justice.gov/eoir). The attorney or representative must check the box indicating whether the entry of 
appearance is for custody and bond proceedings only, for all proceedings other than custody and bond, or for all proceedings 
including custody and bond. When an appearance is made by a person acting in a representative capacity, his/her personal 
appearance or signature constitutes a representation that, under the provisions of 8 C.F.R. part 1003, he/she is authorized and 
qualified to represent individuals and will comply with the EOIR Rules of Professional Conduct in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102.  Thereafter, 
substitution or withdrawal may be permitted upon the approval of the Immigration Judge of a request by the attorney or 
representative of record in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(b).  Please note that although separate appearances in custody and 
non-custody proceedings are permitted, appearances for limited purposes within those proceedings are not permitted. See Matter of 
Velasquez, 19 I&N Dec. 377, 384 (BIA 1986).  A separate appearance form (Form EOIR-27) must be filed with an appeal to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(g)). Attorneys and Accredited Representatives (with full accreditation) must 
first update their address in eRegistry before filing a Form EOIR-28 that reflects a new address. 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT - This form may not be used to request records under the Freedom of Information Act or 
the Privacy Act. The manner of requesting such records is in 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-16.11 and appendices. For further information about 
requesting records from EOIR under the Freedom of Information Act, see How to File a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
Request With the Executive Office for Immigration Review, available on EOIR's website at http://www.justice.gov/eoir. 
PRIVACY ACT NOTICE - The information requested on this form is authorized by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(a), 1362 and 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.17 in order to enter an appearance to represent a party before the Immigration Court. The information you provide is 
mandatory and required to enter an appearance. Failure to provide the requested information will result in an inability to represent a 
party or receive notice of actions in a proceeding. EOIR may share this information with others in accordance with approved routine 
uses described in EOIR's system of records notice, EOIR-001, Records and Management Information System, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,179 
(May 11, 2004), or its successors and EOIR-003, Practitioner Complaint-Disciplinary Files, 64 Fed. Reg. 49237 (September 1999).  
Furthermore, the submission of this form acknowledges that an attorney or representative will be subject to the disciplinary rules 
and procedures at 8 C.F.R. 1003.101et seq., including, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.3(h)(3), 1003.108(c), publication of the name of 
the attorney or representative and findings of misconduct should the attorney or representative be subject to any public discipline by 
EOIR. 
CASES BEFORE EOIR - Automated information about cases before EOIR is available by calling (800) 898-7180 or (240) 314-1500. 
FURTHER INFORMATION - For further information, please see the Immigration Court Practice Manual, which is available on 
the EOIR website at www.justice.gov/eoir.  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: 
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control 
number.  We try to create forms and instructions that are accurate, can be easily understood, and which impose the least possible burden on you 
to provide us with information.  The estimated average time to complete this form is six (6) minutes.  If you have comments regarding the 
accuracy of this estimate, or suggestions for making this form simpler, you can write to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of 
the General Counsel, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600, Falls Church, Virginia  22041. 
Form EOIR - 28 
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APPENDIX F – Sample Cover Page 




A. Tourney, Esquire DETAINED 
1234 Center Street 
Anytown, ST 99999 
 
Filing party.  If pro se, the alien should provide his or her own name 
and address in this location.  If a representative, the representative 
should provide his or her name and complete business address. 
Detention status.  If the alien is detained, 
the word “DETAINED” should appear 
prominently in the top right corner, 
preferably highlighted. 
 
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 






In the Matters of: ) 
) 
Court.  The Immigration Court location (city or 
town) and state should be provided. 
Jane Smith ) File Nos.: A 012 345 678 
John Smith ) A 012 345 679 
Jill Smith ) A 012 345 680 
) 
In removal proceedings ) 
                                                                              ) 
A numbers.  The alien registration number of every person 




Name and type of proceeding.  The full name of every person included in the submission should be listed. 
  
Immigration Judge Susan Jones Next Hearing: September 22, 2008 at 1:00 p.m. 
 
 
Name of the Immigration Judge and the date and time of the next hearing.  This information should 
always be listed. 
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APPENDIX L – Sample Written Pleading 
Sample Written Pleading 
Prior to entering a pleading, parties are expected to have reviewed the pertinent regulations, 




[name and address of attorney or representative] 
 
 
United States Department of Justice 
Executive Office for Immigration Review 
Immigration Court 
[the court’s location (city or town) and state] 
 
)
 In the Matter of: ) 
) File No.: [the respondent’s A number] 
[the respondent’s name] ) 
)
 In removal proceedings ) 
                                                                           ) 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S WRITTEN PLEADING 
 
 
On behalf of my client, I make the following representations: 
 
  
1. The respondent concedes proper service of the Notice to Appear, dated   . 
 
  
2. I have explained to the respondent (through an interpreter, if necessary): 
 
a. the rights set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a); 
b. the consequences of failing to appear in court as set forth in INA § 240(b)(5); 
c. the limitation on discretionary relief for failure to appear set forth in INA § 240(b)(7); 
d. the consequences of knowingly filing or making a frivolous application as set forth in 
INA § 208(d)(6); 
e. the requirement to notify the court within five days of any change of address or 
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3. The respondent concedes the following allegation(s)  
the following allegation(s) ______________________ _. 
, and denies 
 
4. The respondent concedes the following charge(s) of removability       , 
and denies the following charge(s) of removability        . 
 
5. In the event of removal, the respondent; 
 




□ declines to designate a country of removal. 
 
6. The respondent will be applying for the following forms of relief from removal: 
 
□  Termination of Proceedings 
□ Asylum 
□ Withholding of Removal (Restriction on Removal) 
□ Adjustment of Status 
□ Cancellation of Removal pursuant to INA §    
□ Waiver of Inadmissibility pursuant to INA §    
□ Voluntary Departure 
□ Other (specify)    
□ None 
 
7. If the relief from removal requires an application, the respondent will file the application (other than 
asylum), no later than fifteen (15) days before the date of the individual calendar hearing, unless 
otherwise directed by the court.  The respondent acknowledges that, if the application(s) are not 
timely filed, the application(s) will be deemed waived and abandoned under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c). 
 
If the respondent is filing a defensive asylum application, the asylum application will be filed in 
open court at the next master calendar hearing. 
 
8. If background and security investigations are required, the respondent has received the DHS 
biometrics instructions and will timely comply with the instructions.  I have explained the 
instructions to the respondent (through an interpreter, if necessary).  In addition, I have explained to 
the respondent (through an interpreter, if necessary), that, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d), failure to 
provide biometrics or other biographical information within the time allowed will constitute 
abandonment of the application unless the respondent demonstrates that such failure was the result 
of good cause. 
Immigration Court 
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9. The  respondent estimates that  hours will be required for the respondent to present the case. 
 







                                          language,                                            dialect;  
OR 
□ The respondent speaks English and does not require the services of an interpreter. 
 
   





RESPONDENT’S PLEADING DECLARATION 
 
I,   , have been advised of my rights in these proceedings by my attorney or 
representative.  I understand those rights. I waive a further explanation of those rights by this court. 
 
I have been advised by my attorney or representative of the consequences of failing to appear for a hearing.  I 
have also been advised by my attorney of the consequences of failing to appear for a scheduled date of 
departure or deportation.  I understand those consequences. 
 
I have been advised by my attorney or representative of the consequences of knowingly filing a frivolous 
asylum application.  I understand those consequences. 
 
I have been advised by my attorney or representative of the consequences of failing to follow the DHS 
biometrics instructions  within the time allowed.  I understand those consequences. 
 
I understand that if my mailing address changes I must notify the court within 5 days of such change by 
completing an Alien’s Change of Address Form (Form EOIR-33/IC) and filing it with this court. 
 
Finally, my attorney or representative has explained to me what this Written Pleading says.  I understand it, I 
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I,   , am competent to translate and interpret from 
(name of interpreter) 
 
   into English, and I certify that I have read this entire document to the 
(name of language) 
 
respondent in   , and that the respondent stated that he or she understood 
(name of language) 
 













I,                                                              , certify that                                                          , a telephonic 
(name of attorney or representative) (name of interpreter) 
 
interpreter who is competent to translate and interpret from   into English, read 
(name of language) 
 
this entire document to the respondent in   and that the respondent stated 
(name of language) 
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APPENDIX G – Sample Proof of Service 





By law, all submissions to the Immigration Court must be filed with a “Proof of Service” (or 
“Certificate of Service”). See Chapter 3.2 (Service on the Opposing Party). This Appendix provides 
guidelines on how to satisfy this requirement. 
 
What is required.  To satisfy the law, you must do both of the 
following: 
 
1. Serve the opposing party. Every time you file a submission with the Immigration Court, 
you must give, or “serve,” a copy on the opposing party.  If you are an alien in 
proceedings, the opposing party is the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
2.   Give the Immigration Court a completed Proof of Service.   You must submit a signed 
“Proof of Service” to the Immigration Court along with your document(s). The Proof of 
Service tells the Immigration Court that you have given a copy of the document(s) to the 
opposing party. 
 
Sample Proof of Service. You do not have to use the sample contained in this Appendix. You may 
write up your own Proof of Service if you like. However, if you use this sample, you will satisfy the 
Proof of Service requirement. 
 
Sending the Proof of Service.  When you have to supply a Proof of Service, be sure to staple or 
otherwise attach it to the document(s) that you are serving. 
 
Forms that contain a Proof of Service. Some forms, such as the Application for Cancellation of 
Removal for Certain Permanent Residents (Form EOIR-42A), contain a Certificate of Service, 
which functions as a Proof of Service for the form.  You must complete the Certificate of Service to 
satisfy the Proof of Service requirement for that form. Such a Certificate of Service only functions 
as a Proof of Service for the form on which it appears, not for any supporting documents that you 
file with the form.  If you are filing supporting documents with a form that contains a Certificate of 
Service, you must file a separate Proof of Service for those documents. 
 
Forms that do not contain a Proof of Service.  Forms that do not contain a Certificate of Service 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
 
 
On    , I,    ,  
(date) (printed name of person signing below) 
 
served a copy of this       
(name of document) 
 
and any attached pages to    
(name of party served) 
 
at the following address:    
(address of party served) 
 
 
            
(address of party served) 
 
by    . 











Family Name First Name File NumberCitizenship/NationalityMiddle Name Date of Birth    
(mm/dd/yyyy)
A
OMB No. 1615-0008; Expires 02/28/2015
Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
All Other Names Used (include names by previous marriages) U.S. Social Security No. (if any) City and Country of Birth




City and Country of Residence
Current Husband or Wife (If none, so state)                   
Family Name  (For wife, give maiden name)
Date of Birth 
(mm/dd/yyyy) 
First Name City and Country of Birth Date of Marriage 
(mm/dd/yyyy)
Place of Marriage
 Applicant's residence last five years.  List present address first.
Street Name and Number City Province or State Country From   Month            Year
 To 
Month       Year
Present Time
 Applicant's last address outside the United States of more than one year.
Street Name and Number City Province or State Country From   Month            Year
 To 
Month       Year
Full Name and Address of Employer Occupation (Specify) From   Month            Year
 To 
Month       Year
Present Time
 Applicant's employment last five years.  (If none, so state.) List present employment first.
If your native alphabet is in other than Roman letters, write your name in your native alphabet below:
Last occupation abroad if not shown above. (Include all information requested above.)
This form is submitted in connection with an application for:
Penalties: Severe penalties are provided by law for knowingly and willfully falsifying or concealing a material fact.
Applicant: Print your name and Alien Registration Number in the box outlined by heavy border below.
(Alien Registration Number)Complete This Box  (Family Name) (Middle Name)(Given Name)
DateSignature of Applicant
Naturalization Other (Specify):
Status as Permanent Resident
Form G-325 (Rev. 02/07/13) Y 
Former Husbands or Wives (If none, so state)    
Family Name (For wife, give maiden name)
Date of Birth 
(mm/dd/yyyy)
First Name City and Country of Birth
Female
Male
Date of Birth 
(mm/dd/yyyy)
A
Date of Termination of 
Marriage (mm/dd/yyyy)
Place of Termination 
of Marriage
Instructions
Complete this biographical information form and include it with the application or petition you are submitting to U.S.Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS).
If you have any questions on how to complete the form, call our National Customer Service Center at 1-800-375-5283.  For TDD 
(hearing impaired) call: 1-800-767-1833.
Form G-325 (Rev. 02/07/13) Y Page 2 
What Is the Purpose of This Form?
We ask for the information on this form, and associated evidence, to determine if you have established eligibility for the immigration 
benefit for which you are filing. Our legal right to ask for this information can be found in the Immigration and Nationality Act, as 
amended. We may provide this information to other government agencies. Failure to provide this information, and any requested 
evidence, may delay a final decision or result in denial of your immigration benefit.
Privacy Act Notice
Paperwork Reduction Act
An agency may not conduct or sponsor an information collection and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information 
unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated at 
15 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions and completing and submitting the form. Send comments 
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to: 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Regulatory Coordination Division, Office of Policy and Strategy, 20 Massachusetts 
Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20529-2140, OMB No. 1615-0008. Do not mail your completed Form G-325 to this address.







The	 following	manual	 provides	 guidelines	 for	writing	 citations	 in	 compliance	with	 the	
Board	 of	 Immigration	 Appeals	 within	 the	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review	
(EOIR).	An	attorney	should	note	that	the	Board	generally	 follows	A	Uniform	System	of	
Citation,	 also	 known	 as	 the	 Blue	 Book,	 but	 digresses	 from	 that	 convention	 in	 certain	
ways192.	The	Board	appreciates	but	does	not	require	citations	that	follow	the	examples	










192	United	 States	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 Executive	 Office	 for	 Immigration	 Review,	 Immigration	 Court	
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When filing papers with the Immigration Court, parties should keep in mind that accurate and 
complete legal citations strengthen the argument made in the submission. This Appendix provides 
guidelines for frequently cited sources of law. 
 
The Immigration Court generally follows A Uniform System of Citation (also known as the “Blue 
Book”), but diverges from that convention in certain instances. The Immigration Court appreciates 






IV. Legislative history 
V. Treaties and international materials 
VI. Publications and communications by governmental agencies, 
and 
VII. Commonly cited commercial publications 
 
Note that, for the convenience of filing parties, some of the citation formats in this Appendix are 
less formal than those used in the published cases of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Once a 
source has been cited in full, the objective is brevity without compromising clarity. 
 
This Appendix concerns the citation of legal authority.  For guidance on citing to the record and 
other sources, see Chapter 3.3(e) (Source materials) and Chapter 4.18(d) (Citation). 
 
As a practice, the Immigration Court prefers italics in case names and publication titles, but 
underlining is an acceptable alternative. 
 









* This appendix is substantially based on Appendix J (Citation Guidelines) in the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Practice Manual.  The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge wishes to acknowledge the efforts of all those involved 
in the preparation of that appendix. 
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General guidance: Abbreviations in case names.   As a general rule, well-known agency 
abbreviations (e.g., DHS, INS, FBI, Dep’t of Justice) may be used in a case 
name, but without periods. If an agency name includes reference to the “United 
States,” it is acceptable to abbreviate it to “U.S.”  However, when the “United 
States” is named as a party in the case, do not abbreviate “United States.”  For 
example: 
 
DHS v. Smith ..... not D.H.S. v. Smith 
 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Smith ..... not United States Department of 
Justice v. Smith 
 
United States v. Smith ..... not U.S. v. Smith 
 
Short form of case names.  After a case has been cited in full, a shortened 
form of the name may be used thereafter.  For example: 
 
full: INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984) 
 
short: Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 185 
 
full: Matter of Nolasco, 22 I&N Dec. 632 (BIA 1999) 
 
short: Nolasco, 22 I&N Dec. at 635 
 
Citations to a specific point. Citations to a specific point should include the 
precise page number(s) on which the point appears.  For example: 
 
Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99, 100 (BIA 2001) 
 
Citations to a dissent or concurrence. If citing to a dissent or concurrence, this 
should be indicated in a parenthetical notation.  For example: 
 
Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99, 109-110 (BIA 2001) (dissent) 
 
 
Board decisions: Published decisions.  Precedent decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“Board”) are binding on the Immigration Court, unless modified or overruled by 
the Attorney General or a federal court.  All precedent Board decisions are 
available on the Executive Office for Immigration Review website 
at www.justice.gov/eoir.  Precedent decisions should be cited in the “I&N Dec.” 
form illustrated below.  The citation must identify the adjudicator (BIA, A.G., 
etc.) and the year of the decision.  Note that there are no spaces in “I&N” and 
that only “Dec.” has a period.  
PART 1 XI. APPENDIX-
Page 179 of 327
Immigration Court 
Practice Manual Appendix J 
updates: www.justice.gov/eoir J-3 Version released on 






Matter of Balsillie, 20 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992) 
 
Unpublished decisions. Citation to unpublished decisions is discouraged 
because these decisions are not binding on the Immigration Court in other 
cases.  When reference to an unpublished case is necessary, a copy of the 
decision should be provided, and the citation should include the alien’s full 
name, the alien registration number, the adjudicator, and the precise date of 
the decision.  Italics, underlining, and “Matter of” should not be used.  For 
example: 
 
Jane Smith, A 012 345 678 (BIA July 1, 1999) 
 
“Interim Decision.”  In the past, the Board issued precedent decisions in slip 
opinion or “Interim Decision” form.  Because all published cases are now 
available in final form (as “I&N Decisions”), citations to “Interim Decisions” are 
no longer appropriate and are disfavored. 
 
“Matter of,” not “In re.” All precedent decisions should be cited as “Matter of.” 
The use of “In re” is disfavored. For example: Matter of Yanez, not In re Yanez. 
 
For a detailed description of the Board’s publication process, see Board 
Practice Manual, which is available on the Executive Office for Immigration 




IJ decisions:           If referring to an earlier decision in the case by the Immigration Judge, the 
decision should be cited.  This applies whether the decision was issued orally 
or in writing.  Citations to decisions of Immigration Judges should state the 
nature of the proceedings, the page number, and the date. For example: 
 
IJ Bond Proceedings Decision at 5 (Dec. 12, 2008) 
 
 
AG decisions: Precedent decisions by the Attorney General are binding on the Immigration 
Court, and should be cited in accordance with the rules for precedent decisions 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals. All precedent decisions by the Attorney 
General are available on the Executive Office for Immigration Review website 
at www.justice.gov/eoir. 
 
Matter of Y-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (AG 2002) 
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DHS decisions: Precedent decisions by the Department of Homeland Security and the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service should be cited in accordance with the 
rules for precedent decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
 
 
Federal & state Genera l l y.   F ederal and s t ate court decisions should generally be cited  
courts:  according to the standard legal convention, as set out in the latest edition of  
 A Uniform System of Citation (also known as the “Blue Book”). For example: 
 
INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984) 
 
Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001) 
 
McDaniel v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2001) 
 
U.S. Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court Reporter citation (“S.Ct.”) should be 
used only when the case has not yet been published in the United States 
Reports (“U.S.”). 
 
Unpublished cases. Citation to unpublished state and federal court cases is 
discouraged.  When citation to an unpublished decision is necessary, a copy of 
the decision should be provided, and the citation should include the docket 
number, court, and precise date. Parties are also encouraged to provide the 
LexisNexis or Westlaw number.  For example: 
 
Bratco v. Mukasey, No. 04-726367, 2007 WL 4201263 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 
2007) (unpublished) 
 
Precedent cases not yet published.  When citing to recent precedent cases that 
have not yet been published in the Federal Reporter or other print format, 
parties should provide the docket number, court, and year. Parties are also 
encouraged to provide the LexisNexis or Westlaw number.  For example: 
 
Grullon v. Mukasey, __ F.3d __, No. 05-4622, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27325 (2d 
Cir. 2007) 
 
Briefs & exhibits: Text from briefs. If referring to text from a brief, the brief should be cited.  The 
citation should state the filing party’s identity, the nature of proceedings, the 
page number, and the date.  For example: 
 
Respondent’s Bond Appeal Brief at 5 (Dec. 12, 2008) 
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Exhibits.  Exhibits designated during a hearing should be cited as they were 




Exhibits accompanying a brief should be cited by alphabetic tab or page 
number. For example: 
 
Respondent’s Pre-Hearing Brief, Tab A 
 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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II.  Regulations 
 
 
General guidance: Regulations generally.  There are two kinds of postings in the Federal Register: 
those that are simply informative in nature (such as “notices” of public 
meetings) and those that are regulatory in nature (referred to as “rules”). There 
are different types of “rules,” including “proposed,” “interim,” and “final.” The 
type of rule will determine whether or not (and for how long) the regulatory 
language contained in that rule will be in effect.  Generally speaking, proposed 
rules are not law and do not have any effect on any case, while interim and 
final rules do have the force of law and, depending on timing, may affect a 
given case. 
 
Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations.  Regulations appear first in 
the Federal Register (Fed. Reg.) and then in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(C.F.R.). Once regulations appear in a volume of the C.F.R., do not cite to the 
Federal Register unless there is a specific reason to do so (discussed below). 
 
 
C.F.R.: For the Code of Federal Regulations, always identify the volume, the section 
number, and the year. The year need not be given after the first citation, unless 
a subsequent citation refers to a regulation published in a different year. 
Always use periods in the abbreviation “C.F.R.”  For example: 
 
full: 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2002) 
 
short: 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 
 
 
Fed. Reg.: Citations to regulatory material in the Federal Register should be used only 
when: 
 
o the citation is to information that will never appear in the C.F.R., 
such as a public notice or announcement 
 
o the rule contains regulatory language that will be, but is not yet, 
in the C.F.R. 
 
o the citation is to information associated with the rule, but which 
will not appear in the C.F.R. (e.g., a preamble or introduction to 
a rule) 
 
o the rule contains proposed or past language of a regulation that 
is pertinent in some way to the filing or argument 
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The first citation to the Federal Register should always include (i) the volume, 
(ii) the abbreviated form “Fed. Reg.”, (iii) the page number, (iv) the date, and 
(v) important identifying information such as “proposed rule,” “interim rule,” 
“supplementary information,” or the citation where the rule will appear. For 
example: 
 
full: 67 Fed. Reg. 52627 (Aug. 13, 2002) (proposed rule) 
 
full: 67 Fed. Reg. 38341 (June 4, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 100, 103, 236, 245a, 274a, and 299) 
 
short: 67 Fed. Reg. at 52627-28; 67 Fed. Reg. at 38343 
 
Since the Federal Register does not use commas in its page numbers, do not 
use a comma in page numbers.  Use abbreviations for the month. 
 
When citing the preamble to a rule, identify it exactly as it is titled in the Federal 
Register, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 54878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (supplementary 
information). 
 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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General guidance:   Full citations.  Whenever citing a statute for the first time, be certain to include 
all the pertinent information, including the name of the statute, its public law 
number, statutory cite, and a parenthetical identifying where the statute was 
codified (if applicable).  The only exception is the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, which is illustrated below. 
 
Short citations.  The use of short citations is encouraged, but only after the full 
citation has been used. 
 
Special rule for U.S.C. and C.F.R. There are two abbreviations that never need 
to be spelled out: “U.S.C.” for the U.S. Code and the “C.F.R.” for the Code of 
Federal Regulations.  Always use periods with these abbreviations. 
 
Special rule for the INA.  Given the regularity with which the Immigration and 
Nationality Act is cited before the Immigration Court, there is generally no need 
to provide the Public Law Number, the Stat. citation, or U.S.C. citation. The 
Immigration Court will presume INA citations refer to the current language of 
the Act unless the year is provided. 
 
State statutes.  State statutes should be cited as provided in A Uniform 
System of Citation (also known as the “Blue Book”). 
 
Sections of law.  Full citations are often lengthy, and filing parties are 
sometimes uncertain where to put the section number in the citation. For the 
sake of simplicity, use the word “section” and give the section number in front 
of the full citation to the statute.  Once a full citation has been given, use the 
short citation form with a section symbol “§.” This practice applies whether the 
citation is used in a sentence or after it. For example: 
 
The definition of the term “alien” in section 101(a)(3) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act applies to persons who are not citizens or nationals of 
the United States. The term “national of the United States” is expressly 
defined in INA § 101(a)(22), but the term “citizen” is more complex. See 
INA §§ 301-309, 316, 320. 
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USC: Citations to the United States Code, always identify the volume, the section 
number, and the year.  The year need not be given after the first citation, 
unless a subsequent citation refers to a section published in a different year.  
Always use periods in the abbreviation “U.S.C.”  For example: 
 
 full: 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006) 
 
 short: 18 U.S.C. § 16 
 
 
INA: full: section xxx of Immigration and Nationality Act 
 
 short: INA § xxx 
 
 
USA PATRIOT: full: section xxx of Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
 
 short:   USA PATRIOT Act § xxx 
 
 
LIFE: full: section xxx of Legal Immigration and Family Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 
(2000) 
 
 short: LIFE Act § xxx 
 
 
CCA: full: section xxx of Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 
1631 
 
 short: CCA § xxx 
 
 
NACARA: full:   section xxx of Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 111 Stat. 2193 (1997), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 
111 Stat. 2644 (1997) 
 
 short: NACARA § xxx 
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IIRIRA: full:   section xxx of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546  
 
 short: IIRIRA § xxx 
 
 
AEDPA: full:   section xxx of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214  
 
 short: AEDPA § xxx 
 
 
INTCA: full:   section xxx of Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305, amended by Pub. L. No. 105-38, 11 
Stat. 1115 (1997)  
 
 short: INTCA § xxx 
 
 
MTINA: full: section xxx of Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and 
Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733  
 
 short: MTINA § xxx 
 
 
IMMACT90: full: section xxx of Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978  
 
 short: IMMACT90 § xxx 
 
 
ADAA: full: section xxx of Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 
4181  
 
 short: ADAA § xxx 
 
 
IMFA: full: section xxx of Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537  
 
 short: IMFA § xxx 
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IRCA: full: section xxx of Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-603, 100 Stat. 3359  
 
 short: IRCA § xxx 
 
IRFA: full: section xxx of International Religious Freedom Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 
 
 short: IRFA § xxx 
 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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General guidance: Difficult to locate. Because sources of legislative history are often difficult to 
locate, err on the side of providing more information, rather than less. If a 
source is difficult to locate, include a copy of the source with your filing (or an 
Internet address for it) and make clear reference to that source in your filing. 
 
Sources. To locate legislative history, try the Library of Congress website 
(www.thomas.loc.gov) or commercial services.   Citation to common electronic 
sources is encouraged. 
 
 
Bills: Provide the following information the first time a bill is cited:  (i) the bill number, 
(ii) the number of the Congress, (iii) the session of that Congress, (iv) the 
section number of the bill, if you are referring to a specific section, (v) the 
Congressional Record volume, (vi) the Congressional Record page or pages, 
(vii) the date of that Congressional Record, and (viii) the edition of the 
Congressional Record, if known. For example: 
 
full: S. 2104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102, 134 Cong. Rec. 2216 (daily ed. 
Mar. 15, 1988) 
 
short: 134 Cong. Rec. at 2218 
 
 
Reports: Provide  the  following  information  the  first  time  a  report  is  cited: (i) 
whether it is a Senate or House report, (ii) the report number, (iii) the year, and 
(iv) where it is reprinted (a reference to where the document is available 
electronically is acceptable). The short form may refer either to the page 
numbers of the report or the page numbers where the report is reprinted.  For 
example: 
 
full: H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996), available in 1996 WL 563320 
 
short: H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 5 
 
full: S. Rep. No. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 
 
short: 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3183 
 
Many committee reports are available on-line through the Library of Congress 
web site (www.thomas.loc.gov) or commercial services. Copies of the U.S. 
Code Congressional & Administrative News (U.S.C.C.A.N.), which compiles 
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Hearings: Provide the following information the first time a hearing is cited: (i) name of the 
hearing, (ii) the committee or subcommittee that held it, (iii) the number of the 
Congress, (iv) the session of that Congress, (v) the page or pages of the 
hearing, (vi) the date or year of the hearing, and (vii) information about what is 
being cited (such as the identity of the person testifying and context for the 
testimony).  For example: 
 
Operations of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR): 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (2002) (testimony of EOIR 
Director) 
 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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V.  Treaties and International Materials 
 
 
CAT: full:      Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) 
 
short: Convention Against Torture, art. 3 
 
 
 UNHCR Handbook: full:    Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Geneva 1992) 
 
short: UNHCR Handbook ¶ xxx 
  [use paragraph symbol “¶” or abbreviation “para.”] 
 
 
U.N. Protocol full:     Article xxx of the United Natio n s Protocol Relating to the Status 
on Refugees:    of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223  
 
short: U.N. Refugee Protocol, art. xxx 
   
 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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General guidance: No universal citation form.  In immigration proceedings, parties cite to a wide 
variety of administrative agency publications and communications, and there is 
no one format that fits all such documents. For that reason, use common sense 
when citing agency documents, and err on the side of more information, rather 
than less. 
 
Difficult to locate material.  If the document may be difficult for the Immigration 
Court to locate, include a copy of the document with your filing. 
 
Internet material.  If a document is posted on the Internet, identify the website 
where the document can be found or include a copy of the document with a 
legible Internet address. 
 
 
Practice Manual: The Immigration Court Practice Manual is not legal authority.  However, if there 
is reason to cite it, the preferred form is to identify the specific provision by 
chapter and section along with the date at the bottom of the page on which the 
cited section appears.  For example: 
 
full: Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chapter 8.5(a)(iii) (January 
xx, xxxx) 
 
short: Practice Manual, Chap. 8.5(a)(iii) 
 
 
Forms: Forms should first be cited according to their full name and number.  A short 
citation form may be used thereafter.  See Appendix E (Forms) for a list of 
common immigration forms.  For example: 
 
full: Notice of Appeal from a Decision of an Immigration Judge (Form 
EOIR-26) 
 
short:   Notice of Appeal or Form EOIR-26 
 




Country reports: State Department country reports appear both as compilations in 
Congressional committee prints and as separate reports and profiles. Citations 
to country reports should always contain the publication date and the specific 
page numbers (if available). Provide an Internet address when available. The 
first citation to any country report should contain all identifying 
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information, and a short citation form may be used thereafter. For example: 
 
full: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Nigeria Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001  
(Mar. 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ 
hrrpt/2001/af/8397.htm 
 
short: 2001 Nigeria Country Reports 
 
full: Committees   on   Foreign   Relations   and   International 
Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1994 xxx (Joint Comm Print 1995) 
 
short: 1994 Country Reports at page xxx 
 
full: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, The Philippines – Profile of Asylum Claims and Country 
Conditions xxx (June 1995) 
 
short: 1995 Philippines Profile at page xxx 
 
 
Visa Bulletin: Citations to the State Department’s Visa Bulletin should include the volume, 
number, month, and year of the specific issue being cited.  For example: 
 
full:          U.S. Dep’t of State Visa Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 55 (March 2003) 
 
short:      Visa Bulletin (March 2003) 
 
 
Internal A citation to an internal government document, such as a memo or 
documents: cable, should contain as much identifying information as possible.  Be sure 
to include any identifying heading (e.g., the “re” line in a memo) and the 
precise date of the document being cited.  Include a copy of the document with 
the filing or indicate where it has been reprinted publicly. For example: 
 
Dep’t  of  State  cable  (no.  97-State-174342) (Sept.  17,  1997)  (copy 
attached) 
 
Office of the General Counsel, INS, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Compliance with 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture in cases of removable aliens 
(May 14, 1997), reprinted in 75 Interpreter Releases 375 (Mar. 16, 1998) 
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Religious Freedom The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) mandates that the 
Reports: Department of State issue an Annual Report on International Religious 
Freedom (State Department Report).  IRFA further authorizes Immigration 
Judges to use the State Department Report as a resource    in asylum 
adjudications.  The State Department Report should be cited as follows: 
 
  full: Bureau of  Democracy, Human Rights, and  Labor, U.S. Dep’t of 
    State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (Sept. 2007) 
 
 short: 2007 Religious Freedom Report at page xxx 
 
IRFA also mandates the issuance of an Annual Report by the United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF Report). The 
USCIRF is a government body that is independent of the executive branch.  
Citations to the USCIRF Report should be distinguishable from citations to the 
Department of State report: 
 
 full: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
  Annual Report of the United States Commission on International 
  Religious Freedom, xxx (May 2007) 
 
short: 2007 USCIRF Annual Report at page xxx 
 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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VII.  Commonly Cited Commercial Publications 
 
 
General guidance: No universal citation form.  In immigration proceedings, parties cite to a 
wide variety of commercial texts and publications.  Use common sense when 
citing these documents. If a document is difficult to locate, include a copy of the 
document with your filing (or an Internet address for it) and make clear 
reference to that document in your filing. 
 
No endorsements or disparagements. The following list contains citations to 
specific publications that are frequently cited in filings before the Immigration 
Court. Their inclusion in the list is not an endorsement of the publication, nor is 
omission from this list a disparagement of any other publication. 
 
Use of quotation marks, italics or underlining, and first initials.  For all filings, 
parties should use a single format for all publications – quotation marks around 
any article title (whether in a book, law review, or periodical), italics or 
underlining for the name of any publication (whether a book, treatise, or 
periodical), and reference to authors’ last names only (although use of first 
initials is appropriate where there are multiple authors with the same last 
name). 
 
Shortened names. Many publications have long titles. It is acceptable to use a 
shortened form of the title after the full title has been used.  Be certain to use a 
short form that clearly refers back to the full citation. Page and/or section 
numbers should always be used, whether the publication is cited in full or in 
shortened form. 
 
Articles in Books: Articles in books should identify the author (by last name only), title of the 
article, and the publication that contains that article (including the editor and 
year).  For example: 
 
full: Massimino, "Relief from Deportation Under Article 3 of the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture,” in  2  1997-98 
Immigration   &   Nationality   Law   Handbook   467   (American 
Immigration Lawyers Association, ed., 1997) 
 
short: Massimino at 469 
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Bender’s: Bender’s Immigration Bulletin should be cited by author (last name only), 
article, volume, publication, month, and year.  For example: 
 
full: Sullivan, “When Representations Cross the Line,” 1 Bender’s 
Immigration Bulletin (Oct. 1996) 
 
short: Sullivan at 3 
 
 
Immigration This publication should be cited by author (last name only), article, 
 Briefings: volume, publication, month, and year.  For example: 
 
 
full: Elliot,  ”Relief  From  Deportation:  Part  I,”  88-8  Immigration 
Briefings (Aug. 1988) 
 
short: Elliot at 18 
 
 
Immigration Law Citations to treatises require particular attention because their pagination is 
and Procedure: often complex.  The first citation to this treatise must be in full and contain the  
 volume  number,  the  section  number,  the  page number, the edition, and 
year.  For example: 
 
 
full: 2   Gordon,  Mailman  &   Yale-Loehr,  Immigration  Law   and 
Procedure § 51.01(1)(a), at 51-3 (rev. ed. 1997) 
 
short: 2 Immigration Law and Procedure § 51.01(1)(a), at 51-3 
 
 
  Interpreter Citations should state the  volume,  t it l e,  page  num ber(s),  and precise  




full: 75 Interpreter Releases 275-76 (Feb. 23, 1998) (regarding INS 
guidelines on when to consent to reopening of proceedings) 
 
short: 75 Interpreter Releases at 276 
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If an article has a title and named author, provide that information.  For 
example: 
 
full: Wettstein, “Lawful Domicile for Purposes of INA § 212(c): Can 
It Begin with Temporary Residence,” in 71 Interpreter Releases 
1273 (Sept. 26, 1994) 
 




Law Reviews: Law review articles should identify the author (by last name) and the title of 
the article, followed by the volume, name, page number(s), and year of the 
publication.  For example: 
 
full: Hurwitz, “Motions Practice Before the Board of Immigration 
Appeals,” 20 San Diego L. Rev. 79 (1982) 
 
short: Hurwitz, 20 San Diego L. Rev. at 80 
 
 
Sutherland: Citations to this treatise should include the volume number, author, name of 
the publication, section number, page number(s), and edition. For example: 
 
full: 2A  Singer,  Sutherland Statutory Construction §  47.11,  at  144 
(4th ed. 1984) 
 
short: 2A Sutherland § 47.11, at 144 
 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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• Convention	 Against	 Torture	 and	 Other	 Cruel,	 Inhuman	 or	 Degrading	
Treatment	 or	 Punishment,	 Dec.	 10,	 1984,	 1465	 U.N.T.S.	 85.	 The	 CAT	 was	
incorporated	 into	 United	 States	 law	 by	 the	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Reform	 and	
Reconstructuring	 Act	 of	 1998	(FARRA),	Pub.	L. No.	105-277	(1987).	
• Illegal	 Immigration	 Reform	 and	 Immigrant	 Responsibility	 Act	 (IIRIRA),	 Pub.	 L. 
No.	104-208,	 div.	 C;	 110	Stat.	 3009,	 3009-46	 to	 724	 (1996);	 H.R.	 Rep.	 104-863	
(1996).	 104th	Cong.	2d	 Sess,;	H.R.	 Conf.	Rep.	No.	 104-828,	 104th	Cong.	2d	 See.	
(1996);	 S.	 Rep.	 104-	 249,	 104th	 Cong.	 2d	 Sess.	 (1996);	 142	 Cong.	 Rec.	 S4730-
01,	 §150	 (1996);	142	Cong.	Rec.	H2378-05,	 §	309	(1996).	
• REAL	 ID	Act	of	2005-	 Emergency	 Supplemental	 Appropriations	 for	Defense,	 the	
Global	War	 on	 Terror,	 and	 Tsunami	 Relief,	 2005,	 PL	 109-13,	 div.	 B,	 119	 Stat.	






































































































































































Bond	 Eligibility	 in	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 (May	 12,	 2015),	
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/DiopAdvisory.pdf.		
• Barbara	 Hines,	 Suggested	 Documentation	 and/or	 Testimony	 for	 Cancellation	 of	
Removal	and	section	212(c)	relief.	
• Center	for	Immigrants’	Rights	and	the	American	Bar	Association,	To	File	or	Not	to	File	a	
Notice	 to	 Appear:	 Improving	 the	Government’s	 Use	 of	 Prosecutorial	 Discretion	 (last	
visited	May	12,	2016).	
• Erica	 Steinmiller-Perdomo,	 Consequences	 Too	 Harsh	 For	 Noncitizens	 Convicted	 of	
Aggravated	Felonies?,	41	Fla.	St.	U.	L.	Rev.	1173,	1173	(2014).	
• Immigration	 Defense	 Project,	 Practice	 Advisory:	 Descamps	 v.	 United	 States	 and	 the	
Modified	 Categorical	 Approach	 (July	 17,	 2013),	
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Descamps-
advisory-7-17-FINAL.pdf.		
• Immigration	 Defense	 Project,	 Practice	 Advisory:	 Matter	 of	 Chairez-Castrejon:	 BIA	
Applies	 Moncrieffe	 and	 Descamps	 to	 Modify	 and	 Clarify	 its	 Views	 on	 Proper	
Application	 of	 the	 Categorical	 Approach	 (July	 31,	 2014)	
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/
crim/2014_13Jul_chairez-castrejon.pdf.	










Overcome	 The	 Aggravated	 Felony	 Bar	 To	 Cancellation	 Of	 Removal”,	 available	 at	
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/
crim/2007	_22Mar_proof-burden-agfel.pdf	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
• New	 Jersey	 State	 Police,	 NJ	 Criminal	 History	 Records	 Information,	
http://www.njsp.org/criminal-history-records/	(last	visited	May	12,	2016).	
• Shoba	Sivaprasad	Wadhia,	The	History	of	Prosecutorial	Discretion	In	Immigration	Law	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605164	 (last	 visited	 May	 12,	
2016).	
• State	 of	 Delaware,	 State	 Bureau	 of	 Identification,	
http://dsp.delaware.gov/state_bureau_of_identification.shtml	 (last	 visited	 May	 12,	
2016).		
• The	Florence	Immigrant	and	Refugee	Rights	Project,	available	at	http://www.firrp.org	
(choose	 "Resources"	 and	 follow	 "How	 to	 Defend	 Your	 Case”	 hyperlink,	 scroll	 to	
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